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ADJUDICATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN AFRICA
John Mukum Mbaku*
ABSTRACT
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been
significant progress in the recognition and protection of human rights around the world. The
international community has, since 1948, adopted several treaties, which impose obligations on
States Parties to make certain that the human and fundamental rights of their citizens are
recognized and fully protected. Although human rights are considered the domain of international
law, international legal scholars have argued that national governments—that is, the governments
of States Parties—must function as the mechanisms for enforcing international human rights law.
However, in order for national governments to enforce international human rights law, each
country that ratifies an international human rights treaty must incorporate the treaty into its
national constitution and hence, create rights that are justiciable in domestic courts. Thus, an
African country can, through its constitution, cast away any doubts regarding whether
international law, including customary international law, is law within its jurisdiction. This
article notes that in African countries whose constitutions do not expressly define a law of reception
for international law, it is still possible for domestic courts to employ international law and
comparative case law in the interpretation and adjudication of cases involving human rights. After
examining cases from several African countries to determine the extent to which domestic courts
have utilized international law and comparative law sources in their decisions generally and
interpretation of national constitutions in particular, the article then examines two cases from the
Constitutional Court of South Africa involving socio-economic rights. It is determined that, even
where African States have not yet domesticated international human rights instruments and
created rights that are justiciable in domestic courts, progressive judiciaries can still enhance the
recognition and protection of human rights by using international law as an interpretive tool in
their legal adjudications. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal must remain the domestication of
international human rights instruments to create rights that are justiciable in domestic courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars, policymakers, as well as, human rights activists,
consider the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and the
subsequent adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”) on December 10, 1948, by the UN General Assembly 1 as
“the beginning of the modern struggle to [recognize and] protect
human rights.”2 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the origins of
human rights can be traced back “to early philosophical and religious
ideas as well as legal theories of the ‘natural law’—a law higher than
the ‘positive law’ of states (such as legislation).’” 3 These theories posit
that “positive laws must either be derived from or reflect ‘natural law’
because individuals have certain immutable rights as human beings.” 4
Since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the global
community “has codified a series of fundamental precepts that are
intended to prevent such grave abuses as arbitrary killing, torture,
discrimination, starvation, and forced eviction.”5 In addition,
“[s]tandards have also been developed for positive rights such that
governments can provide the means of assuring, for example, fair
trials, education, and health care.”6 During this period, international
*John Mukum Mbaku is an Attorney and Counselor at Law (licensed in the State of
Utah) and Brady Presidential Distinguished Professor of Economics & John S.
Hinckley Research Fellow at Weber State University (Ogden, Utah, USA). He is also
a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. He
received the J.D. degree and Graduate Certificate in Environmental and Natural
Resources Law from the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, where he
was Managing Editor of the Utah Environmental Law Review, and the Ph.D.
(economics) from the University of Georgia. This article reflects only the present
considerations and views of the author, which should not be attributed to either
Weber State University or the Brookings Institution.
1
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by UN General Assembly
Resolution 217 (III), on December 10, 1948, at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. See
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN GA Res. 217 (IIII), December 10, 1948,
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (October 3, 2019).
2
DAVID WEISSBRODT AND CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2007).
3
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3.
4
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3.
5
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3.
6
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3.
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and regional organizations, as well as governments, have developed
and adopted various “procedures for protecting against and providing
remedies for human rights abuses.”7
Human rights are generally considered the domain of
international law.8 Given that treaties and custom are the most
important sources of international law, any study of international
human rights law must necessarily involve taking a look at treaties. 9
One of the most important treaties of the modern era is the United
Nations Charter, which is a “multilateral treaty among all the UN
member nations” and which “established the United Nations.” 10 With
respect to international human rights, the most important treaties are
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 11
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”),12 both of which were drafted by the United
Nations. The two covenants, together with the UDHR, are generally
referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights. 13
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which was adopted on December 16, 1966, and opened for signature
on December 19, 1966, at New York, entered into force on March 23,
1976, in accordance with the treaty’s article 49.14 As of this writing, the
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 3.
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4.
9
Treaties are defined as “agreements between nations that are intended to
have binding legal effect between the governments that have formally agreed to
them.” WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4.
10
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4.
11
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(December 16, 1966).
12
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (December 16, 1966).
13
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4. See also CHRISTOPHER N. J. ROBERTS,
THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2–
3 (2015) (noting, inter alia, that the ICESCR, the UDHR and the ICCPR are
collectively known as the International Bill of Human Rights).
14
Article 49(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states that “[t]he present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date
of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.” See ICCPR, supra note 11, art.
49(1).
7
8
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ICCPR has been ratified by 173 States.15 The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was also adopted on
December 16, 1966, and opened for signature on December 19, 1966,
entered into force on January 3, 1976, in accordance with article 27 of
the treaty.16 As of this writing, the ICESCR has been ratified by 170
States.17
Given the fact that the global community does not have a
“world government” that can make certain that human rights are
recognized and protected, the question is: Who enforces international
human rights law? While noting that human rights law is part of
international law, legal scholars have argued that “[t]he most effective
mechanism for enforcing international law [including international
human rights law] is for each ratifying government to incorporate its
treaties and customary obligations into national laws.”18 Some African
countries have already modified their national constitutions to
expressly define how international law should be treated by their
domestic courts. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of
Kenya, 2010, states that “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya
shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.” 19 In
addition, the Kenyan Constitution also states that “[t]he general rules
of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya.”20 The
Constitution of the Republic of Bénin states that “[t]reaties or
agreements lawfully ratified shall have, upon publication, an authority
15
See United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and
Political
Rights:
Status
of
Treaties,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&clang=_en (October 3, 2019).
16
Article 27(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights states that “[t]he present Covenant shall enter into force three
months after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.” See
ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 27(1).
17
See United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic,
Social
and
Cultural
Rights:
Status
of
Treaties,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en (October 3, 2019).
18
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4.
19
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, 2010, art. 2(6).
20
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, 2010, art. 2(5).
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superior to that of laws, without prejudice for each agreement or treaty
in its application by the other party.”21
Whether an international treaty that has been signed and
ratified by a country can automatically become a part of that country’s
national laws will depend on “how effect is given to international
instruments in the particular country.”22 Within the international law
literature, there exist two well-established approaches to the
determination of how effect is given to international law instruments
or how domestic courts receive international and foreign law. These
are the “monist” approach, 23 and the “dualist” approach.24 In those
countries in which the relationship between international law and
domestic law is regulated by monism, “the latter and the former
comprise one single legal order within the nation’s legal system.”25
In countries that follow the monist approach, however, within
the domestic legal system, international law is superior to domestic law.
Hence, “in an African country which adheres to this approach, the
provisions of international human rights instruments, for example,
override any contrary domestic law.”26 This assumes, of course, that
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN, 1990, art. 147. Note that
“Benin” (Republic of Benin) is the English spelling of the country’s name and
“Bénin” (République du Bénin) is the French spelling. Since the country prefers the
French spelling, this article will use “Bénin” or Republic of Bénin throughout.
22
Charles Manga Fombad, Internationalization of Constitutional Law and
Constitutionalism in Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 439, 447 (2012).
23
The monist approach to international law is prevalent in countries that
follow “the civil law tradition derived from Roman law and include such nations as:
Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Germany,” as well as Francophone and
Lusophone countries in Africa. See WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 4. See also Fombad,
supra note 22, at 447. See also Graham Hudson, Neither Here nor There: The (Non-) Impact
of International Law on Judicial Reasoning in Canada and South Africa, 21 CANADIAN J. L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 321 (2008) (examining, inter alia, the monist and dualist
approaches to judicial reception of international and foreign law).
24
The dualist approach is prevalent in the countries that follow the
Common Law tradition of England and Wales and which spread later to former
British colonies (e.g., Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and several
Anglophone African countries). See, e.g., Fombad, supra note 22, at 447.
25
John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and Limits on the Sovereignty of African
States, 30 FLA. J. INT’L L. 43, 69 (2018).
26
Mbaku, supra note 25, at 69.
21
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the African country with the monist system has signed and ratified the
international human rights instrument in question.
Specifically, in those countries that follow the monist approach
to international law, once an international treaty has been signed and
ratified by the country, it is not necessary for national authorities to
domesticate the treaty and create rights that are justiciable in national
courts. For, the act of ratification alone automatically incorporates that
international instrument into national law and hence, creates rights that
are justiciable in municipal courts.27 Domestic courts in monist States,
then, must “give effect to principles of international law over
[superseding] or conflicting rules of domestic law.”28
In those countries that follow the dualist approach to
international law, the national legal system may consider “international
law as binding between governments” but, “it may not be asserted by
individual residents of the country in national courts unless the
legislature or other branch of government makes it national law or
regulation.”29 In these countries, international law and national law are
considered separate and independent of each other. International law,
it is argued, “prevails in regulating the relations between sovereign
States in the international system, whereas municipal law takes
precedence in governing national legal systems.” 30 For international
law to create rights that are justiciable in national courts, the national
legislature or some other authority must incorporate, through explicit
legislation, the provisions of the international instruments into
domestic law.31

See COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS & UNICEF,
GUIDE TO THE O PTIONAL PROTOCOL ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN
ARMED C ONFLICT 24 (noting, inter alia, that “[i]n States with a ‘monist system’, the
treaty is automatically incorporated into national law upon ratification”).
28
Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and Comparative Case Law:
Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 103, 109 (2002).
29
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 5.
30
Adjami, supra note 28, at 109.
31
See COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS & UNICEF, supra
note 27, at 24 (noting, inter alia, that “States with a ‘dualist’ system must incorporate
the treaty into domestic law through explicit legislation to make the treaty locally
enforceable”).
27
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When making reference to “international law’s binding status
in domestic legal systems,” international legal experts and international
jurists have distinguished between “the types and sources of
international law.”32 In general, international jurists consider
international norms “that have attained the status of international
customary law . . . to be part of municipal law under both the monist
and dualist theories, and therefore prevail over national law even in
domestic courts.”33 Some countries, such as the United Kingdom
(“UK”), however, are not completely dualist in their approach to
international law—as part of the European Union, the UK has
“accepted all of European Union law as part of its national law which
may be directly applied by the courts and administration.” 34
Unless a dualist State has internationalized its national
constitution and created rights that are justiciable in municipal courts,
violations of international law, including international human rights
law, can only “be asserted at the international level.”35 It is important,
then, especially for the recognition and protection of human rights,
Adjami, supra note 28, at 109.
Adjami, supra note 28, at 109.
34
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 5. Of course, following a June 23, 2016
referendum, 51.9% of British voters opted to leave the European Union. Her
Majesty’s Government formally announced the country’s withdrawal from the EU
in March 2017. That announcement started a two-year process that was supposed to
cumulate in the UK withdrawing from the EU on March 29, 2019. The dateline was
eventually extended to October 31, 2019. As of this writing, what is referred to as
“Brexit,” a portmanteau of the words “British” and “exit”, has taken place—the UK
officially left the EU on January 31, 2020 and effectively entered an eleven-month
transition period. During this transition period, the UK will remain a member of the
EU’s customs union and single market and will continue to obey all EU rules.
Nevertheless, the UK will no longer have membership in all of the EU’s political
institutions, including, for example, the EU Parliament. Negotiations between the
UK and the EU are currently underway to agree on a treaty that will determine the
nature of the trade relationship between the EU and the UK. By the end of January
2021, the UK’s exit from the EU will effectively be completed, either with or without
a trade deal. After that date, it is expected that EU law will no longer be applied
directly by the courts and administration of the UK. See, e.g., Peter Barnes, Brexit:
What Happens Now?, BBC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/ukpolitics-46393399 (last visited on Mar. 6, 2020). See also TIM OLIVER, EUROPE’S
BREXIT: EU PERSPECTIVES ON BRITAIN’S VOTE TO LEAVE (2018) (examining, inter
alia, the debate on the UK’s decision to leave the EU).
35
WEISSBBRODT, supra note 2, at 5.
32
33
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that policymakers in each African country, particularly those which
follow the dualist approach, enact explicit legislation to domesticate
the various international human rights instruments and create rights
that are directly justiciable in domestic courts.
It is also important to note that the “effect of international law
on a national system also hinges on the properties of international
instruments themselves.”36 For example, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is generally considered “a hortatory declaration of
principles and aspirations” and hence, it “does not have the legal status
of a treaty.”37 However, since the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”) are international treaties, they are binding on all States
Parties.38
With respect to the recognition and protection of human rights
in Africa, a few treaties are critical. First, is the African (Banjul) Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR” or “Banjul Charter”): the
ACHPR is binding on all States Parties. According to article 1 of the
ACHPR, the “parties to the present Charter [i.e., the ACHPR] shall
recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and
shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measure to give effect to
them.”39 According to the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, as of this writing (2020), fifty-four African Union

Adjami, supra note 28, at 110.
Adjami, supra note 28, at 110.
38
An international treaty’s binding effect can be traced to or stems from the
principle in international law referred to as pacta sunt servanda. This principle is
codified in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 26, which
is titled “Pacta sunt servanda,” states as follows: “Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (with annex), concluded at Vienna on May 23, 1969, art.
26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
39
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on June 27,
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force on
Oct. 21, 1986, art. 1.
36
37
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Member States had ratified the ACHPR. The latest country to ratify
the treaty was South Sudan, which did so on October 23, 2013.40
The failure of a State Party to the ACHPR to adopt necessary
measures to give effect to the provisions of the ACHPR, that is, to
domesticate the ACHPR and create rights that are justiciable in the
State Party’s domestic courts, is a breach of the Charter. Article 62 of
the Charter imposes an obligation on States Parties to “undertake to
submit every two years, from the date the present Charter comes into
force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a view
to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed
by the present Charter.”41 Many scholars of human rights in Africa
have noted that “[t]he combined effect of articles 1 and 62 suggests
that in light of resistance to the signing and ratification of the
International Covenants, the drafters of the African Charter paid
particular attention to ensuring the binding force of the Charter in
national legal systems.”42
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“African Commission”) is the “primary human rights body on the
African continent.”43 The African Commission’s “progressive
interpretation of the Charter” has allowed it to give “guidance to states
about the content of their obligations under the Charter,” and the

40
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ratification Table:
African
Charter
on
Human
and
Peoples’
Rights,
https://www.achpr.org/ratificationtable?id=49 (Oct. 4, 2019). The list of States that
have ratified the ACHPR does not include Morocco, which withdrew from the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984 over the OAU’s recognition of the
independence of the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Morocco returned to the
African Union (the successor organization to the OAU) in 2017. See, e.g., Hamza
Mohamed, Morocco rejoins the African Union after 33 years, AL JAZEERA NEWS, Jan. 31,
2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/morocco-rejoins-african-union33-years-170131084926023.html (Oct. 4, 2019).
41
Banjul Charter, supra note 39, art. 62.
42
Adjami, supra note 28, at 111.
43
CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF
PRETORIA & THE AFRICAN COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO THE AFRICAN HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM: CELEBRATING 30 YEARS SINCE THE ENTRY INTO F ORCE OF THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, 1986–2016, 8 (Pretoria
University Law Press, 2016).
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Charter’s “provisions have inspired domestic legislation.” 44 In some
African countries, “the Charter is an integral part of national law by
virtue of the constitutional system in place.”45 For example, in their
constitution, the people of the Republic of Bénin, make clear that the
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
which Bénin ratified on January 20, 1986, are an integral part of both
the constitution and Béninese law. Specifically, the Constitution of the
Republic of Bénin states as follows:
WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE, [r]eaffirm our
attachment to the principles of democracy and human
rights as they have been defined by the Charter of the
United Nations of 1945 and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948, by the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the
Organization of African Unity and ratified by Bénin on January
20, 1986 and whose provisions make up an integral part of this
present Constitution and of Béninese law and have a value
superior to the internal law.46
Since Bénin’s constitution makes the provisions of the African
Charter “an integral part of” the country’s constitutional law, as well
as “of Béninese law,” it has effectively created rights that are justiciable
in the country’s domestic courts. Nigeria, a dualist country, however,
enacted explicit legislation to “make the Charter part of domestic
law.”47
Second, is the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child (“African Children’s Charter”). The African Children’s
Charter is also binding on States Parties. According to article 1, States
Parties “shall recognize the rights, freedoms and duties enshrined in
this Charter and shall undertake the necessary steps, in accordance with
their Constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present
Charter, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
44
45
46

CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 8–9.
CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 9.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BÉNIN, 1990, at pmbl. Emphasis

added.
47

CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 9.
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necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Charter.”48 The
African Children’s Charter also addresses customary and traditional
practices and states that “[a]ny custom, tradition, cultural or religious
practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties, and obligations
contained in the present Charter shall to the extent of such
inconsistency be discouraged.”49
The African Children’s Charter was “inspired by several
regional concerns germane to the continent of Africa and which were
not covered by the African Charter of 1981.”50 Of particular
importance to the drafters of the African Children’s Charter “were
issues around child trafficking, use of child soldiers in armed conflicts,
harmful cultural and traditional practices as well as several other
[localized] anti-human rights practices within the domain of many
African countries.”51 It was argued at the time that these issues had not
been adequately “articulated by the African Charter [on Human and
Peoples’ Rights] and existing international and regional bill of rights”
and this “highlighted the need for a context-driven and contextspecific norm for the promotion and protection of the rights and
welfare of the African Child.”52 Of particular note is the fact that the
African Children’s Charter also established “the African Committee of
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child . . . within the OAU to
promote and protect the rights stipulated in the African Children’s
Charter.”53
In the African countries, as is the case with countries in other
parts of the world, “[a] State can, through its constitution, put to rest
any doubts as to whether international law, including customary
international law, is law within its national jurisdiction.” 54 The
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (“S. Afr. Const.”), for
example, directly addresses the applicability of both international law and
48
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African
Children’s Charter), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), art. 1.
49
African Children’s Charter, supra note 48, art. 3.
50
CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 51.
51
CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 51.
52
CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 51.
53
CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 51.
54
Mbaku, supra note 25, at 72.
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customary international law in the country’s domestic courts.55 Article 232
of the S. Afr. Const. deals specifically with customary international law
and states that “[c]ustomary international law is law in the Republic [of
South Africa] unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act
of Parliament.”56 The issue of the applicability of international law in
South African courts is dealt with in Article 233, which states that
“[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent
with international law.”57
When South Africans undertook to design a constitution for
themselves in the aftermath of the collapse of the dreaded apartheid
system, they “voluntarily opted to allow international law to infringe
on their sovereign right to determine the content of their constitutional
law in an effort to enhance and improve the protection of human and
peoples’ rights, as well as create, within the country, a culture that
respects and protects human rights.” 58 Many scholars have lauded
South Africa’s emerging rights jurisprudence, particularly its
application of international law.59 While provisions in the South
African Constitution have significantly enhanced the ability of the
country’s courts—particularly, the Constitutional Court—to develop a
“body of human rights jurisprudence that has gained international
prominence,”60 many other countries in the continent “do not provide
such explicit approval of the use of international sources for domestic
jurisprudence.”61
Nevertheless, many African countries have been able to
overcome the constraints that “nonincorporation would normally
impose through their use of international human rights instruments as
55
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA NO. 108 OF 1996.
This is the country’s permanent, post-apartheid constitution.
56
S. AFRI. C ONST., 1996, supra note 55, § 232.
57
S. AFRI. C ONST., 1996, supra note 55, § 232.
58
Mbaku, supra note 25, at 73.
59
Richard Cameron Blake, The World’s Law in One Country: The South African
Constitutional Court’s Use of Public International Law, 115 S. AFR. L. J. 668 (1999).
60
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112.
61
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112.
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persuasive authority in national court decisions.” 62 For example, courts
in Ghana, a country, which, unlike South Africa, has not provided
through its constitution, “explicit approval of the use of international
sources for domestic jurisprudence,”63 have overcome the obstacles
brought about by nonincorporation by adopting what has been
referred to as the “transjudicial model.”64 Adjami argues that “[t]he
transjudicial model accounts for the actual use of international law and
comparative case law in domestic courts, regardless of the binding or
nonbinding status of their sources.”65 This approach to the
interpretation of national constitutional law, it is argued, produces a
“cross-fertilization of international law and comparative case law in
domestic courts in continents around the globe,” including Africa.66 It
is argued that transjudicialism has significantly improved dialogue
across the world’s judicial systems, as well as, judicial comity.67 Below,
we examine cases from a few African countries to determine how
judges have utilized international and comparative law sources as tools
for interpreting national constitutional law and legislative acts.
A. Republic of Ghana
Although Ghanaian courts, have, as a result of the country’s
dualist approach to international law, “demonstrated some restraint in
their articulation of international law rules and principles,” they have,
nevertheless, been “striving to defeat the constraints imposed [on the

Adjami, supra note 28, at 112.
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112.
64
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of
Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (noting, inter alia, that
“transjudicial communication” can significantly strengthen international regimes,
such as human rights treaties,” as well as, enhance the “dissemination of ideas from
one national legal system to another, from one regional legal system to another, or
from the international legal system or a particular regional legal system to national
legal systems”). Slaughter, id. at 117.
65
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112–113.
66
Adjami, supra note 28, at 113. See also Slaughter, supra note 64, at 117–118
(elaborating, inter alia, the concept of cross-fertilization).
67
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112. See also The Honorable Claire L’HeureuxDubé, Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L. J. 15,
40 (1998) (noting, inter alia, “the place of all courts in the global dialogue on human
rights and other common legal questions”).
62
63
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country’s legal system] by [the country’s] dualist posture in the course
of adjudicating cases.”68 For example, in the case, New Patriotic Party v.
Inspector General of Police,69 the Ghanaian Supreme Court was called upon
to rule on the constitutionality of provisions of the Ghana Public
Order Decree, 1972, which granted the Minister of the Interior, inter
alia, the power to impose restrictions on the freedom of assembly, and
whether individuals holding a meeting to celebrate a traditional custom
should obtain prior “consent” or “permit” of the Minister of the
Interior.70
Ghana’s Supreme Court found that § 7 of the Public Order
Decree, 1972, was in violation of the Constitution of Ghana,
specifically, § 21, which defines “general fundamental freedoms,”
which include “freedom of assembly including freedom to take part in
processions and demonstrations.” 71 The Court also determined that §
7 of the Public Order Decree also violated article 11 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which guarantees the “right
to assembly.”72 To the leading judgment of Hayfron-Benjamin, J.,
Archer, CJ., added the following declaration:
Ghana is a signatory to [the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights] and Member States of the
Organization of African Unity and parties to the
Charter are expected to recognize the rights, duties and
freedoms enshrined in the Charter and to undertake to
adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to
the rights and duties. I do not think the fact that Ghana
has not passed specific legislation to give effect to the
Charter, [means that] the Charter cannot be relied
upon. On the contrary, Article 21 of our Constitution
68
Christian N. Okeke, The Use of International Law in the Domestic Courts of
Ghana and Nigeria, 32 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 409 (2015).
69
New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police, [1993–94] 2 GLR 459
SC (Nov. 30, 1993).
70
New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police, supra note 69, at 459.
See also Frans Viljoen, Application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by
Domestic Courts in Africa, 43 J. AFR. L. 1, 5 (1999).
71
CONST. OF GHANA, § 21(d).
72
AFRICAN (BANJUL) CHARTER, art. 11.
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has recognized the right to assembly mentioned in
Article 11 of the African [Banjul] Charter.73
B. Republic of Botswana
Courts in Botswana have also relied on international human
rights instruments that have been ratified by Botswana to inform their
interpretation of national constitutional provisions. In Attorney-General
v. Unity Dow,74 Amissah, JP, writing for the Court of Appeal, noted that
“[t]he learned judge a quo [had] referred to the international
obligations of Botswana in his judgment in support of his decision that
sex-based discrimination was forbidden under the Constitution [of
Botswana].”75 Noting that the appellant had objected to the ruling of
the judge a quo,76 Amissah, JP declared that “by the law of Botswana,
relevant international treaties and conventions, may be referred to as
an aid to interpretation.”77 The learned judge then cited to § 24 of
Botswana’s Interpretation Act, which states that as “an aid to the
construction of the enactment a court may have regard to . . . any
relevant international treaty, agreement or convention.” 78
In objecting to the ruling of the judge a quo, the appellant,
nevertheless, “conceded [to the Court of Appeal] that international

Quoted in Okeke, supra note 68, at 411–412. Also quoted in Viljoen, supra
note 70, at 5. Also see Okeke, supra note 68, at 411–412. Viljoen cautions, however,
that the reliance of the Ghanaian Supreme Court on the African (Banjul) Charter in
New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police may “not necessarily form a pattern in
judicial interpretation” in Ghana given the fact that “[i]n another decision handed
down on the same day, New Patriotic Party v. Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, pertaining
to the right to information, no reference is made to the African Charter.” See Viljoen,
supra note 70, at 6. Nevertheless, Viljoen notes that there is reason “for optimism
about the increased role of the Charter in the fact that a high-ranking [Ghanaian]
government official, the attorney-general, [had] referred to a provision of the Charter
during a case.” See Viljoen, supra note 70, at 6.
74
Attorney-General v. Unity Dow, [1992] LRC (Const.) 623.
75
Attorney-General v. Unity Dow, 1992 BLR 119, 151 (CA).
76
That is the judgment of Horwitz, J of the High Court of Botswana in The
Attorney-General of the Republic of Botswana v. Unity Dow, (Unreporter) MISCA
124/90, June 3, 1990.
77
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151.
78
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151.
73
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treaties and conventions may be used as an aid to interpretation.” 79
However, he objected to the use, “by the learned judge, a quo of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Declaration
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women . . . on two
grounds.”80 The first ground was that “none of [these treaties] had
been incorporated into the domestic law by legislation, although
international treaties became part of the law only when so
incorporated”; and the second was that “treaties were only of
assistance in interpretation when the language of the statute under
consideration was unclear.”81 Amissah, JP, writing for the Court of
Appeal, noted that “[a]ccording to the appellant’s argument, of the
treaties referred to by the learned judge a quo, Botswana had ratified
only the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, but had not
incorporated it into domestic law. That, the appellant admitted,
however, did not deny that particular Charter the status of an aid to
interpretation.”82
The second objection offered by the appellant, stated Amissah,
JP, “was that treaties were only of assistance in interpretation when the
language of the statute under consideration was unclear.”83 In rejecting
the appellant’s objections, Amissah, JP noted that:
[e]ven if it is accepted that those treaties and
conventions do not confer enforceable rights on
individuals within the State until Parliament has
legislated its provisions into the law of the land, in so
far as such construction of enactments, including the
Constitution, I find myself at a loss to understand the
complaint made against their use in that manner in the
interpretation of what no doubt are some difficult
provisions of the Constitution. 84

79
80
81
82
83
84

Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151.
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151.
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151–152.
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151.
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 151–152.
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 153.
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Amissah, JP went on to state that:
[t]he reference made by the judge a quo to these
materials [i.e., international treaties and conventions to
which Botswana is a State Party] amounted to nothing
more than that. What he had said at p. A245c was: “I
am strengthened in my view by the fact that Botswana
is a signatory to the O.A.U. Convention on NonDiscrimination. I bear in mind that signing the
Convention does not give it the power of law in
Botswana but the effect of the adherence by Botswana
to the Convention must show that a construction of
the section which does not do violence to the language
but is consistent with and in harmony with the
Convention must be preferable to a ‘narrow
construction’ which results in a find that section 15 of
the Constitution permits unrestricted discrimination
on the basis of sex.”85
With respect to the African (Banjul) Charter, Amissah, JP
noted that Botswana is a signatory to the Charter and that the State is,
in fact, “one of the credible prime movers behind the promotion and
supervision of the Charter.”86 Amissah, JP then went on to concede
that the African (Banjul) is not binding “within Botswana as legislation
passed by its Parliament.”87 Nevertheless, domestic legislation in
Botswana should be interpreted “so as not to conflict with Botswana’s
obligations under the Charter or other international obligations.” 88
Amissah, JP concluded the discussion of the appellant’s objections by
making the following observation:
I am in agreement that Botswana is a member of the
community of civilized States which has undertaken to
abide by certain standards of conduct, and, unless it is
impossible to do otherwise, it would be wrong for its
courts to interpret its legislation in a manner which
85
86
87
88

Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 154.
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 153.
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 154
Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 154.
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conflicts with the international obligations Botswana
has undertaken. This principle, used as an aid to
construction as is quite permissive under section 24 of
the Interpretation Act, adds reinforcement to the view
that the intention of the framers of the Constitution
could not have been to permit discrimination purely on
the basis of sex.89
C. Republic of Namibia
Namibia adopted a new constitution in February 1990,90 and
formally became an independent country on March 21, 1990.
Subsequently, on July 30, 1992, the Government of Namibia ratified
the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 91 In
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others, the High Court of Namibia,92 a
case brought before the Namibian High Court in 1994, the applicant,
Elvis Kauesa, a warrant officer in the Namibian Police, questioned the
constitutionality of “Reg. 58(2), which had been published under
Government Notice R203 in Government Gazette 719 dated 14
February 1964.”93 Specifically, Kausea sought:
a declaratory order against the Minister of Home
Affairs as first respondent, the Inspector-General of
the Namibian Police as second respondent, and the
Deputy Commissioner of the Namibian Police as third
respondent, in the following terms:
1. Declaring reg 58(32), published under
Government Notice R203 in Government Gazette
719 date 14 February 1964, to be invalid and
without force and effect.

Unity Dow, supra note 75, at 154.
CONST. REP. OF NAMIBIA, 1990 (WITH AMENDMENTS 2010).
91
African Union, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Status List,
https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights (Oct. 7, 2019).
92
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others, the High Court of
Namibia, 1995 (1) 51 (NM).
93
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 53.
89
90
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2. Ordering such respondents as may oppose this
application to pay the costs thereof, jointly and
severally.
3. Granting the applicant such further and/or
alternative relief as this honorable Court deems
fit.94
O’Linn, J., writing for the Court, started the analysis of the case
by noting that “[w]hen considering the constitutionality of provisions
of statute law, our Courts must in the first place rely on the Namibian
Constitution, and not on that of other countries with constitutions
fundamentally different.”95 The learned judge then added that “[a]fter
all, art 1(6) [of the Constitution of Namibia] provides: 96 ‘This
Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Namibia.’”97
From the applicant’s “founding affidavit,” the Court
determined that he relied “for his attack on the validity of the
regulation on the ground that the regulation [Reg. 58(32)] is now in
conflict with his ‘fundamental right’ to freedom of speech and
expression expressed in art 21(1)(a) of the Constitution [of Nambia].” 98
Kauesa, the applicant, asserted in his founding affidavit, that:
I submit that I and other members of the police have
the constitutionally protected right to engage in
discussion or debate in a public sense on issue of such
legitimate public concern about the administration of
the force, conditions of service and other issues of
public importance such as corruption or irregularities,
even if such comment can be construed as
unfavorable. In participating in the televised discussion

Kauesa, supra note 92, at 53.
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 55.
96
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 55.
97
CONST. REP. OF NAMIBIA, art. 1(6).
98
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 55. Article 21(a) of the Namibian Constitution
states as follows: “All persons shall have the right to: (a) freedom of speech and
expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media.” CONST. REP.
OF NAMIBIA, art. 21(1)(a).
94
95
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aforesaid, I respectfully submit that I was lawfully
exercising this right.99
O’Linn, J., cited to a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals of
the Seventh Circuit and noted that in Choudry v. Jenkins,100 the majority
“quoted without criticism . . . [a] dictum of Judge Grant in the Court a
quo:101 ‘Open comment by a public employee which is false and made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth,
constitutes an unpermissible form of expression.’”102 In analyzing the
case, O’Linn, J., made reference to several international and national
instruments, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,103 the European Convention on Human Rights, 104
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,105 and the African
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.106 Then, the learned
judge moved on to deal with the issue of the applicability of
international law and agreements in Namibian courts. In doing so,
O’Linn J., went directly to Article 143 of the Constitution of Namibia,
which provides that: “All existing international agreements binding
upon Namibia shall remain in force, unless and until the National
Assembly acting under Article 63(2)(d) hereof otherwise decides.” 107

Kauesa, supra note 92, at 57.
Choudry v. Jenkins, 559 F. 2d. 1085 (7th Cir. 1977).
101
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 70
102
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 70. Grant J.’s quote can be found at Choudry v.
Jenkins, 559 F 2d 1085, 1088 (1977).
103
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 72.
104
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 75.
105
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 82.
106
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86.
107
CONST. REP. OF NAMIBIA, art. 143. Article 63(2)(d) deals with the power
of the National Assembly in the post-independence period to deal with international
obligations that were made on behalf of Namibia when it was a colony and was then
known as South West Africa. Hence, Article 63(2)(d) states as follows: “The National
Assembly shall further have the power and function, subject to this Constitution: d.
to consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such international agreements
as may have been entered into prior to independence by administrations within
Namibia in which the majority of the Namibian people have historically not enjoyed
democratic representation and participation.” See CONST. REP. OF NAMIBIA, art.
63(2)(d).
99

100
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The learned judge then moved on to Article 144 of the
Constitution of Namibia, which deals specifically with international
law and which states that:
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act
of Parliament, the general rules of public international
law and international agreements binding upon
Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of the
law of Namibia.108
O’Linn, J., then noted that “[t]he Namibian Government [had],
as far as can be established, formally recognized the African Charter in
accordance with art 143 read with art 63(2)(d) of the Namibian
Constitution.”109 As a consequence, argued O’Linn, J., “[t]he
provisions of the Charter have therefore become binding on Namibia
and form part of the law of Namibia in accordance with art 143, read
with art 144 of the Namibian Constitution.” 110 However, argued the
learned judge,
[i]t is questionable . . . whether the aforesaid 1982
agreement and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights have become part of the law of Namibia. But,
even if they are not, their provisions should carry weight when
interpreting provisions of the Namibian Constitution, such as
those which are relevant to the issues in this case and which are
discussed or interpreted in the course of this judgment.111
On this basis, the High Court rejected and dismissed the
applicant’s application for a declaratory order with costs. 112 Kauesa,
however, appealed the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court of
Namibia.113 The Supreme Court began its analysis of the appeal by
providing an overview of the judgment of the Court a quo. Of specific
108
109
110
111
112
113

Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86.
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86.
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86.
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 86. Emphasis added.
Kauesa, supra note 92, at 120.
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, (SA 5/94) [1995] NASC 3 (Oct. 11,

1995).
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interest to the appeal is the Court a quo’s judgment that “the
Regulation [i.e., Reg. 58(32) of the Police Force] complies with the
provisions of Article 21(2) of the Namibian Constitution in that it: (i)
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights and
freedoms contained in Sub-Article (1) of Article 21, including on the
freedom of speech and expression; (ii) the restrictions are necessary in
a democratic society; and (iii) are required in the interest of sovereignty
and integrity of Namibia, national security and public order.”114
The Supreme Court then examined judgments from courts in
the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Canada, as well as, the
European Court of Human Rights, on cases dealing with the
suppression of free speech. Dumbutshena AJA, writing for the Court,
made specific reference to the judgment delivered by Dickson CJ and
Lamer and Wilson JJ of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case, Re
Singh and Minister of Employment & Immigration and 6 Other Appeals, 115
which dealt with limitations on rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.116
Dumbutshena AJA also cited to the European Court of
Human Rights’ decision in the Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom,117
and made specific reference to the following section in that judgment:
The Court’s supervisory functions oblige it to pay the
utmost attention to the principles characterizing a
“democratic society.” Freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and
for the development of every man. Subject to
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10–2), it is applicable not
only to “information” or “ideas” that are favorably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 5.
Re Singh and Minister of Employment & Immigration and 6 Other
Appeals, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
116
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 20–21.
117
Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 5493/72),
Strasbourg, December 7, 1976.
114
115
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disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no
“democratic society.” This means, amongst other
things, that every “formality,” “condition,”
“restriction” or “penalty” imposed in this sphere must
be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.118
Dumbutshena AJA then noted that:
[i]n the context of Namibia freedom of speech is
essential to the evolutionary process set up at the time
of independence in order to rid the country of
apartheid and its attendant consequences. In order to
live in and maintain a democratic state the citizens
must be free to speak, criticize and praise where praise
is due. Muted silence is not an ingredient of democracy
because the exchange of ideas is essential to the
development of democracy.119
The learned justice then went on to cite to several U.S.
Supreme Court cases that deal specifically with limitations on “the
right to free speech.”120
Like the High Court, the Supreme Court of Namibia utilized
international and comparative law sources as an aid in its interpretation
of national constitutional law and declared “Regulation 58(32)
published under Government Notice R203 in Government Gazette
791, dated 14 February 1964 invalid and without force and effect in
law.”121 The Court concluded that “Regulation 58(32) is in our view
Case of Handyside, supra note 117, at para. 49. Dumbutshena AJA also
made reference to the European Court’s decision in The Sunday Times v. The United
Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, App. No. 6538/74 (1979), a case that also dealt with
issues of restrictions on individual rights and freedoms.
119
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 28.
120
Some of these include Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hamsphire, 315 U.S. 588 (1942); Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405 (1974); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); New
York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
121
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 40.
118
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inconsistent with Article 21(1) and (2) of the Constitution [of Namibia]
and we do not consider this to be a proper case to exercise the
discretionary power conferred by Article 25(1)(a).” 122
D. Republic of South Africa
In one of the earliest cases decided by the post-apartheid
Constitutional Court of South Africa, the Court was called upon to
decide on the constitutionality of the death penalty.123 Chaskalson P,
in his leading judgment, made references to several international
human rights instruments. The two individuals accused in this case
were convicted “in the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme
Court on four counts of murder, one count of attempted murder and
one count of robbery with aggravating circumstances.”124 The
convicted persons were subsequently sentenced to death “on each of
the counts of murder and to long terms of imprisonment on other
counts.”125 They then appealed their convictions to the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court, which subsequently dismissed “the
appeals against the sentences on the counts of attempted murder and
robbery, but postponed the further hearing of the appeals against the
death sentence until the constitutional issues are decided by this
Court.”126
Chaskalson P noted that the trial was concluded before South
Africa’s Interim Constitution (1993) came into force and, as a
consequence, “the constitutionality of the death sentence did not arise
at the trial.”127 The learned justice also stated that “[i]t would have been
better if the framers of the Constitution had stated specifically, either
that the death sentence is not a competent penalty, or that it is
permissible in circumstances permitted by law.”128 Since South Africa’s
post-apartheid framers did not deal specifically with the death
sentence, continued Chaskalson P, it was incumbent upon the
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, supra note 113, at 40.
The State v. Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 1.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 1.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 3.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 4.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 5.
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Constitutional Court (“CC”) “to decide whether the penalty is
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.” 129
The two issues raised in the appeal to the CC were: (1) “the
constitutionality of section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and
the implications of section 241(8) of the Constitution.”130 While no
formal reference was made to the CC “in terms of section 102(6) of the
Constitution,” Chaskalson P noted that “that was implicit in the
judgment of the Appellate Division, and was treated as such by the
parties.”131
While South Africa’s 1993 Constitution was a transitional
constitution, it was, nevertheless, one that established:
a new order in South Africa; an order in which human
rights and democracy are entrenched and in which the
Constitution: “ . . . shall be the supreme law of the
Republic and any law or act inconsistent with its
provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly
or by necessary application in this Constitution, be of
no force and effect to the extent of the
inconsistency.”132
Chaskalson P then proceeded to examine other sections of the
South African Interim Constitution that dealt with fundamental rights,
as well as its own case law interpreting these rights.133
Next, Chaskalson P examined international and comparative
law sources dealing with the death penalty. The learned justice states
that “[c]ustomary international law and the ratification and accession
to international agreements is dealt with in section 231 of the
Constitution which sets the requirements for such law to be binding

129
130
131
132
133

S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 5.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 3. Emphasis in original.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 3. Emphasis in original.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 7.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 9.
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within South Africa”134 and that “[i]n the context of section 35(1), public
international law would include non-binding as well as binding law.”135
Chaskalson P noted that international agreements and customary
international law would be utilized as tools of interpretation. 136
Specifically, Chaskalson P noted that the
[i]nternational agreements and customary international
law accordingly provide a framework within which
Chapter Three can be evaluated and understood, and
for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with
comparable instruments, such as the United Nations
Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the European Commission on
Human Rights, and the European Court of Human
Rights, and in appropriate cases, reports of specialized
agencies such as the International Labor Organization
may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation
of particular provisions of Chapter Three.137
Public international law, argues Chaskalson P, does not
prohibit capital punishment. 138 International human rights
instruments, the learned justice continued, “differ . . . from our
Constitution in that where the right to life is expressed in unqualified
terms they either deal specifically with the death sentence, or authorize
exceptions to be made to the right to life by law.”139 This, continued
the learned justice, “has influenced the way international tribunals have
dealt with issues relating to capital punishment, and is relevant to a
proper understanding of such decisions.”140

134

ACT NO. 200 OF 1993: CONST. REP. SOUTH AFRCA (INTERIM CONST.), §

231.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 35.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 35. See also ACT NO. 200 OF
1993, supra note 134, § 35(1).
137
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 35.
138
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 36.
139
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 36.
140
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 36.
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The CC then moved on to examine several judicial decisions
from the United States that deal with capital punishment and stated
that “[t]he earliest litigation on the validity of the death sentence seems
to have been pursued in the courts of the United States of America.” 141
Chaskalson P argues further that “[a]lthough challenges under state
constitutions to the validity of the death sentence have been successful
[in the United States], the federal constitutionality of the death
sentence as a legitimate form of punishment for murder was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia.”142
Chaskalson P states that in Gregg, Brennan, J., in a dissenting
opinion, held that
[t]he fatal constitutional infirmity in the punishment of
death is that it treats “members of the human race as
nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.
[It is] thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise
of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a
human being possessed of common human dignity.” 143
Chaskalson P then went on to state that “[t]he weight given to
human dignity by Justice Brennan is wholly consistent with the values
of our Constitution and the new order established by it. It is also
consistent with the approach to extreme punishments followed by
courts in other countries.”144
Chaskalson P next turns to a decision of the German Federal
Constitutional Court (“FCC”) in a case involving life imprisonment
and makes special note of a part of the decision dealing with “respect
for human dignity.”145 In that case, Germany’s FCC noted that
“[r]espect for human dignity especially requires the prohibition of
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishments. [The state] cannot turn
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 40.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 41. See also Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
143
Gregg, supra note 142, at 230.
144
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 58.
145
[1977] 45 BVerfGE 187, 228. See S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at
para. 59
141
142
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the offender into an object of crime prevention to the detriment of his
constitutionally protected right to social worth and respect.”146
The fact that capital punishment, argues Chaskalson P,
“constitutes a serious impairment of human dignity has also been
recognized by judgments of the Canadian Supreme Court.” 147 In Kindler
v. Canada,148 the “appellant was found guilty of first degree murder,
conspiracy to commit murder and kidnapping in the State of
Pennsylvania and the jury recommended the imposition of the death
penalty.”149 Nevertheless, before the court could impose the sentence,
“the appellant escaped from prison and fled to Canada where he was
arrested.”150 After the usual judicial proceedings, the Canadian Minister
of Justice ordered that the appellant should be extradited to the United
States “pursuant to s.25 of the Extradition Act without seeking
assurances from the U.S., under Art. 6 of the Extradition Treaty
between the two countries, that the death penalty would not be
imposed or, if imposed, not carried out.”151 The appellant appealed the
Minister’s decision, but both “the Trial Division and the Court of
Appeal of the Federal Court dismissed appellant’s application to
review the Minister’s decision.” 152 The Supreme Court of Canada was
called upon to “determine whether the Minister’s decision to surrender
the appellant to the U.S., without first seeking assurances that the death
penalty will not be imposed or executed, violates the appellant’s rights
under s. 7 or s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”153
Lamer C.J. and Sopinka and Cory JJ dissenting, dismissed the
appeal and confirmed the extradition order. Nevertheless, in doing so,
they noted that the death penalty is “the supreme indignity to the
individual, the ultimate corporal punishment, the final and complete
lobotomy and the absolute and irrevocable castration. [It is] the

146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Quoted in S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 59.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 60.
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1991) 2 SCR 779.
Kindler, supra note 148, at 780.
Kindler, supra note 148, at 780.
Kindler, supra note 148, at 780.
Kindler, supra note 148, at 780.
Kindler, supra note 148, at 780.
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ultimate desecration of human dignity.”154 Chaskalson P noted that in
their ruling,
the majority of the [Supreme Court of Canada] held
that the validity of the order for extradition did not
depend upon the constitutionality of the death penalty
in Canada, or the guarantee in its Charter of Rights
against cruel and unusual punishment. The Charter was
concerned with legislative and executive acts carried
out in Canada, and an order for extradition neither
imposed nor authorized any punishment within the
borders of Canada.155
Chaskalson P went on to note that the issue in “Kindler’s case
was whether the action of the Minister of Justice, who had authorized
the extradition without any assurance that the death penalty would not
be imposed was constitutional.”156 The learned justice then stated that:
[i]n balancing the international obligations of Canada
in respect of extradition, and another purpose of the
extradition legislation—to prevent Canada from
becoming a safe haven for criminals, against the
likelihood that the fugitives would be executed if
returned to the United States, the view of the majority
was that the decision to return the fugitives to the
United States could not be said to be contrary to the
fundamental principles of justice.157
The two fugitives, Ng and Kindler, then took their case to the
UN Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”) and argued “that Canada
had breached its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.”158 While noting that “by definition, every
execution of death may be considered to constitute cruel and inhuman
154
Kindler, supra note 148, at 780. This is the part of the judgment in Kindler
that Chaskalson P relied on.
155
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 61.
156
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 62.
157
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 62.
158
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 63.
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treatment within the meaning of article 7 of the [International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights],” 159 the UNHRC also made
reference to Article 6(2) of the Covenant, which permits, with some
qualifications, the imposition of the death penalty “for the most
serious crimes.”160 Chaskalson P then noted that
[i]n view of these provisions, the majority of the
[UNHRC] were of the opinion that the extradition of
fugitives to a country which enforces the death
sentence in accordance with the requirements of the
International Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights],
should not be regarded as a breach of the obligations
of the extraditing country.161
From the examination of the cases of the two fugitives—Ng
and Kindler—before the UN Human Rights Committee, Chaskalson
P concluded that:
[d]espite these differences of opinion, what is clear
from the decisions of the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations is that the death penalty is regarded
by it as cruel and inhuman punishment within the
ordinary meaning of those words, and that it was
because of the specific provisions of the International
Covenant authorizing the imposition of capital
punishment by member States in certain
circumstances, that the words had to be given a narrow
meaning.162
Chaskalson P then moved on to examine decisions of cases
decided under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”)
by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). The learned
159
Quoted in S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 63. See also Chitat Ng
v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991
(1994), at para. 16.2.
160
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), art. 6(2).
161
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 64.
162
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 67.
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justice made reference specifically to Soering v. United Kingdom.163 This
case, like the Kindler case, involved the extradition to the United States,
of a fugitive “to face murder charges for which capital punishment was
a competent sentence.”164 Soering (i.e., the applicant), a West German
national, had:
alleged that the decision by UK Secretary State for the
Home Department to extradite him to the United
States of America to face trial in Virginia on a charge
of capital murder would, if implemented, give rise to a
breach by the United Kingdom of Article 3 [of the
European Convention on Human Rights]. 165
Chaskalson P noted that while Article 2 of the ECHR “protects
the right to life,” it, nevertheless, “makes an exception in the case of
‘the execution of a sentence of a court following [the] conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”166 The learned justice
then noted that in Soering, the majority in the ECtHR “held that article
3 could not be construed as prohibiting all capital punishment, since
to do so would nullify article 2.”167 Nevertheless, argued Chaskalson P,
it was
competent to test the imposition of capital punishment
in particular cases against the requirements of article
3—the manner in which it is imposed or executed, the
personal circumstances of the condemned person and
the disproportionality to the gravity of the crime
committed, as well as the conditions of detention
awaiting execution, were capable of bringing the
Soering v. United Kingdom, Series A, No. 161; App. No. 14038/88;
[1989] 11 EHRR 439.
164
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 68. See also Soering, supra note
163.
165
Soering, supra note 163, Headnote/Summary. Article 3 of the ECHR
states as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.” See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN C ONVENTION FOR
THE P ROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AS AMENDED
BY PROTOCOLS NOS. 11 AND 14, Nov. 1950, C.E.T.S. 5.
166
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 68.
167
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 68.
163
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treatment or punishment received by the condemned
person within the proscription. 168
Counsel for Soering argued that his extradition to the United
States to face trial in the State of Virginia would expose him to the
“risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by article 3 [of the
European Convention on Human Rights].” 169 This assessment was
based on “the youth of the fugitive (he was eighteen at the time of the
murders), an impaired mental capacity, and the suffering on death row
which could endure for up to eight years if he were convicted.” 170
Soering, who was a national of Germany, was also liable to be tried in
Germany for the same offense. Chaskalson P noted that:
Germany, which has abolished the death sentence, also
sought [the fugitive’s] extradition for the murders.
There was accordingly a choice in regard to the country
to which the fugitive should be extradited, and that
choice should have been exercised in a way which
would not lead to a contravention of article 3.171
Chaskalson P then added that:
[w]hat weighed with the [ECtHR] was the fact that the
choice facing the United Kingdom was not a choice
between extradition to a country which allows the
death penalty and one which does not. We are in a
comparable position. A holding by us that the death penalty for
murder is unconstitutional, does not involve a choice between
freedom and death; it involves a choice between death in the very
few cases which would otherwise attract that penalty under section
277(1)(a), and the severe penalty of life imprisonment.172
Chaskalson P then moved on to an examination of case law on
the death penalty from India. Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
168
169
170
171
172

S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 68.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 69.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 69.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 69.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 69. Emphasis added.
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permits the imposition of the death penalty for murder. 173
Nevertheless, Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides as
follows: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.”174 The case Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab175 offered the Supreme Court of India the
opportunity to test the constitutionality of § 302 of the Indian Penal
Code. Nevertheless, the wording of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, argues Chaskalson P, represented an obstacle “to a challenge to
the death sentence, because there was a ‘law’ which made provision for
the death sentence.”176 In addition, argues Chaskalson P,
article 72 of the Constitution [of India] empowers the
President and Governors to commute sentences of
death, and article 134 refers to the Supreme Court’s
powers on appeal in cases where the death sentence
has been imposed. It was clear, therefore, that capital
punishment was specifically contemplated and
sanctioned by the framers of the Indian Constitution,
when it was adopted by them in November 1949.177
The Indian Supreme Court then took a look at international
authorities “for and against the death sentence, and with the arguments
concerning deterrence and retribution.” 178 After thoroughly reviewing
arguments for and against the death sentence, the Court concluded
that:
. . . the question whether or not [the] death penalty
serves any penological purpose is a difficult, complex
and intractable issue. It has evoked strong, divergent
views. For the purpose of testing the constitutionality
of the impugned provision as to death penalty in
173
Section 302 of the Penal Code of India states that “Whoever commits
murder shall be punished with death, or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be
liable to fine.” THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 ACT NO. 45 OF 1860 (Oct. 6, 1860),
§ 302.
174
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art. 21.
175
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684.
176
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 72.
177
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 72.
178
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 76.
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Section 302 of the Penal Code on the ground of
reasonableness in the light of Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution, it is not necessary for us to express any
categorical opinion, one way or the other, as to which
of these two antithetical views, held by the
Abolitionists and Retentionists, is correct. It is
sufficient to say that the very fact that persons of
reason, learning and light are rationally and deeply
divided in their opinion on this issue, is a ground
among others, for rejecting the petitioners’ argument
that retention of [the] death penalty in the impugned
provision, is totally devoid of reason and purpose.179
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of India held that § 302 of
the Indian Penal Code “violates neither the letter nor the ethos of
Article 19.”180 Chaskalson P then noted that, after making this
conclusion, the Court then proceeded to deal with Article 21 and
argued that “if that article 21 were to be expanded in accordance with
the interpretative principle applicable to legislation limiting rights
under Article 19(1), article 21 would have to be read as follows: ‘No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to fair, just and reasonable procedure established by a valid law.’”181
In its expanded form, argued the Supreme Court of India, the
State could deprive an individual of his or her life by “fair, just and
reasonable procedure.”182 With respect to the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, Chaskalson P noted that the provisions of
that constitution are different from those of the Constitution of India.
The learned justice then argued that:

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, para. 132.
Bachan Singh, supra note 179 at para. 132.
181
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 77. See also Bachan Singh, supra
note 179, at para. 136.
182
Specifically, the Supreme Court of India held that “[t]hus expanded and
read for interpretative purposes, Article 21 clearly brings out the implication, that the
founding fathers recognized the right of the State to deprive a person of his life or
personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and reasonable procedure established by
valid law.” Bachan Singh, supra note 179, at para. 136.
179
180

613

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

[t]he question we have to consider is not whether the
imposition of the death sentence for murder is ‘totally
devoid of reason and purpose’, or whether the death
sentence for murder ‘is devoid of any rational nexus’
with the purpose and object of section 277(1)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Act. It is whether in the context of
our Constitution, the death penalty is cruel, inhuman
or degrading, and if it is, whether it can be justified in
terms of section 33.183
Chaskalson P noted that the Indian Penal Code “leaves the
imposition of the death sentence to the trial judge’s discretion.” 184 In
Bachan Singh, the Court was also called upon to decide the
“constitutionality of the legislation on the grounds of arbitrariness,
along the lines of the challenges that have been successful in the United
States.”185 In its decision, the Supreme Court of India “rejected the
argument that the imposition of the death sentence in such
circumstances is arbitrary, holding that a discretion exercised judicially
by persons of experience and standing, in accordance with principles
crystallized by judicial decisions, is not an arbitrary discretion.”186
Chaskalson P then examined case law dealing with the
limitation of rights in Canada, 187 Germany,188 and under the European
Convention.189 With respect to case law dealing with the limitation of
rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights, the learned justice
noted that “there are differences between [the Interim Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa]190 and the Canadian Charter which have
a bearing on the way in which section 33 [of the Constitution of the

S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 78.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 79.
185
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 79.
186
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 79. See also Bachan Singh, supra
note 179, at para. 165.
187
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 104–107.
188
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 108.
189
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 109.
190
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, ACT 200 OF 1993.
183
184
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Republic of South Africa]191 should be dealt with.”192 Chaskalson P also
noted that, “[t]his is equally true of the criteria developed by other
courts, such as the German Constitutional Court and the European
Court of Human Rights.”193 The learned justice then made the
following statement:
”I see no reason this case . . . to attempt to fit our
analysis into the Canadian pattern,” or for that matter
to fit it into the pattern followed by any of the other
courts to which reference has been made. Section 33
prescribes in specific terms the criteria to be applied
for the limitation of different categories of rights and
it is in the light of these criteria that the death sentence
for murder has to be justified.194
After reexamining the decision of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of South Africa in the case at bar, the Constitutional
Court (“CC”) concluded that:
[t]he rights to life and dignity are the most important
of all human rights, and the source of all other personal
rights in Chapter Three [of the Interim Const. of the
Rep. of South Africa].195 By committing ourselves to a
society founded on the recognition of human rights we
are required to value these two rights above all others.
And this must be demonstrated by the State in
everything that it does, including the way it punishes
criminals. This is not achieved by objectifying
murderers and putting them to death to serve as an
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, ACT 200 OF 1993, § 33.
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at para. 110. Section 33 of the INTERIM
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, deals with limitations on the
rights guaranteed by the constitution. See CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, ACT 200 OF 1993,
§ 33.
193
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 110.
194
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 110. Chaskalson P was
quoting from the judgment written by Kentridge AJ in the Constitutional Court of
South Africa’s case, S v. Zuma and Others (CCT5/94),[1995] ZACC 1; 1995 (2) SA
642; 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA), at para. 35.
195
Chapter Three deals with “Fundamental Rights.”
191
192

615

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

example to others in the expectation that they might
possibly be deterred thereby.196
The CC then held as follows:
1. In terms of section 98(5) of the Constitution, 197 and
with effect from the date of this order, the provisions
of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of section 277(1)
of the Criminal Procedure Act, and all corresponding
provisions of other legislation sanctioning capital
punishment which are in force in any part of the
national territory in terms of section 229, are declared to
be inconsistent with the Constitution and, accordingly,
to be invalid.
In terms of section 98(7) of the Constitution, and
with effect from the date of this order:
(a) the State is and all its organs are forbidden to
execute any person already sentenced to death
under any of the provisions thus declared to be
invalid; and
(b) all such persons will remain in custody under
the sentences imposed on them, until such
sentences have been set aside in accordance with
law and substituted by lawful punishments.198
E. United Republic of Tanzania
In 1990, the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza was called
upon to decide a case, Ephrahim v. Pastory,199 which dealt with the rights
of women under Haya Customary Law. In the case, a woman, Holaria
Pastory, had inherited clan land from her father through a will. 200
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 144.
This is the Interim Constitution (1993).
198
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, at paras. 151.
199
Ephrahim v. Pastory (1990) LRC (Const.) 757; (2001) AHRLR 236
(TzHC 1990).
200
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 1.
196
197

616

2020

The Role of International Human Rights Law

8:2

Pastory later sold the clan land to one Gervazi Kaizilege, who was
considered by Pastory’s clan as a stranger and non-member.201 A day
after Pastory finalized the sale of the clan land, one Bernardo
Ephrahim, a relative of Pastory’s, “filed a suit at Kashasha Primary
Court in Muleba District, Kagera Region, praying for a declaration that
the sale of the clan land by his aunt, . . . was void as females under
Haya Customary Law have no power to sell clan land.”202
Ephrahim’s position was in line with the Haya Customary Law
(Declaration) (No. 4) Order of 1963, which provides at paragraph 20
that “[w]omen can inherit, except for clan land, which they may receive
in usufruct but may not sell. However, if there is no male of that clan,
women may inherit such land in full ownership.”203 The Primary Court
agreed with Ephrahim, declared the sale null and void and asked
Pastory to refund the money paid on the property to the purchaser.204
Pastory then appealed the Primary Court’s decision to the
District Court at Muleba and the latter quashed the decision of the
Primary Court, stating that that ruling had been in violation of the Bill
of Rights in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania,
which granted all citizens—men and women—equality before the
law.205 Dissatisfied with the District Court’s decision, Ephrahim
appealed it to the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza. 206
Mwalusanya J, who wrote the decision for the High Court,
began the analysis of the case by noting that Haya Customary Law is
clear on the issue before the Court since it is codified “in the Laws of
Inheritance of the Declaration of Customary Law, 1963” (Tanzania). 207
Under Haya Customary Law, Mwalusanya J noted, “females can inherit
clan land which they can use in usufruct . . . [b]ut they have no power

201
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 1. The sale of the clan land
was finalized on August 24, 1988.
202
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 1.
203
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 2.
204
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 2.
205
See THE CONST. UNITED REP. TANZANIA, Part III (Basic Rights and
Duties).
206
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199.
207
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 2.
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to sell it, otherwise the sale is null and void.”208 The learned judge
noted, however, that there is precedent in Tanzanian case law that
courts in matters such as those before the High Court, are bound by
customary law.209
Mwalusanya J, argues, however, that since the Bill of Rights
was incorporated into the constitution in 1984, “female clan members
[now] have the same rights as male clan members.”210 Unfortunately,
declared the learned judge, Haya Customary Law has not been changed
despite the incorporation of a Bill of Rights into the country’s
constitution and subsequent guarantee of equality of women to their
men-folk. He noted, specifically, that “[w]hat is more is that since the
Bill of Rights was incorporated in our 1977 Constitution [vide Act no.
15 of 1984], by Article 13(4), discrimination against women has been
prohibited.”211
Mwalusanya J then made note of various international human
rights instruments that the United Republic of Tanzania has ratified
and which outlaw discrimination, particularly against women. The
learned judge states, for example, that “Tanzania has also ratified the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, which in article
18(3) prohibits discrimination on account of sex.”212 In addition,
Mwalusanya J argues, “Tanzania has ratified the International

Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 3.
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 3.
210
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 5. See also Chris Maina Peter,
Five Years of the Bill of Rights in Tanzania: Drawing a Balance-Sheet, 4 AFR. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 131 (1992) (examining, inter alia, the incorporation of a Bill of Rights into
Tanzania’s Constitution). The Bill of Rights specifically provides that: “(1) All human
beings are born free, and are all equal. (2) Every person is entitled to recognition and
respect for his dignity.” CONST. UNITED REP. TANZANIA, art. 12(1–2). “All persons
equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to protection and
equality before law. No law enacted by any authority in the United Republic of
Tanzania shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its
effect.” CONST. U NITED REP. TANZANIA, art. 13(1–2).
211
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 10.
212
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 10.
208
209
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, which in article 26
prohibits discrimination based on sex.”213 The judge then declares that:
The principles enunciated in the above-named
documents214 are a standard below which any civilized
nation will be ashamed to fall. It is clear from what I
have discussed that the customary law under
discussion flies in the face of our Bill of Rights as well
as the international conventions to which we are
signatories.215
After determining that the Haya Customary Law (Declaration)
(No. 4) Order of 1963 was unconstitutionally discriminatory against
women, he then turned to an examination of the case at bar in order
to determine the appropriate remedy. First, he made reference to § 5(1)
of the Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1984 and various academic writings on § 5(1), which
“hold[] the view that courts in Tanzania can modify discriminatory
customary law in the course of statutory interpretation.” 216
Further, as provided by § 5(1) of the Constitution
(Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984,
with effect from March 1988, Tanzania’s domestic courts must
construe existing law, including customary law, “[w]ith such
modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be
necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Fifth
Constitutional Amendment Act, 1984, i.e., the Bill of Rights.” 217
Mwalusanya J adopted a purposive approach to constitutional
interpretation and determined that in enacting § 5(1) and the Bill of
Rights, it was the intention of the Parliament of the United Republic
of Tanzania to “do away with all oppressive and unjust laws of the
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 10.
These documents are the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 1979; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
215
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 10.
216
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 22.
217
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 19.
213
214
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past.”218 Parliament, Mwalusanya J noted, “wanted all existing laws (as
they existed in 1984) which were inconsistent with the Bill of Rights to
be inapplicable in the new era or be treated as modified so that they
would be in line with the Bill of Rights. It wanted the courts to modify
by construction those existing laws which were inconsistent with the
Bill of Rights such that they were in line with the new era.”219
Next, Mwalusanya J looked for guidance from the experiences
of the Republic of Zimbabwe after the country introduced its Bill of
Rights into its constitution. 220 The Constitution of Zimbabwe,
Mwalusanya J noted, also has a similar provision like Tanzania’s § 5(1)
of Act 16 of 1984.221 The learned justice then briefly examined a case
from the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Bull v. Minister of Home Affairs,
which dealt with limitations on the right to liberty guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights,222 and concluded that the case was “persuasive authority
for the proposition of law that any existing law that is inconsistent with
the Bill of Rights should be regarded as modified such that the
offending part of that statute or law is void.”223
Judge Mwalusanya then held as follows:
I have found as a fact that section 20 of the Rules of
Inheritance of the Declaration of Customary Law,
1963, is discriminatory of females in that, unlike their
male counterparts, they are barred from selling clan
land. That is inconsistent with article 13 (4) of the Bill
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 28.
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 28.
220
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 32.
221
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 32. The relevant section in
Zimbabwe’s constitution is § 4(1) of the ZIMBABWE CONSTITUTION
(TRANSITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTARY AND C ONSEQUENTIAL PROVISION) ORDER,
1980, which provides “That existing laws must be so construed with such
modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to
bring them into conformity with the Constitution.” See Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra
note 199, at para. 32. See also THE ZIMBABWE CONSTITUTION (TRANSITIONAL,
SUPPLEMENTARY AND CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS) ORDER 1980 (DONE AT THE
COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, THE 19TH DAY OF MARCH 1980), § 4(1).
222
Bull v. Minister of Home Affairs [1987] LRC (Const) 547.
223
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 34.
218
219
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of Rights of our Constitution which bars
discrimination on account of sex. Therefore under
section 5(1) of Act 16 of 1984 I take section 20 of the
Rules of Inheritance to be now modified and qualified
such that males and females now have equal rights to
inherit and sell clan land. Likewise the Rules
Governing the Inheritance of Holdings by Female
Heirs (1944) made by the Bukoba Native Authority,
which in rules 4 and 8 entitle a female who inherits selfacquired land of her father to have usufructuary rights
only (rights to use for her lifetime only) with no power
to sell that land, is equally void and of no effect.224
Additionally, Mwalusanya J declared as follows:
From now on, females all over Tanzania can at least
hold their heads high and claim to be equal to men as
far as inheritances of clan land and self-acquired land
of their fathers is concerned. It is part of the long road
to women’s liberation. But there is no cause for
euphoria as there is much more to do in the other
spheres. One thing which surprises me is that it has
taken a simple, old rural woman to champion the cause
of women in this field and not the elite women in town
who chant jejune slogans for years on end on women’s
liberation, but without delivering the goods.225
The various African courts that we have examined were faced
with important legal conflicts, which concerned the existence of laws
that conflict with their countries’ modernized constitutions, 226 and by
implication, international human rights instruments. These courts also
operate in countries that have not yet internationalized their national
constitutional law—while many of these countries have ratified a
number of international human rights instruments, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 42. Emphasis added.
Ephrahim v. Pastory, supra note 199, at para. 44.
226
These are constitutions, which since the early-1990s, have modified to
include a Bill of Rights, which guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms.
224
225
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as, the
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, they have not
yet domesticated the provisions of these international instruments. In
other words, they have not yet enacted the necessary legislation to
make the provisions of these instruments part of national
constitutional law. As a consequence, the provisions of these
international instruments do not represent rights that are justiciable in
the domestic courts of many of these African countries.
Nevertheless, many of the courts that we have examined have
recognized the role that they can play to bring domestic laws, including
customary law, into conformity with provisions of their national
constitutions, as well as, those of relevant international human rights
instruments. Reliance on various international human rights
instruments has allowed domestic courts in Africa, such as the High
Court of Tanzania, to invalidate customary law that conflicts with the
Bill of Rights. Other African courts have used the provisions of
international human rights instruments as a tool to interpret national
constitutions and legislative acts and bring them in conformity with
international human rights law. These courts have come to the
realization that the failure by their national legislatures to enact
necessary legislation to domesticate international human rights
instruments to which their countries are States Parties does not mean
that the provisions of these instruments cannot be made relevant to
the protection of human rights in these countries.
As argued by several international law experts, “[w]here States
have failed to abolish or reform customary laws that discriminate
against women and children and other historically marginalized
groups, judges can use their interpretive powers to strike down or
modify discriminatory customary law provisions and generally bring all
law into conformity with the provisions of international human rights
instruments.”227 In fact, as more African countries reform their
institutions and provide themselves with independent judiciaries, there
is likely to emerge in these countries “a progressive and global

John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and Limits on the Sovereignty of African
States, 30 FLA. J. INT’L L. 43, 109 (2018).
227
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approach to interpreting constitutional rights,”228 a development
which, it is argued, “could significantly enrich national or domestic
constitutional law.”229
On December 16, 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”) and it came into effect on January 3, 1976.230 The
ICESCR is a multilateral treaty, which committed States Parties to
“undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the
. . . Covenant.”231 As of October 2019, most African countries have
ratified the treaty.232 In most of these countries, ratification, however,
has not created rights that are justiciable in domestic courts. In order
for each of these States Parties to the ICESCR to create rights that are
justiciable in domestic courts, they must amend their national
constitutions and provide a “supremacy clause,” such as that present
in the U.S. Constitution. 233 The Supremacy Clause in the U.S.
Constitution reads as follows:
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.234

Charles Manga Fombad, Internationalization of Constitutional Law and
Constitutionalism in Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 439, 472–473 (2012).
229
Mbaku, supra note 227, at 109.
230
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
UNGA Res. 2200A(XXI), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx (Oct. 17, 2019).
231
ICESCR, supra note 230, art. 3.
232
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Status at 17–10–
2019,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en (Oct. 17, 2019).
233
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, art. VI, clause 2.
234
CONST. UNITED STATES, art. VI, clause 2.
228
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With such a clause, once the treaty is ratified by the country’s
legislature, its provisions become rights that are justiciable in domestic
courts. A country can also directly insert provisions of the treaty in
question into its national constitution, effectively making the rights
contained in the treaty both an integral part of the constitution and of
the country’s laws. Beyond this, how effect is given to international
instruments in a particular African country is dependent on whether
the country follows the monist or dualist approach to international law.
In “[m]onist legal systems, where international law is
incorporated directly into the domestic legal system,” allowance is
made “for the immediate domestic application of international
treaties.”235 In countries that follow the dualist approach to
international law, the latter is “not automatically part of domestic law”
and additional “steps are needed to incorporate it into national law.” 236
Nevertheless, even in countries in which international treaties can only
apply when national legislatures have either incorporated the content
of the treaty into the national constitution or made reference to it in
the national constitution, judges “have developed more creative ways
of making use of international standards.” 237 For example, before
South Africa finally ratified the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights on January 12, 2015, its courts were already
using the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) to “interpret the ESC rights enshrined
in the South African Constitution.” 238

235
International Commission of Jurists, Courts and the Legal Enforcement of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative Experiences of Justiciability, Human Rights
and
Rule
of
Law
Series
No.
2
(2008),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a7840562.html (Oct. 17, 2019), at 19.
236
International Commission of Jurists, supra note 235, at 19.
237
International Commission of Jurists, supra note 235, at 19.
238
International Commission of Jurists, supra note 235, at 19. See also The
Government of Republic of South Africa & Others v. Irene Grootboom and Others, [2000]
ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (Oct. 4, 2000). The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) is a UN institution, consisting of
eighteen experts that meets twice a year, usually in Geneva, to examine the reports
sent to it by UN Member States on their compliance with the provisions of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). The
CESCR also oversees the implementation of the ICESCR. See, e.g., Office of the UN
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In the following sections, we use case law from the Republic
of South Africa to show how judges can find creative ways to use
international human rights instruments to interpret the economic,
social and cultural rights enshrined in their national constitutions, as
well as, adjudicate cases about these rights, even if the provisions of
these international human rights instruments have not yet been
domesticated by their national legislatures.
II. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
A. Introduction
South African constitutional and human rights experts have
noted that “[t]he constitutional protection of socio-economic rights in
South Africa has to be seen in the context of the debate that has often
characterized the justiciability of such rights.” 239 That debate eventually
came to an end, for at least two reasons. First, the Constitutional
Assembly saw fit to include socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights,
making them directly justiciable in the country’s courts. 240 Second, the
Constitutional Court (“CC”), the country’s highest court, has since
held that socio-economic rights are justiciable. For example, in
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and
Others,241 Yacoob J, writing for the Court, noted that “[w]hile the
justiciability of socio-economic rights has been the subject of
considerable jurisprudential and political debate, the issue of whether
socio-economic rights are justiciable at all in South Africa has been put
beyond question by the text of our Constitution as construed in the
Certification judgment.”242 The learned justice then quoted from the

High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (Nov.
19, 2019).
239
John Cantius Munbanzi, The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights
in Selected African Countries: A Comparative Evaluation, 2 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3
(2006).
240
See CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, CHAPTER 2.
241
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom
and Others, [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (Oct. 4, 2000).
242
Grootboom and Others, supra note 241, at para. 20.
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Certification judgment.243 In response to a question regarding whether
socio-economic rights are justiciable in South African courts, the Court
in In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
held as follows:
[T]hese rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable.
As we have stated in the previous paragraph, many of
the civil and political rights entrenched in the
[constitutional text before this Court for certification
in that case] will give rise to similar budgetary
implications without compromising their justiciability.
The fact that socio-economic rights will almost
inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem
to us to be a bar to their justiciability. At the very
minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively
protected from improper invasion.244
During the post-apartheid constitution-making process, there
arose questions regarding whether socio-economic rights could be
enforced by the courts.245 In addition, it was argued further that “the
protection of such rights should be a task for the legislature and
executive and that constitutionalizing them would have the inevitable
effect of transferring power from these two branches of government
to the judiciary, which lacks the democratic legitimacy necessary to
make decisions concerning allocation of social and economic
resources.”246 However, South Africans who argued in favor of the
constitutional guarantee of socio-economic rights “pointed out that it
makes little sense to tell people that their civil and political rights will

Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744; 1996
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC).
244
In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, supra note 243, at para. 78.
245
See Munbanzi, supra note 239, at 3. See also Christof Heyns and Danie
Brand, Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution, 2 LAW,
DEMOCRACY & DEV. 153, 154 (JOURNAL OF THE FACULTY OF LAW, UWESTERN
CAPE, SOUTH AFRICA) (1998).
246
See Munbanzi, supra note 239, at 3.
243
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be protected, if they continue to be at the mercy of the elements and
of social exploitation.”247
Some constitutional scholars have argued that “[s]ocioeconomic rights are a central terrain in new democracies,”248 such as
South Africa’s, and that while they are “[o]ften deemed essential for
the legitimacy of the constitution at the time of adoption, they are
subject to downstream pressures at the implementation stage as
governments confront limited budgets and the need for
macroeconomic credibility.”249 Including socio-economic rights in the
Bill of Rights, it was argued by some South Africans, would raise “the
[specter] of angry and disillusioned people holding up the Constitution
and asking whether this is what the struggle [against apartheid] was all
about.” 250
Then, there was the argument that proper adjudication of
socio-economic rights “requires an assessment of fundamental social
values that can only be carried out legitimately by the political branches
of government, and [that] the proper enforcement of socio-economic
rights requires significant government resources that can only be
adequately assessed and balanced by the legislature.”251 It was also
argued that “[j]udges and courts . . . lack the political legitimacy and
institutional competence to decide such matters.”252
In the end, socio-economic rights were entrenched in South
Africa’s permanent post-apartheid constitution—Constitution of the

Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 154.
Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court
and Socio-Economic Rights as ‘Insurance Swaps,’ Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 650 (2d Series)/Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 436, University of Chicago Law School, Aug. 2013,
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1426&context
=public_law_and_legal_theory (Dec. 10, 2019), at 1.
249
Dixon and Ginsburg, supra note 248, at 1.
250
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 154.
251
Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic
Rights and the South African Constitution, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321, 322 (2007).
252
Christiansen, supra note 251, at 322.
247
248
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Republic of South Africa, 1996.253 The debate then moved on to what
role judges would play in the implementation and enforcement of these
rights. The International Commission of Jurists has noted that
[i]n cases where different legal interpretations are
possible, if duties or prohibitions regarding [economic,
social and cultural] rights are part of the legal system,
and especially of the superior layers of the legal system,
assigning judges a role in the enforcement of these
norms is absolutely compatible with the traditional
functions performed by the judiciary.254
Of course, constitutionally guaranteeing socio-economic rights
imposes a duty on the government of South Africa to find ways to
realize these rights. Given the universal problem of scarcity, it is most
likely the case that, in enacting legislation to realize the rights
guaranteed by the constitution, which include socio-economic rights,
there is bound to arise issues of “equity,” “reasonableness,”
“proportionality,” etc., all of which are within the purview of the
judiciary.255
As South Africans engaged in national discourse about the
constitutional principles that were expected to form the foundation for
their permanent post-apartheid constitution and serve as a constraint
on the constitutional drafters (i.e., the Constitutional Assembly),
constitutional and legal scholars floated four options, which they
believed, could help resolve the various issues associated with the
guarantee of socio-economic rights. These included:
(1) the full recognition of socio-economic rights as
justiciable rights without any qualifications;

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, ACT NO. 108 OF
1996 (adopted on May 8, 1996 and amended on Oct. 11, 1996 by the Constitutional
Assembly). Socio-economic rights are found in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2).
254
International Commission of Jurists, supra note 235, at 77.
255
International Commission of Jurists, supra note 235, at 77.
253
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(2) including socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights
as justiciable rights;
(3) merely listing them as non-justiciable principles of
state policy; or
(4) not making any reference to these rights at all.256
South Africa’s first post-apartheid constitution, the Interim or
Transitional Constitution, was designed to enhance and facilitate
governance while the Constitutional Assembly drafted the permanent
constitution.257 During South Africa’s multi-party constitutional
negotiation process, which took place between 1990 and 1993, “the
ANC (“African National Congress”)258 and like-minded parties wished
a democratically elected constituent assembly to have an almost free
hand in drafting the Bill of Rights, and therefore argued for as minimal
a protection of rights in the interim constitution as possible.”259 The
ANC and its supporters were of the view that the multi-party
constitutional negotiations were expected to produce an interim
constitution that would facilitate and enhance transition to democratic
rule and that a democratically elected Constituent or Constitutional
Assembly, empowered by the people, would draft the Bill of Rights.
As a consequence, the ANC “required protection for the most basic
civil and political rights, those essential to a process of ‘free and fair
elections’” and which would be found in most of the world’s
democratic constitutions. 260 The democratically elected Constituent
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 154.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT 200 OF 1993
(INTERIM CONSTITUTION) (REPEALED BY THE C ONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA (ACT NO. 108 OF 1996), G 17678, Dec. 18, 1996.
258
The African National Congress was one of several political parties
involved in the constitutional negotiations to end apartheid and bring about a nonracial democratic system in South Africa. See, e.g., ANDREA LOLLINI,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND TRANSITION: JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 49 (2011)
(examining, inter alia, the constitutional negotiations that established the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and the post-apartheid
democratic South African State).
259
Hugh Corder, Towards a South African Constitution, 57 MOD. L. REV. 491,
512 (1994).
260
Corder, supra note 259, at 512.
256
257
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Assembly, which was empowered to draft the country’s permanent
post-apartheid constitution, would then be left to decide how to
protect socio-economic rights.
Thus, the Interim Constitution dealt primarily with what were
considered largely uncontroversial rights—political and civil rights.
Hence, while there was an exhaustive list of political and civil rights,
the list of economic, social and cultural rights was relatively limited.
Section 27 (labor rights) enshrined various labor rights, including, for
example, the right of labor “to strike for the purpose of collective
bargaining;”261 section 25 guaranteed the right of “[d]etained, arrested
and accused persons to be detained under conditions consonant with
human dignity, which shall include at least the provision of adequate
nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at state expense”; 262
section 30 guaranteed children the right “to security, basic nutrition
and basic health and social services”;263 and section 32 guaranteed that
“[e]very person shall have the right to basic education and to equal
access to educational institutions.” 264
The decision regarding the inclusion of socio-economic rights
in the final and permanent constitution was left to be decided by the
Constitutional Assembly (“CA”), the drafters of that constitution. By
entrenching socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of
the Constitution), the CA effectively recognized them as human rights,
on the same level as civil and political rights.265 Nevertheless, the CA
decided that “extensive internal limitations would apply in respect of
most aspects of these rights, to restrict the obligations placed on the
[South African] state.”266 Since these were rights guaranteed by the
constitution, they were directly justiciable in the country’s courts.

INTERIM C ONST. S. AFR., supra note 257, § 27(4).
INTERIM C ONST. S. AFR., supra note 257, § 25(1)(b).
263
INTERIM C ONST. S. AFR., supra note 257, § 30(1)(c).
264
INTERIM C ONST. S. AFR., supra note 257, § 32(a).
265
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, 1996, Chapter 2. See also Jonathan Klaaren, A
Second Look at the South African Human Rights Commission, Access to Information, and the
Promotion of Socioeconomic Rights, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 539, 543 (2005).
266
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 155.
261
262
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Two institutions were granted the power to enforce these
rights—the courts and the South African Human Rights Commission
(“SAHRC”).267 Since the socio-economic rights guaranteed by the
constitution were justiciable in the nation’s courts, a citizen-litigant
could directly and indirectly invoke them. Nevertheless, it has been
argued that the SAHRC’s “decisions are not legally binding,” meaning
that the protection of these rights by the SAHRC is only “soft
protection.”268 In addition, the role played by South Africa’s courts and
the South African Human Rights Commission must be seen in “the
context of and in interaction with the role of those institutions with an
implicit, but vital function in the process of implementing socioeconomic rights, such as the legislature, elected by popular
franchise.”269
Post-apartheid South Africa’s situation, particularly with
respect to the constitutional protection of socio-economic rights, is
considered exemplary. First, it is one of the few countries whose
constitution has recognized socio-economic rights as human rights and
entrenched them in the country’s Bill of Rights. Second, “[a]lthough
some other countries’ constitutions enumerate socio-economic rights,
few countries’ courts have found such rights to be fully and directly
justiciable, and even fewer have multiple, affirmative social rights
opinions. No other country has developed their case law sufficiently
to outline a comprehensive jurisprudence.”270

267
The South African Human Rights Commission is a constitutionallycreated and mandated institution, tasked with promoting respect for human rights
and a culture of human rights in South Africa. Its functions are provided in §§ 184–
186 of the CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA NO. 108 OF 1996.
It is one of several institutions that were established in terms of Chapter 9 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and empowered to guard the country’s
democracy. The others are (1) The Public Protector; (2) The Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic
Communities; (3) The Commission for Gender Equality; (4) The Auditor-General;
and (5) The Independent Electoral Commission. See CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, 1996,
Chapter 9.
268
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 155–156.
269
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 156.
270
Christiansen, supra note 251, at 323.
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Proponents of the justiciability of socio-economic rights
consider South Africa’s role as “revolutionary and heroic” while
“detractors” see South Africa’s role as “irresponsible and doomed.” 271
Some scholars have suggested that guidance could be obtained from
examining case law from various jurisdictions around the world, while
others have argued in favor of seeking guidance from “the
jurisprudence which has been developed on the level of international
law.”272 In fact, they argue that “legal protection for socio-economic
rights, . . . , largely has its roots in international law.”273 However, an
examination of South African court adjudications of cases involving
socio-economic rights reveals “a [Constitutional] Court that has been
both less revolutionary and less irresponsible than commentators
expected (and continue to allege).”274 Christiansen goes on to argue
that
[t]his is because the Court’s jurisprudence has
incorporated the concerns of the jurists who argue that
courts lack the legitimacy and competence to decide
such matters, even while the Court is performing the
affirmative review and remediation functions desired
by the jurists who favor enforcement of social rights.
The Court maintains an affirmative social rights
jurisprudence tempered by internalized justiciable
concerns.275
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”) is the primary UN human rights instrument that
deals with socio-economic rights.276 South Africa signed the ICESR on

Christiansen, supra note 251, at 323.
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 156.
273
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 156.
274
Christiansen, supra note 251, at 323.
275
Christiansen, supra note 251, at 323–324.
276
See, e.g., PROGRAM ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS (NEW DELHI), HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL: INTERNATIONAL C OVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (New Delhi, India, 2015),
http://www.pwescr.org/PWESCR_Handbook_on_ESCR.pdf (Dec. 11, 2019). See
also INTERNATIONAL C OVENANT ON E CONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966).
271
272
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October 3, 1994, and ratified it on January 12, 2015.277 There are, of
course, other international human rights instruments with provisions
that guarantee the protection of socio-economic rights. For example,
articles 22–26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
guarantees various socio-economic rights, including, for example, the
“right to social security,” “the right to work,” “the right to equal pay
for equal work,” “the right to rest and leisure,” “the right to a standard
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family,” the right of children, regardless of the nature of their birth, to
enjoy all the protections granted to others, and “the right to
education.”278
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) also has provisions that
guarantee socio-economic rights, specifically for women. For example,
article 3 states as follows:
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the
political, social, economic and cultural fields, all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure
the full development and advancement of women, for
the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on a basis of equality with men.279
The Republic of South Africa signed the CEDAW on January
29, 1993, and ratified it on December 15, 1995.280 South Africa is also

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: STATUS AS AT OCTOBER 19, 2019 (STATUS OF TREATIES),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en (Oct. 19, 2019).
278
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, UNGA Res. 217A(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
279
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (Dec. 18, 1979), art. 3. See
also arts. 10–14.
280
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: STATUS AS OF OCTOBER 19, 2019 (STATUS OF
TREATIES),
277
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a State Party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 281
which also has provisions that protect socio-economic rights. South
Africa signed the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on July 9, 1996, and ratified it on the same day.282 The Banjul
Charter has provisions that guarantee both civil and political, as well
as social and economic rights.283
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“CESCR”)284 is the international institution empowered and charged
with supervising compliance by States Parties to the ICESCR. States
Parties are supposed to send regular reports to the CESCR on how
they are realizing the rights guaranteed by the ICESCR. Although these
reports are supposed to be submitted by the governments of the States
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV8&chapter=4&clang=_en (October 19, 2019).
281
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov.20,
1989). See generally arts. 4, 6(2), 19, 20, 24, 26–29, and 31.
282
OAU/AU TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS & CHARTERS,
https://au.int/en/treaties (Oct. 19, 2019).
283
The Banjul Charter recognizes the right to work (Article 15), the right to
health (Article 16), and the right to education (Article 17). Through its decision in
SERAC v. Nigeria, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
interpreted the Banjul Charter to include a right to housing and a right to food, the
right to health, and the right to development. See African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and
Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria (Communication No.
155/96),
https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2006/social-and-economic-rightsaction-center-center-economic-and-social-rights-v-nigeria (Dec. 11, 2019).
284
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is “a body of
18 independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its States [P]arties.” See Office of the UN
Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (Oct. 19, 2019).
The Committee was established under ECOSOC Res. 1985/17 (May 28, 1985) and
charged with carrying out the monitoring of the functions assigned to the United
National Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) in Part IV of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Part IV covers arts. 16–25.
According to art. 16, “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
submit in conformity with this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which
they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights
recognized herein.” INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON E CONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS , 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 18, 1966), art. 16.
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Parties, in practice, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)
working on development and human rights issues also submit what are
referred to as “shadow reports” which are considered an integral part
of the CESCR reporting system and an important input into the
CESCR’s country review process.285
Since it came into being in 1985, the CESCR has issued several
General Comments on the ICESCR, “which have developed the
normative content of [economic, social and cultural] rights and State
obligations since the 1990s.”286 For example, the CESCR issued its first
general comment on July 27, 1981, titled CESCR General Comment No.
1: Reporting by States Parties.287 This comment explains the reporting
system and elaborates on the system’s seven objectives. The initial
report, which each State Party was required to submit within “two
years of the Covenant’s entry into force for the State Party concerned,”
was to ensure that “a comprehensive review is undertaken with respect
to national legislation, administrative rules and procedures, and
practices in an effort to ensure the fullest possible conformity with the
Covenant.”288

See, e.g., International Women’s Rights Action Watch, NGO Shadow
Reporting
to
CESCR:
A
Procedural
Guide
(June
2003),
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/iwraw/shadow/CESCRNGOguideJune2003.pdf (Dec.
11, 2019); See also Rukmini Datta & Program on Women’s Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, New Perspectives on NGO Reporting to the UN Committee on Economic, Social
and
Cultural
Rights:
Challenges
and
Opportunities,
http://www.pwescr.org/PWESCRPaperPR-Revised_8-9-2012%5B1%5D.pdf
(Dec. 11, 2019) & International Commission of Jurists, Overview of the Periodic Reporting
Process of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies, International Commission of Jurists Background
Note,
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/TreatyBodiesPeriodicReporting.pdf (Dec. 11, 2019).
286
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The Influence of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, 64 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 259, 263 (2017).
287
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General
Comment No. 1: Reporting by States Parties, Adopted at the Thirteenth Session of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, July 27, 1981, UN Doc.
E/1989/22 (July 27, 1981), https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838b2.html (Oct.
19, 2019).
288
CESCR General Comment No. 1, supra note 287, para. 1.
285

635

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

B. The South African Constitution and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
The rights guaranteed by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ESC rights”) can only be
realized on the territory of the States Parties to the Covenant. As of
October 2019, one hundred seventy (170) countries have ratified the
ICESCR and hence, are States Parties to the Covenant. 289 Each State
Party is under obligation to “take steps, individually and through
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including the adoption
of legislative measures.”290
The first step that States Parties should take in order help them
effectively realize ESC rights is for each of them to incorporate these
rights into their national constitutions and make them part of their
constitutional law. By doing so, States Parties make the incorporated
ESC rights directly justiciable in their domestic courts and grant
aggrieved citizens the standing to make a claim before the courts for a
remedy.291 The process of domesticating ESC rights can involve
explicitly listing all these rights in the constitution (e.g., in the Bill of
Rights) or by inserting in the national constitution, a phrase that makes
the treaty (i.e., the ICESCR) part of the State Party’s constitutional law.
For example, according to Article 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya,
“[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law
of Kenya under this Constitution.”292 Since Kenya ratified the ICESCR
on May 1, 1972, and taking into consideration Article 2(6) of the
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: STATUS AS AT OCTOBER 20, 2019 (STATUS OF TREATIES),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en (Oct. 20, 2019).
290
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966), art. 2(1).
291
See Evan Rosevear, Ran Hirschl & Courtney Jung, Justiciable and
Aspirational Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, in THE FUTURE OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 37 (Katharine G. Young ed., 2019) (examining,
inter alia, the justiciability of economic and social rights in domestic courts).
292
CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010, art. 2(6).
289
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Constitution, the ESC rights are, in principle, part of the laws of Kenya
and hence, are justiciable in Kenyan courts.293
South Africa is one of the few African countries that have
directly incorporated all or some of the ESC rights into their national
constitutions. The constitution that South Africans ratified and
adopted in 1996 was part of a national effort to deal with the injustices
of their racialized past and provide a foundation for the construction
of a non-racial democratic governance system. For example, the
Preamble to the Constitution begins with the following words:
We, the people of South Africa,
Recognize the injustices of our past;
Honor those who suffered for justice and freedom in
our land;
Respect those who have worked to build and develop
our country; and
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it,
united in our diversity.294
Those injustices of the past included the denial of economic,
social and cultural rights to the country’s majority African groups. It is
no wonder that the architects of the country’s post-apartheid
293
In ratifying the ICESCR, Kenya made some declarations and
reservations. Upon ratification, Kenya made the following statement: “While the
Kenya Government recognizes and endorses the principles laid down in paragraph
2 of article 10 of the Covenant, the present circumstances obtaining in Kenya do not
render necessary or expedient the imposition of those principles by legislation.” See
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS :
STATUS AS AT OCTOBER 20, 2019 (STATUS OF TREATIES),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en (Oct. 20, 2019), at “Declarations and Reservations.”
Paragraph 2 of Article 10 states as follows: “Special protection should be accorded
to mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth. During such
period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social
security benefits.” Id. at art. 10(2).
294
CONST. REP. S. AFR., 1996, pmbl.
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constitution took a special interest in entrenching ESC rights in the
country’s permanent constitution. However, it is important to note
that South Africans did not list ESC rights separately from other
fundamental rights. Instead, they considered ESC rights, together with
civil and political rights “as human rights in the Bill of Rights” and
hence, ESC rights “are interspersed between the other rights, on an
equal level, emphasizing the interdependence and indivisibility of the
different generations of rights.”295 Chapter 2 of the Constitution is
devoted to the Bill of Rights, which the drafters considered as the
“cornerstone of democracy” in the country and which “enshrines the
rights of all the people in [the] country and affirms the democratic
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.” 296 The Constitution
imposed an obligation on the State of South Africa to “respect, protect,
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.”297 This duty implies
that the State must not only make certain that these rights are not
violated by non-state actors but that the State itself and its agents (i.e.,
state actors), must not violate the rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights.
Heyns and Brand have noted that a violation of the State’s duty
to respect can involve a situation in which the State, for example,
“without proper justification or procedure, demolishes the shacks of
squatters, thereby removing their existing access to housing.”298 They
go on to argue that the “duty to protect places a positive duty on the
state to protect the bearers of these rights from unwarranted
interference by private or non-state parties, or at least to provide an
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 157.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 7(1).
297
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 7(2).
298
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245 at 158. Feinberg argues, for example,
that after 1948, the year in which apartheid became official policy in South Africa,
the “government orchestrated a new, large-scale dispossession to evict African
owners and tenants from their urban homes and districts, as well as to expel rural
Africans from so-called ‘black spots.’ This policy of forced removals may have
included as many as 3.5 million people and included a reorganization of rural space
to accommodate the people who were removed from cities or their rural land.” See
Harvey M. Feinberg, Dispossession, Black South African Land Ownership and Restitution in
Historical Perspective, 1913–1948 and Beyond, in SOUTH AFRICA AFTER APARTHEID:
POLICIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 87, 87 (Arrigo
Pallotti & Ulf Engel eds., 2016).
295
296
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effective remedy should that have happened.”299 They note that, with
respect to South Africa, the right to protect, when “[a]pplied to the
right to access to sufficient food for instance, this duty implies that the
state is under an obligation to regulate the prices of foodstuffs, in order
to ensure that they remain within the reach of ordinary people.”300
With respect to the right to promote, the State has the
obligation to educate the citizenry and make sure that they are fully
aware of their rights while “[t]he obligation to fulfil refers to the positive
obligation on the state to ensure the full realization of the rights in
question.”301 When the duty to fulfil is applied to ESC rights, it means
that “except to the extent that this is excluded through internal
qualifiers (and of course the general limitations clause), the state must
ensure that everyone within its jurisdiction ultimately receives the
social goods in question.”302
Section 8(2) is another general provision of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, which can potentially and significantly
impact human rights in South Africa generally and socio-economic
rights in particular. This section states as follows: “A provision of the
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158. Emphasis in original.
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158.
301
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158. Emphasis in original.
302
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158. See also Maastricht Guidelines on
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, The Netherlands, Jan. 22–
26, 1997, para. 6, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html
(Oct. 20, 2019). Paragraph 6 of the Maastricht Guidelines, which deals with the
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil states as follows: “Like civil and political
rights, economic, social and cultural rights impose three different types of obligations
on States: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. Failure to perform any one of
these three obligations constitutes a violation of such rights. The obligation to respect
requires States to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of economic, social
and cultural rights. Thus, the right to housing is violated if the State engages in
arbitrary forced evictions. The obligation to protect requires States to prevent
violations of such rights by third parties. Thus, the failure to ensure that private
employers comply with basic labor standards may amount to a violation of the right
to work or the right to just and favorable conditions of work. The obligation to fulfil
requires States to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and
other measures towards the full realization of such rights. Thus, the failure of States
to provide essential primary health care to those in need may amount to a violation.”
Maastricht Guidelines, id. at para. 6.
299
300
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Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent
that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the
nature of any duty imposed by the right.”303
According to § 8(2), ESC rights bind the State and create and
regulate a vertical relationship between it and individuals within the
State.304 The section also creates and regulates a horizontal relationship
between private parties. It is important too that §§ 26(3) and 27(3)
which deal with arbitrary evictions and the denial of emergency medical
treatment respectively, clearly bind private persons/parties.305 The ESC
rights and all the other rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the
general limitation clause provided in § 36.306
In ratifying the ICESCR, some countries made “qualifications”
in respect of some of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant. South
Africa ratified the Covenant on January 12, 2015, and in doing so, it
made a declaration under Article 13(2)(a), which read as follows: “The
Government of the Republic of South Africa will give progressive
effect to the right to education, as provided for in Article 13(2)(a) and
Article 14, within the framework of its National Education Policy and

CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 8(2).
If, for example, the state arbitrarily deprives a person of his property, that
person can seek relief in the courts. Such action by the state violates § 25(1) of the
Constitution (which is part of the Bill of Rights). That section states as follows: “No
one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.” CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 25(1).
305
If a landlord arbitrarily evicts a tenant, the latter can bring action in court
for relief. The landlord’s action violates one of the rights elaborated in the Bill of
Rights. Section 26(3) states as follows: “No one may be evicted from their home, or
have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all
the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” CONST. S.
AFR., 1996, § 26(3). See also Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158.
306
Section 36(1) states that: “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited
only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including—(a) the
nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature
and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose;
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 36(1).
303
304
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available resources.”307 In South Africa, civil society and various nongovernmental organizations (e.g., the Socio-Economic Rights
Institute,308 the Legal Resources Center, Section 27,309 and the
Community Law Center),310 many of whom had fought for ratification,
criticized the government regarding its Article 13(2)(a) declaration.
Section 27, the Legal Resources Center and several other NGOs
declared as follows: “We are dismayed by the qualification made in
respect of the right to education, which detracts from what is otherwise
a moment to celebrate.”311
The South African Constitution provides qualifications to ESC
rights that are similar to those attached to the rights in the ICESCR.
For example, § 27 of the South African Constitution guarantees rights
to heath care, food, water and social security. Nevertheless, paragraph
2 of § 27 imposes an internal qualification on the State’s obligation to
realize these rights: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of

307
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: STATUS AS AT OCTOBER 21, 2019: DECLARATIONS AND RESERVATIONS,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec (Oct. 21, 2019).
308
The Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa is a non-profit
human rights organization, “which work[s] with communities, social movements,
individuals and other non-profit organizations in South Africa and beyond to
develop and implement strategies to challenge inequality and realize socio-economic
rights.” SERI (SOCIO-E CONOMIC RIGHTS INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA),
http://www.seri-sa.org (Oct. 21, 2019).
309
According to its website, Section 27 is “a public interest law center that
seeks to achieve substantive equality and social justice in South Africa.” See SECTION
27: CATALYSTS FOR JUSTICE, http://section27.org.za (Oct. 21, 2019).
310
The Community Law Center was renamed the Dullah Omar Institute for
Constitutional Law, Governance and Human Rights in honor of its founding
direction, Dullah Omar, the first Minister of Justice in post-apartheid democratic
South Africa. The Center was born out of community reaction to apartheid and
opened its doors in 1990 with financial assistance from the Ford Foundation. The
Center played a critical role in the negotiations to produce a non-racial democratic
state in South Africa. See Dullah Omar Institute: About Us,
https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/about-us/about-the-institute (Oct. 21, 2019).
311
ESCR-Net, The Government of South Africa ratifies the ICESCR, Jan. 201,
2015,
https://www.escr-net.org/news/2015/government-south-africa-ratifiesicescr (Oct. 21, 2019).
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each of these rights.”312 It is evident, then, that with respect to South
Africa, one can recognize two types of ESC rights: “those with a fairly
standard list of internal qualifications, and those without these
qualifications.”313 The standard qualifications indicate that the
government need only provide “access” to the “social good in
question”314 and can do so, as made evident by § 27, “subject to
available resources” and the State need only take “reasonable legislative
and other measures” towards the “progressive realization” of these
ESC rights.315
The South African constitution speaks in terms of “rights to
access,” as opposed to “direct access” to certain social goods. For
example, § 26(1) states that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to
adequate housing” and that “[t]he state must take reasonable legislative
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realization of this right.”316 Again, in § 27(1), it is stated
that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to—(a) health care services,
including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves
and their dependents, appropriate social assistance.”317 Heyns and
Brand argue that:
The formulation of some socio-economic rights in the
South African Constitution as rights to “access” to
certain social goods, rather than as direct rights to the
social goods in question, does not reflect the
formulation of socio-economic rights in the ICESCR
or other international instruments, where rights are
formulated as direct rights.318

312
313
314
315

CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(2). Emphasis added.
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 158.
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 159.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(2). See also Heyns and Brand, supra note 245,

at 159.
316
317
318

CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(1). Emphasis added.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(1)(a–c).
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 159.
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They go on to note that this formulation, “give[s] expression
to the interpretation attached to the rights on the international level as
in the first instance rights to the creation of an enabling environment
rather than rights to the provision of specific social goods.”319 Thus,
“[t]he point of departure on the international level with regard to
socio-economic rights is that of individuals who, given the right kind
of enabling environment, are able to acquire the social goods implied
by these rights for themselves.”320 The obligation imposed on the State
with respect to these rights as defined in these international
instruments is that each State should “create the right kind of
environment within which self-sufficient individuals are able to acquire
social goods for themselves” and that the State does not have to
directly provide these socio-economic goods.321
With respect to South Africa, consider, for example, the right
to health care, food, water, and society security, enumerated in § 27 of the
South African Constitution.322 The enumeration of these rights is
prefaced by the phrase: “Everyone has the right to have access to,”323 which
implies that the obligation imposed on the State of South Africa by the
constitution is not for the government to directly provide those social
goods and services (e.g., health care, food, water, and social security).
Instead, the constitutional obligation is for the government to create
an enabling environment within which each citizen can, on their own
accord, acquire the socio-economic goods implied by these rights. 324
The South African Constitution states simply that “[e]veryone
has the right to have access to,” for example, “adequate housing,”
“health care services, including reproductive health care,” etc.325 It
appears that under Section 27(1)(b) of the South African Constitution,
which deals with the right to have access to “sufficient food and water,”326
the South African state—at the national, provincial and local levels—
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326

Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 159.
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 159.
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 159.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(1).
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(1). Emphasis added.
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 159.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, §§ 26(1) and 27(1)(a).
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, §27(1)(b).
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is not legally required to provide citizens with food. However, the State
is required to make certain that quality food at affordable prices is
made available to all citizens. Nevondwe and Odeku argue, for
example, that “the right to food is subject to the qualifier of
progressive realization within the State’s available resources.”327
Thus, the ESC rights guaranteed by South Africa’s Bill of
Rights do not entitle citizens to socio-economic goods that are
provided by the government at no cost to them. As made clear by §
27, the Constitution only guarantees the “right to have access to,” for
example, “sufficient food and water.”328 Nevertheless, in the case of a
“natural disaster or famine, or other forms of destitution,” the State is
then expected to “become responsible for the actual provision of
food” and other socio-economic goods and services (e.g., health
care).329
The UN CESCR has made several general comments on the
nature of States Parties’ obligations with regard to the ESC rights. In
General Comment No. 3, the CESCR states that “while the [ICESCR]
provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the constraints
due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various
obligations which are of immediate effect.”330 According to the
CESCR, in order to fully understand and appreciate the “precise
nature” of the obligations of States Parties under the ICESCR,331 one
must take cognizance of the following specific obligations found in
Articles 2(1) & 2(2): First, is the “undertakes to take steps” obligation:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take steps, individually and through international
Lufuno Nevondwe and Kola O. Odeku, An Overview of the Constitutional
Right to Food under the South African Constitution, 5 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCI. 761,
761–762 (2014).
328
CONST. REP. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(1)(b).
329
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 159.
330
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General
Comment No. 3: The Nature of States’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant),
E/1991/23,
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Trea
tyID=9&DocTypeID=11 (Oct. 31, 2019).
331
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 1.
327
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assistance and cooperation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.332
Second, is the “undertake to guarantee” that the rights
enumerated in the ICESCR “will be exercised without discrimination”
obligation:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any
kind as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status. 333
With respect to these two obligations, the CESCR, in its
General Comment No. 3, states that “while the full realization of the
relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal
must be taken within a reasonably short time after the [ICESCR’s]
entry into force for the States concerned” and that “[s]uch steps should
be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards
meeting the obligations recognized in the [ICESCR].”334 Although, as
indicated in Article 2(1), each State Party is required to undertake to
take steps to achieve the full realization of the rights recognized in the
ICESCR, the State Party is expected to do so “to the maximum of its
available resources.”335 CESCR adds in its General Comment No. 3,
however, that “even where the available resources are demonstrably
inadequate, the obligation remains for a State Party to strive to ensure
the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the
See ICESCR, infra note 333, art. 2(1). Emphasis added.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
UNGA
Res.
2200A
(XXI)
(Dec.
16,
1966),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx (Oct. 31, 2019),
art. 2(2). Emphasis added.
334
See CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 2.
335
See ICESCR, supra note 333, art. 2(1). Emphasis added.
332
333
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prevailing circumstances.”336 Thus, even if a State does not have
enough resources to carry out all its necessary obligations, “the
obligation remains for a State Party to strive to ensure the widest
possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing
circumstances.”337 In addition, argues the CESCR, “even in times of
severe resources constraints whether caused by a process of
adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable
members of society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption
of relatively low-cost targeted programs.”338
The means which the State is expected to use to realize the
qualified ESC rights contained in South Africa’s Bill of Rights—which
are “reasonable legislative and other measures,”339 are “similar to those
mentioned in article 2(1) of the ICESCR (‘all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’).” 340 The
CESCR argues, however, that “the adoption of legislative measures, as
specifically foreseen by the [ICESCR], is by no means exhaustive of
the obligations of States Parties.”341 The phrase “by all appropriate
means,” argues the CESCR, “must be given its full and natural
meaning.”342 States Parties to the ICESCR must, therefore, provide the
CESCR with reports that “indicate not only the measures that have
been taken but also the basis on which they are considered to be the
most ‘appropriate’ under the circumstances.”343
The CESCR also noted that “[a]mong the measures that might
be considered appropriate, in addition to legislation, is the provision
of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance
with the national legal system, be considered justiciable.”344 For
example, in South Africa, a country with a notorious and painful
history of racial and other forms of discrimination, the provision of an
336
337
338
339
340

CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 11.
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 11.
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 12.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 24(b).
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 160. See also ICESCR, supra note 333,

art. 2(1).
341
342
343
344

CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 4.
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 4.
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 4.
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 5.
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effective and independent judiciary system has been considered critical
to the elimination of various forms of discrimination in the postapartheid society.345 Additional measures that are considered
“appropriate” for the purpose of effecting the obligations imposed on
States Parties by Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, include “administrative,
financial, educational and social measures.”346
Another “internal qualifier” placed on the South African State
by the country’s Constitution as relates to the realization of the ESC
rights is the requirement that “[t]he state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realization of this right.”347 This internal qualifier is
analogous to that found in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR that States
Parties must “take steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized” in the ICESCR. 348
Due to resource scarcity, the realization of the ESC rights
requires time, especially in countries, such as those in Africa, with
extremely high rates of poverty. Many of these economies are unable
to attract the type of investment expenditures that can create both
wealth and jobs as well as generate the revenues that the government
needs to realize the ESC rights. In addition, these countries face
additional challenges from dysfunctional governing processes which
endanger peace and security.349 The absence of peace and security in
345
See Pius Nkonzo Langa, The Protection of Human Rights by the Judiciary and
Other Structures in South Africa, 52 SMU L. REV. 1531 (1999) (examining, inter alia, the
role of the judiciary in the promotion and protection of human rights in postapartheid South Africa).
346
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 7.
347
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(2).
348
See ICESCR, supra note 333, art. 2(1). See also CESCR General Comment
No. 3, supra note 330, para. 9 (noting, inter alia, that “[t]he concept of progressive
realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization of all economic,
social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of
time.”).
349
In countries, such as Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, and South
Sudan, the absence of effective and fully functioning governance systems has
exacerbated violent conflict between subcultures and created an environment that is
antithetical to entrepreneurship and the creation of the wealth that could be used to
realize ESC rights. Even in countries with more effective and democratic governance
institutions (e.g., Nigeria and Kenya), corruption and other forms of political
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these countries threatens the type of investment that could create the
wealth needed to significantly improve the fulfilment of the ESC
rights. Hence, “[b]ecause the full realization of socio-economic rights
(including hospitals and universities, training doctors, et cetera) takes
time, an obligation to realize the rights fully immediately would be
unrealistic—the obligation is accordingly tempered to require only the
full realization of the rights over time.”350
This, however, is not a “blanket reprieve,”351 which may allow
the State to take as long as it wishes to fulfil the obligations imposed
on it by the ICESCR and, in the case of South Africa and other
countries, their national constitutions. However, as the CESCR argues
in its General Comment No. 3, while States Parties do have some level
of flexibility when it comes to the realization of the ESC rights, each
State Party, nevertheless, is required “to move as expeditiously and
effectively as possible towards [the realization of the rights spelled out
in the ICESCR].”352 As reflected in the Maastricht Guidelines on
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “[t]he fact that the
full realization of most economic, social and cultural rights can only be
achieved progressively, . . . does not alter the nature of the legal
obligation of States which requires that certain steps be taken
immediately and others as soon as possible.”353 Thus, “the burden is
on the State to demonstrate that it is making measurable progress

opportunism continue to obstruct economic growth and wealth creation. See, e.g.,
Jorge C. Carrasco, Africa’s Economic Development is Impeded by Corruption and Populism,
FOUNDATION
FOR
ECONOMIC
EDUCATION,
Dec.
30,
2018,
https://fee.org/articles/africa-s-economic-development-is-impeded-by-corruptionand-populism/ (Dec. 12, 2019); THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH
SUDAN: CORRUPTION, PEACEBUILDING, AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION (Steven C.
Roach & Derrick K. Hudson eds., 2018) (presenting a series of essays that examines,
inter alia, obstacles to human development in South Sudan); MEGAN BRADLEY,
IBRAHIM FRAIHAT & HOUDA MZIOUDET, LIBYA’S DISPLACEMENT CRISIS:
UPROOTED BY REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR (2016) (examining, inter alia, Libya’s
descend into anarchy).
350
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 160.
351
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 160.
352
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 9.
353
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan.
22–26, 1997, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html (Nov. 1,
2019), at para. 8.
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toward the full realization of the rights in question.” 354 In addition, the
State cannot “justify derogations or limitations of rights recognized in
the [ICESCR] because of different social, religious and cultural
backgrounds.”355 The Maastricht Principles also state that “resource
scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum obligations in
respect of the implementation of economic, social and cultural
rights.”356
The CESCR also talks in terms of a “minimum core obligation
[on the part of States Parties] to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the [ESC] rights.” 357 As an
example, the CESCR states that a State Party in which any significant
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic
forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations
under the [ICESCR].358
1. The South African Constitution and Priority Rights
Some scholars have distinguished between ESC rights that are
not subject to internal constitutional qualifications, which they call
“priority obligations” and those that are subject to internal
constitutional qualifications or “internally qualified rights.” 359 The
South African Constitution creates priority rights through certain
provisions. First, § 29(1)(a), which is part of the Bill of Rights, provides
that “[e]veryone has the right—(a) to a basic education, including adult
basic education.”360 Second, the Interim Constitution also made similar
guarantees—§ 32(a) provides that “[e]very person shall have the
right—(a) to basic education and to equal access to educational
institutions.”361 In In re Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995, the
Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 353, at para. 8.
Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 353, at para. 8.
356
Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 353, at para. 8.
357
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 10.
358
CESCR General Comment No. 3, supra note 330, para. 10.
359
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 161.
360
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 29(1)(a).
361
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 200 of
1993), https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-southafrica-act-200-1993 (Nov. 1, 2019), art. 32(a).
354
355
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Constitutional Court of South Africa held that § 32(a) of the Interim
Constitution “creates a positive right that basic education be provided
for every person and not merely a negative right that such a person
should not be obstructed in pursuing his or her basic education.” 362 In
Motala and Another v. University of Natal, a case that was decided in 1995
under the Interim Constitution and before the permanent constitution
was adopted in 1996, the then Supreme Court held that the expression
“basic education” as it is used in § 32(a) “does not include institutions
of higher learning.”363
Third, South Africa’s Bill of Rights also defines the rights of
“[a]rrested, detained and accused persons.”364 Section 35(2)(e) provides
that “[e]veryone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner,
has the right—(e) to conditions of detention that are consistent with
human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state
expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and
medical treatment.”365 The interpretation of this section, in so far as it
relates to “adequate medical treatment” was the subject of Van Biljon
and Others v. Minister of Correctional Services and Others.366
In this case, a group of South African prisoners, who were HIV
positive and had reached the symptomatic stage of the disease (i.e.,
AIDS), had claimed that they had a constitutionally-guaranteed right
to be provided anti-viral medication at government expense as per §
35(2)(e).367 The High Court (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division)
was called upon to decide two issues. The first issue was whether
prisoners living with HIV who had reached the symptomatic stage of
the disease were entitled to be prescribed antiretroviral treatment. The
second issue was directly related to the first: if, indeed, these prisoners
were entitled to be prescribed antiretroviral treatment, would such an
In re Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995, [1996] ZACC 4; 1996 C4)
BCLR 537; 1996 (3) SA 165 (Apr. 4, 1996), para. 9 per Mahomed DP.
363
Motala and Another v. University of Natal, 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D); 1995
SACLR LEXIS 256, at 2.
364
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 35.
365
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 35(2)(e).
366
Van Biljon and Others v. Minister of Correctional Services and Others,
1997 (4) SA 441 (C); 1997 (6) BCLR 789 (C). This case is also cited as B and Others
v. Minister of Correctional Services and Others.
367
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 35(2)(e).
362
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entitlement be at government expense? The “Court held that the first
question was not within its purview to decide, as it was a purely medical
assessment.”368 With respect to the second question, the Court “held
that a lack of funds did not justify the Government’s failure to realize
a prisoner’s right to adequate medical treatment.”369 The Court,
however, noted that “the determination of what constitutes ‘adequate
medical treatment’ could not be made in a vacuum and that financial
constraints could be considered when making this decision.”370
It has been noted that §§ 26(3) and 27(3) of the South African
Constitution also “create priority obligations” on the part of the
government.371 Section 26(3) deals with “housing” and provides as
follows:
No one may be evicted from their home, or have their
home demolished, without an order of court made
after considering all the relevant circumstances. No
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.372
In Despatch Municipality v. Sunridge Estate and Development
Corporation (Pty) Ltd.,373 the High Court was called upon to rule on the
conflict between § 3(b) of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (Act
No. 52 of 1951)374 and § 26(3) of the South African Constitution.
Section 3(b) of the 1951 law authorized the demolition of unauthorized
368
B and Others v. Minister of Correctional Services and Others: Judgment
Details,
GLOBAL
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS
DATABASE,
https://www.globalhealthrights.org/africa/van-biljon-and-ors-v-minister-ofcorrectional-services-and-ors-also-known-as-b-v-minister-of-correctional-services/
(Nov. 3, 2019).
369
B and Others, supra note 368.
370
B and Others, supra note 368. See also Van Biljon and Others, supra note
366, paras. 49, 58.
371
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 162.
372
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(3).
373
Despatch Municipality v. Sunridge Estate and Development Corporation
(Pty) Ltd., 1997 (8) BCLR 1023 (SE).
374
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (Act No. 52 of 1951), § 3(b),
http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/leg19510706028020052 (Nov. 3, 2019). This statute was
enacted during three years after apartheid become law in South Africa and was
designed to prohibit illegal squatting and was aimed primarily at the country’s African
population.
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“buildings or structures” without a court order. This was directly in
conflict with § 26(3) of the Constitution of South Africa. The High
Court held that § 3(b) was in conflict with § 26(3) and declared the
former invalid.375
The requirements of § 26 were also examined in Occupiers of 51
Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg and City of
Johannesburg and Others.376 In this case,
[m]ore than 400 occupiers of two buildings in the inner
city of Johannesburg (the occupiers) applied for leave
to appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal. They challenged the correctness of the
judgment and order of that Court authorizing their
eviction at the instance of the City of Johannesburg
(the City) based on the finding that the buildings they
occupied were unsafe and unhealthy.377
Yacoob J, writing for the Constitutional Court (“CC”), noted
that § 26(3) of the Constitution “prohibits eviction of people from
their home absent a court order that must be made after taking into
account all the relevant circumstances. It means in effect that no
person may be compelled to leave their home unless there exists an
appropriate court order.”378 In addition, the learned justice added that
“[i]t follows that any provision that compels people to leave their
homes on pain of criminal sanction in the absence of a court order is
contrary to the provisions of section 26(3) of the Constitution.” 379
Yacoob J also made reference to the CC’s decision in Port Elizabeth
Municipality v. Various Occupiers,380 where it was held that:

Despatch Municipality, supra note 373.
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street,
Johannesburg and City of Johannesburg and Others, [2008] ZACC 1; 2008 (3) SA
208 (CC); 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) (Feb. 19, 2008).
377
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, supra note 376, para. 1.
378
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, supra note 376, para. 49.
379
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, supra note 376, para. 49.
380
Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers, 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC).
375
376
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Section 26(3) evinces special constitutional regard for
a person’s place of abode. It acknowledges that a home
is more than just a shelter from the elements. It is a
zone of personal intimacy and family security. Often it
will be the only relatively secure space of privacy and
tranquility in what (for poor people in particular) is a
turbulent and hostile world. Forced removal is a shock
for any family, the more so for one that established
itself on a site that has become its familiar habitat. 381
Section 27(3) of the South African Constitution provides that
“[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment.”382 The South
African Constitutional Court was called upon to consider this
constitutional provision in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZuluNatal).383 In this case, the appellant was a forty-one-year old,
unemployed, diabetic man, who suffered “from ischaemic heart
disease and cerebro-vascular disease which caused him to have a stroke
during 1996.”384 After his kidneys failed, he subsequently applied for
dialysis at state expense but his application was not successful. The CC
turned down the application. Writing for the Constitutional Court,
Chaskalson P held as follows:
The applicant suffers from chronic renal failure. To be
kept alive by dialysis he would require such treatment
two to three times a week. This is not an emergency
which calls for immediate remedial treatment. It is an
ongoing state of affairs resulting from a deterioration
of the applicant’s renal function which is incurable. In
my view section 27(3) does not apply to these facts.385
Chaskalson P then noted that § 27(3) only provides that

Port Elizabeth Municipality, supra note 380, para. 17.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(3).
383
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), [1997] ZACC 17;
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (Nov. 27, 1997).
384
Soobramoney, supra note 383, para. 1.
385
Soobramoney, supra note 383, para. 21.
381
382
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[a] person who suffers a sudden catastrophe which
calls for immediate medical attention . . . should not be
refused ambulance or other emergency services which
are available and should not be turned away from a
hospital which is able to provide the necessary
treatment. What the section requires is that remedial
treatment that is necessary and available be given
immediately to avert that harm. 386
2. The South African Constitution and Internally Qualified Rights
Sections 26, 27 and 29 of the South African Constitution create
internally qualified rights. First, is § 26 which provides as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate
housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realization of this right.387
Second, is § 27, which provides as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to—
(a) health care services, including reproductive
health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to
support themselves and their dependents,
appropriate assistance.

386
387

Soobramoney, supra note 383, para. 20.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(1–2).
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(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realization of each of these rights. 388
Note that § 27(1)(a) and § 27(2)389 were dealt with by the
Constitutional Court in Soobramoney where the applicant made a claim
for kidney dialysis treatment at state expense after invoking § 27(3).
The Constitutional Court rejected his application, based on the right
to “emergency medical treatment”390 and the “right to life.”391
Nevertheless, Chaskalson P, writing for the CC, attempted to
determine if the applicant’s application could succeed on the basis of
§ 27(1)(a)’s “right to have access to—(a) health care services.”392 The
Court noted that the right described in § 27(1)(a) is qualified by §
27(2)—the State is only required by the Constitution to give effect to
the right contained in § 27(1)(a) “within its available resources.”393
Chaskalson P then noted that “[i]n the Court a quo Combrinck
J had held that ‘[i]n this case the respondent has conclusively proved
that there are no funds available to provide patients such as the
applicant with the necessary treatment.’”394 The learned justice then
went on to note that it was not only the Department of Health in
KwaZulu-Natal that did not have enough funds to “cover the cost of
services which are being provided to the public” but that this was “a
nation-wide problem” as “resources [were] stretched in all renal clinics
throughout the land.”395 Chaskalson P also noted that the respondent
had developed guidelines that could be used to “assist the persons
working in these clinics to make the agonizing choices which have to
be made in deciding who should receive treatment, and who not. These
guidelines were applied in the present case.”396

388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396

CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(1–2).
As § 27(2) relates to § 27(1)(a).
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(3).
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 11.
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(1)(a).
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 27(2).
Soobramoney, supra note 383, para. 23.
Soobramoney, supra note 383, para. 24.
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Stating that “[a] court will be slow to interfere with rational
decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical
authorities whose responsibility is to deal with such matters,” 397
Chaskalson P held that the applicant’s claim would still have failed
even if “it had been brought on the basis of section 27(1)(a).” 398
Finally, is § 29(1)(b), which provides that “[e]veryone has the
right—to further education, which the state, through reasonable
measures, must make progressively available and accessible.”399 In
Mahapa v. Minister of Higher Education and Another,400 the High Court of
South Africa (Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg) was called upon
to decide a case involving § 29(1)(b). The applicant, Desmond Mahapa,
had applied for a bursary from the National Student Financial Aid
Scheme (“NSFAS”) to finance his study of law at the University of
South Africa (“UNISA”) but was not successful.401
The applicant in Mahapa “contented that he [was] entitled to
education at the tertiary level”402 by virtue of the right provided him by
§ 29(1)(b) of the Constitution. 403 The counsel for the Minister of
Education (the first respondent) argued, however, that the first
respondent had “no obligation to provide funds for the applicant to
further his education” based on the strength of § 36(1) which provides
that:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only
in terms of law of general application to the extent that
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant
factors, including—

Soobramoney, supra note 383, para. 29.
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 163. See also Soobramoney, supra note
383, para. 31.
399
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 29(1)(b).
400
Mahapa v. Minister of Higher Education and Another, [2017] ZAGP
JHC 9; [2017] 2 All SA 254 (GJ) (Feb. 7, 2017).
401
Mahapa, supra note 400, at paras. 1–11.
402
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 12.
403
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 29(1)(b).
397
398
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(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its
purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.404
As part of the analysis of the case, Mabesele J provided a brief
review of the educational system of South Africa, with specific
emphasis on access to education for African children during the
apartheid era. The learned judge noted that since the end of apartheid,
the “law and policies that governed and regulated [the] system of
education [have] since been repealed” and that it would “not be
necessary to refer to them, save to demonstrate their adverse impact
on the education of the African child.”405
Mabesele J noted that during the apartheid period in South
Africa, “educational policies were carefully and deliberately formulated
on the basis of discrimination, with the primary intention to prevent
an African child, in particular, from thinking independently, debating
issues constructively and becoming self-reliant.”406 The learned judge
then referred to the Constitutional Court of South Africa case, Head of
Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v. Hoërskool
Ermelo and Another,407 and highlighted what Moseneke DCJ said about
the impact of apartheid on education in South Africa.
Writing for the CC in Head of Department, Moseneke DCJ
reminded the country of the oppressive nature of the policy of
apartheid on South Africa’s black population:

CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 35(1)(a–e).
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 18.
406
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 19.
407
Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and
Another v. Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC);
2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) (Oct. 14, 2009).
404
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Apartheid has left us with many scars. The worst of
these must be the vast discrepancy in access to public
and private resources. The cardinal fault line of our
past oppression ran along race, class and gender. It
authorized a hierarchy of privilege and disadvantage.
Unequal access to opportunity prevailed in every
domain. Access to private or public education was no
exception. While much remedial work has been done
since the advent of constitutional democracy, sadly
deep social disparities and resultant social inequity are
still with us.
It is so that white public schools were hugely better
resourced than black schools. They were lavishly
treated by the apartheid government. It is also true that
they served and were shored up by relatively affluent
white communities. On the other hand, formerly black
public schools have been and by and large remain
scantily resourced. They were deliberately funded
stingily by the apartheid government. Also, they served
in the main and were supported by relatively deprived
black communities. That is why perhaps the most
abiding and debilitating legacy of our past is an unequal
distribution of skills and competencies acquired
through education.408
Mabesele J then noted that section 29(1) was designed to
address these extreme inequalities in the distribution of educational
opportunities.409 However, § 29(1) distinguishes between an immediately
realizable right and one that is progressively realizable given available resources.
The right to “basic education” is provided for in § 29(1)(a)—Mabesele
J argues that this right is “immediately realizable.”410 This was made
clear in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Others v. Essay

408
409
410

Head of Department, supra note 407, at paras. 45–46.
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 24.
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 25.
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N. O. and Others,411 where Nkabinde J, writing for the Constitutional
Court, held as follows:
It is important, for the purpose of this judgment, to
understand the nature of the right to “a basic
education” under section 29(1)(a). Unlike some of the
other socio-economic rights, this right is immediately realizable.
There is no internal limitation requiring that the right
be “progressively realized” within “available
resources” subject to “reasonable legislative
measures.” The right to a basic education in section
29(1)(a) may be limited only in terms of a law of general
application which is “reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom.” This right is therefore distinct
from the right to “further education” provided for in
section 29(1)(b). The state is, in terms of that right,
obliged, through reasonable measures, to make further
education “progressively available and accessible.”412
Mabesele J noted that South African courts have, on several
occasions, “ordered the state to comply with section 289(1)(a) in order
to fulfil its constitutional obligation.” 413 For example, in Tripartite
Steering Committee and Another v. Minister of Basic Education and Others,414
the High Court of South Africa (Eastern Cape Division,
Grahamstown) directed the Minster of Basic Education “to provide
scholar transport . . . to the scholars”415 who lived very far away from
their school and were unable to afford the cost of transportation. In
the High Court’s view, the right to basic education would be

411
Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Others v. Essay
N. O. and Others, [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) (Apr. 11, 2010).
412
Governing Body, supra note 411, at para. 37. Emphasis added. Footnotes
omitted.
413
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 26.
414
Tripartite Steering Committee and Another v. Minister of Basic
Education and Others, [2015] ZAECGHC 67; 2015 (5) SA 107 (ECG); [2-15] 3 All
SA 718 (ECG) (June 25, 2015).
415
Tripartite Steering Committee, supra note 414, para. 67.
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meaningless if students could not get to school to receive that
education. Specifically, the High Court declared that:
The right to education is meaningless without teachers
to teach, administrators to keep schools running, desks
and other furniture to allow scholars to do their work,
text books from which to learn and transport to and from
school at State expense in appropriate cases. 416
In Section 27 & Others v. Minister of Education and Another,
Kollapen J came to a similar conclusion as that reached in Tripartite
Steering Committee. The learned judge declared that “the failure by the
Limpopo Department of Education and the Department of Basic
Education to provide text books to schools in Limpopo is a violation
of a right to basic education.”417 The learned judge ordered the
Limpopo Department of Education/Department of Basic Education
“to provide text books for Grades R, 1, 2, 3 and 10 on an urgent
basis.”418
Kollapen J’s ruling in Section 27 & Others was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa by the Minister of Basic
Education and other Limpopo officials.419 In dismissing the appeal,
Navsa J (with Lewis, Cachalia, Petse and Dambuza JJA concurring)
“declared that § 29(1)(a) of the Constitution entitles every learner at
public schools in Limpopo to be provided with every textbook
prescribed for his or her grade before commencement of the teaching
of the course for which the textbook is prescribed.”420 The learned
judge declared further that “it is the duty of the State, in terms of s 7(2)
of the Constitution, to fulfil the s 29(1)(a) right of every learner by
providing him or her with every textbook prescribed for his or her
grade before commencement of the teaching of the course for which
416
Tripartite Steering Committee, supra note 414, para. 17, Plasket J citing
to Kollapen J in Section 27 & Others v. Minister of Education and Another, [2012]
ZAGPPHC 114; [2012] 3 All SA 579 (GNP); 2013 (2) BCLR 237 (GNP); 2013 (2)
SA 40 (GNP) (May 17, 2012).
417
Section 27 & Others, supra note 416, at para. 20(2).
418
Section 27 & Others, supra note 416, at para. 20(3).
419
Minister of Basic Education v. Basic Education for All, [2015] ZASCA
198; [2016] 1 All SA 369 (SCA); 2016 (4) SA 63 (SCA) (Dec. 2, 2015).
420
Basic Education for All, supra note 419, at para. 3(1).
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the textbook is prescribed.”421 Finally, Navsa J declared that “the
National Department of Basic Education and the Limpopo
Department of Education violated the s 29(1)(a), s 9 (equality) and s
10 (dignity) rights of learners in Limpopo in 2014 by failing to provide
all of them with every prescribed textbook before commencement of
the teaching of the courses for which they were prescribed.”422
While § 29(1)(a) deals with rights to basic education, § 29(1)(b)
addresses the “right to further [tertiary] education.”423 The applicant in
Mahapa relied on § 29(1)(b) to seek a bursary from the Minister of
Higher Education to fund his study of the law.424 Mabesele J, writing
for the High Court in Mahapa, noted that “[u]nlike section 29(1)(a), [§
29(1)(b)] . . . has internal limitation, requiring the state to be obliged,
through reasonable measures, to make further education ‘progressively
available and accessible.’”425 The learned judge went on to declare that
“[r]egrettably, this right is distinct from [the] right to basic education,
which is immediately realizable, and with no internal limitation
requiring that it be ‘progressively realized’ within ‘available resources’
subject to ‘reasonable legislative measures.’”426
Mabesele J also noted that § 29(1)(a) “is intended to eradicate
illiteracy and promote literacy to enable everyone to understand the
society in which they live and to fit well in that modern society.”427 On
the other hand, § 29(1)(b) is designed to help individuals obtain the
training, education, and the skills that they need to develop into
productive and economically-viable adults.428 The learned judge then
dismissed Desmond Mahapa’s application and declared that the
Minister of Education did not owe any obligation to Mahapa, arising
from section 29(1)(b), to protect the applicant’s right to further his
education, by providing him with funds.”429

421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429

Basic Education for All, supra note 419, at para. 3(2).
Basic Education for All, supra note 419, at para. 3(3).
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, §§ 29(1)(a) and 29(1)(b).
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 30.
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 30.
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 31. Emphasis in original.
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 31.
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 31.
Mahapa, supra note 400, at para. 31.
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3. Other ESC Rights in South Africa’s Constitution
There are other economic, social and cultural rights that are
enshrined in the Bill of Rights but which “do not fit easily into the
scheme of ‘priority’ rights and ‘internally qualified’ rights” examined
earlier. Section 23 defines rights related to labor relations. According
to § 23,
(1) Everyone has the right to fair labor practices.
(2) Every worker has the right—
(a) to form and join a trade union;
(b) to participate in the activities and program of a
trade union; and
(c) to strike.
(3) Every employer has the right—
(a) to form and join an employers’ organization;
and
(b) to participate in the activities and programs of
an employers’ organization.
(4) Every trade union and every employers’
organization has the right—
(a) to determine its own administration, programs
and activities;
(b) to organize; and
(c) to form and join a federation.
(5) Every trade union, employers’ organization and
employer has the right to engage in collective
bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to
regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the
662
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legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the
limitation must comply with section 36(1).
(6) National legislation may recognize union security
arrangements contained in collective agreements. To
the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this
Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1).
Under South Africa’s Constitution and as examined earlier, all
these rights, the ESC rights, the priority rights, the internally qualified
rights, and the labor rights, “are subject to the general limitations
clause.”430
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERPRETATION AND
ADJUDICATION OF CASES INVOLVING ESC RIGHTS IN SOUTH
AFRICA’S BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Introduction
Since the end of apartheid and the emergence of a non-racial,
multiparty, democratic dispensation in the Republic of South Africa,
whose foundation was the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996, there has been intense debate about the justiciability of
economic, social and cultural (“ESC”) rights. The designers of South
Africa’s post-apartheid constitution specifically included ESC rights in
the Bill of Rights.431 One important part of the debate on ESC rights
centered around the “fact that the protection of such rights is
dependent on the availability of resources.”432 Hence, some
commentators have argued that “it is meaningless to provide for such
rights without the resource capacity to ensure their protection.”433
Arguments for and against inclusion of ESC rights in the Bill
of Rights “were considered in the First Certificate Judgment in which
Heyns and Brand, supra note 245, at 163.
John Cantius Mubangizi, The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights
in Selected African Countries: A Comparative Evaluation, 2 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3
(2006).
432
Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3.
433
Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3.
430
431
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the Constitutional Court held that although socio-economic rights are
not universally accepted as fundamental rights, they ‘are, at least to
some extent justiciable; and at the very minimum can be negatively
protected from invasion.’”434 As noted by the Constitutional Court in
the case, Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996,435 “[t]he formal purpose of [the judgment in this case] is to
pronounce whether or not the Court certifies that all the provisions of
South Africa’s proposed new constitution comply with certain
principles contained in the country’s current constitution.” 436
Specifically, the Constitutional Court held, in Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, that:
we are of the view that these rights are, at least to some
extent, justiciable. As we have stated in the previous
paragraph, many of the civil and political rights
entrenched in the NT437 will give rise to similar
budgetary implications without compromising their
justiciability. The fact that socio-economic rights will
almost inevitably give rise to such implications does
not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability.438

Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3. See also Ex parte Chairperson of the
Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996, [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253
(CC) (Sept. 6, 1996).
435
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
supra note 434.
436
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
supra note 434, at para. 1. The reference to the “country’s current constitution” was
to the Interim Constitution, officially known as Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa (Act 200 of 1993). The principles mentioned are those contained in Schedule 4
of the Interim Constitution and called “Constitutional Principles.” See Interim
Constitution, Schedule 4. In order for the Constitutional Court to certify the final
and permanent Constitution, § 71 of the Interim Constitution imposed the following
conditions: “A new constitutional text shall—(a) comply with the Constitutional
Principles contained in Schedule 4; and (b) be passed by the Constitutional Assembly
in accordance with this Chapter.” See Interim Constitution, id. at § 71.
437 “NT” refers to New Text (that is, the 1996 Constitution) to distinguish it
from the Interim Constitution, 1993.
438
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
supra note 434, at para. 78. One of the objections of the inclusion of the socio434
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Since South Africa adopted its permanent Constitution, the
issue of the availability of resources “has been raised in all cases that
have come before the Constitutional Court involving socio-economic
rights.”439 It has been noted that although the Constitutional Court
“initially stuttered in its decision in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health,
KwaZulu-Natal, it was later to redeem itself in the subsequent decisions
in Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, Minister of Health
and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, and Khosa v. Minister
of Social Development.”440 Ngwena and Cook have argued that “what is
missing from Soobramoney is a systematic approach to the determination
of a socio-economic rights and a clear articulation of the normative
content of the right to health care services.”441 In addition, they argued
that:
Soobramoney did not really lay down any guidelines that
could be followed when interpreting socio-economic
rights so as to illuminate and indigenize jurisprudence
on socio-economic rights and also to guide lower
courts with jurisdiction to determine constitutional
matters. The Court did not consider how the right to
health or the right of access to health care has been
interpreted under international human rights
instruments. In particular, the Court failed to make use
of jurisprudence that has been developed by the
Committee on [Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].
Thus, while the Court arrived at the correct conclusion,
its approach fell short of a diligent consideration of
relevant law.442

economic rights in the country’s permanent constitution was “socio-economic rights
are not justiciable, in particular because of the budgetary issues their enforcement
may raise.” Id. at para. 78.
439
Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3.
440
Mubangizi, supra note 431, at 3–4. Footnotes omitted.
441
Ngwena and Cook, infra note 442, at 127.
442
Charles Ngwena and Rebecca Cook, Rights Concerning Health, in SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 107, 137–138 (Danie Brand & Christof Heyns
eds., 2005).
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The Constitutional Court’s decisions in the last three cases
listed above have been in line with the comments of the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) on
the obligations of States Parties under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). With respect to the
ability of States Parties to attribute their failure to meet their minimum
obligations under the ICESCR on a lack of available resources, the
CESCR made the following declaration:
In order for a State party to be able to attribute its
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to
a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that
every effort has been made to use all resources that are
at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of
priority, those minimum obligations.443
The decisions of South Africa’s highest court, the
Constitutional Court, in several cases, have effectively settled the
debate on the justiciability of socio-economic rights in the country.
Yacoob J has noted that “[d]uring argument [in The Government of the
Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others],444 considerable
weight was attached to the value of international law in interpreting
section 26 of the Constitution.” 445 Section 26 of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, which is part of the country’s Bill of
Rights, defines rights related to housing. This section states specifically
that:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate
housing.

443
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (art. 2, para. 1, of the ICESCR), para. 10.
444
The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v.
Grootboom and Others, [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC) (Oct. 4, 2000).
445
Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 26.
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(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realization of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have
their home demolished, without an order of court
made after considering all the relevant circumstances.
No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. 446
Section 39 of the South African Constitution provides
modalities for interpreting the Bill of Rights. 447 This section imposes
an obligation on South African courts to “consider international law
as a tool to interpretation of the Bill of Rights.”448 Specifically, § 39
provides as follows:
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court,
tribunal or forum—
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open
and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when
developing the common law or customary law, every
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of
any other rights or freedoms that are recognized or
conferred by common law, customary law or

446
447
448

CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(1–3).
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 39.
Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 26.
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legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with
the Bill.449
In Makwanyane, a case that was decided under South Africa’s
Interim Constitution, 450 Chaskalson P, writing in the context of § 35(1)
of that Constitution, 451 declared as follows:
[P]ublic international law would include non-binding
as well as binding law. They may both be used under
the section as tools of interpretation. International
agreements and customary international law
accordingly provide a framework within which [the Bill
of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for
that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with
comparable instruments, such as the United Nations
Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the European Commission on
Human Rights, and the European Court of Human
Rights, and, in appropriate cases, reports of specialized
agencies such as the International Labor Organization,
may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation
of particular provisions of [the Bill of Rights]. 452
In the section that follows, we shall examine two South African
cases to see how the country’s courts have utilized international law as
a tool of interpretation in deciding cases involving the economic, social
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 39(1–3). Emphasis added.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ACT 200 OF 1993,
https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africaact-200-1993 (Nov. 4, 2019).
451
Section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution states as follows: “In
interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the
protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to
comparable foreign case law.” Id. at § 35(1). Emphasis added.
452
S v. Makwanyane and Another, [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665;
1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (June 6, 1995), para. 35.
Footnotes omitted.
449
450
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and cultural rights contained in the Bill of Rights. These cases were
chosen because it was the Constitutional Court’s rulings in them that
settled the debate on the justiciability of socio-economic rights in the
Republic of South Africa and established the legal foundation for the
protection of ESC rights in the country. A recent report by the South
African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development noted
that although the government has been providing “free housing to the
poor” for a while, “the Grootboom judgment” (Grootboom is one of the
cases examined), however, “made it mandatory for the State to put in
place mechanisms that would speed up this process and provide shelter
in emergency situations. [Grootboom] led to the introduction of a new
Housing Code that sought to respond to the [Constitutional Court’s]
judgment and order.”453 Grootboom, as well as the other case examined
below—Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and
Others—can be considered foundational cases in the development of
South Africa’s jurisprudence on the enforcement of socio-economic
rights.
B. The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v.
Grootboom and Others (Constitutional Court of South Africa)
In Grootboom and Others,454 Mrs. Irene Grootboom and several
other respondents455 had been evicted from their “informal homes

453
N. Bohler-Muler, et al, Assessment of the Impact of Decisions of the Constitutional
Court and Supreme Court of Appeal on the Transformation of Society: Final Report
(Commissioned by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development),
Nov.
2015,
http://repository.hsrc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.11910/1768/8835_Final%2
0report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Dec. 13, 2019), at 88. See also John Cantius
Mubangizi, The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights in Selected African
Countries: A Comparative Evaluation, 2 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2006). The report
produced by Bohler-Muller and his colleagues at the Human Sciences Research
Council (“HSRC”) and the Nelson Mandela School of Law of the University of Fort
Hare noted that the “Grootboom case had a marked impact on the development of
South African constitutional jurisprudence, particularly on the enforcement of socioeconomic rights” and that it also “had a major impact on housing policy in South
Africa.” Bohler-Muller, id. at 89.
454
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444.
455
The respondents consisted of 510 children and 390 adults. Mrs.
Grootboom, who was the first respondent, had brought an application before the
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situated on private land earmarked for formal low-cost housing”456 and
hence, rendered homeless. After they were evicted, the respondents
made an application to the Cape of Good Hope High Court “for an
order requiring government to provide them with adequate basic
shelter or housing until they obtained permanent accommodation and
were granted certain relief.”457 The High Court ordered the appellants
“to provide the respondents who were children and their parents with
shelter. The judgment provisionally concluded that ‘tents, portable
latrines and a regular supply of water (albeit transported) would
constitute the bare minimum.’”458 Subsequently, “[t]he appellants who
represent all spheres of government responsible for housing
challenge[d] the correctness of that order.”459
During the court hearing on the matter, the appellants made
an offer “to ameliorate the immediate crisis situation in which the
respondents were living. The offer was accepted by the
respondents.” 460 Nevertheless, four months after the offer was made
and accepted, the appellants had not yet complied with the terms of
the offer and the respondents “made an urgent application to [the
Constitutional Court]” and the CC, “after communication with the
parties, crafted an order putting the municipality on terms to provide
certain rudimentary services.”461
Yacoob J, writing for the Constitutional Court, began his
analysis with an overview of the history of housing discrimination
under apartheid and how the latter’s policies affected African people’s

High Court on behalf of all the respondents. See Grootboom and Others, supra note
444, para. 4(fn. 2).
456
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 4.
457
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 4.
458
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 4.
459
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 4. The appellants were the
Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Premier of the Province of the
Western Cape representing the Western Cape Provincial Government, the Cape
Metropolitan Council, and the Oostenberg Municipality, all of which are organs of
the Government of the Republic of South Africa at the central, provincial, and
municipal levels. See id. at fn 5.
460
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 5.
461
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 5.
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access to housing.462 One consequence of apartheid housing and influx
control policies was that they forced many people into “rudimentary
informal settlements providing for minimal shelter, but little else.”463 The
learned justice then went on to describe the horrible conditions which
Mrs. Grootboom and the other respondents, who lived in an informal
settlement called Wallacedene, were subjected to.464
Although Mrs. Grootboom and the others had applied to the
municipal government for “subsidized low-cost housing,”465 none was
forthcoming even after seven years of waiting. So, many of them
moved out of Wallacedene at the end of September 1998 and
subsequently “put up their shacks and shelters on vacant land that was
privately owned and had been earmarked for low-cost housing. They
called the land ‘New Rust.’”466 In December 1998, the owner of the
land on which Mrs. Grootboom and the others had settled “obtained
an ejectment order against them in the magistrates’ court” and after
negotiations, an order of eviction was granted “requiring the occupants
to vacate New Rust and authorizing the sheriff to evict them and to
dismantle and remove any of their structures remaining on the land on
19 May 1999.”467
Yacoob J noted that “although the validity of the eviction order
[had] never been challenged,” to determine its validity under “the
provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from the Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act, 19 of 1998,” it had to be “accepted as
correct.”468 The learned justice then stated that the respondents “were
forcibly evicted at the municipality’s expense” and that “[t]his was
done prematurely and inhumanely: reminiscent of apartheid-style
evictions. The respondents’ homes were bulldozed and burnt and their
possessions destroyed. Many of the residents who were not there could
not even salvage their personal belongings.”469 The respondents
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 6.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 6. Emphasis added.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 7.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 8.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 8.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 9.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 10
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 10.
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subsequently sought shelter at the Wallacedene sports field. Shortly
thereafter, their attorney “wrote to the municipality [and described] the
intolerable conditions under which his clients were living and
demanded that the municipality meet its constitutional obligations and
provide temporary accommodation to the respondents.” 470
Not satisfied with the municipality’s response, the respondents
“launched an urgent application in the High Court on 31 May 1999”
and the High Court subsequently “granted relief to the respondents
and the appellants [appealed] against that relief.”471 Yacoob J then
proceeded to outline the “reasoning adopted in the High Court
judgment.”472 The learned justice noted that Mrs. Grootboom and the
other respondents based their claim on § 26 of the Constitution, which
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to adequate
housing”473 and imposes an obligation on the State “to take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realization of this right.”474 The respondents also
invoked § 28(1)(c) of the Constitution to support their claim.475
Yacoob J noted that the High Court judgment consisted of two
separate parts. First, the High Court considered the respondent’s claim
under § 26 of the Constitution and concluded that:
In short [appellants] are faced with a massive shortage
in available housing and an extremely constrained
budget. Furthermore in terms of the pressing demands
and scarce resources [appellants] had implemented a
housing program in an attempt to maximize available
resources to redress the housing shortage. For this
reason it could not be said that [appellants] had not
taken reasonable legislative and other measures within
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 11.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 11.
472
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 12.
473
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(1).
474
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(2).
475
Section 28(1)(c) provides that “[e]very child has the right—(c) to basic
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.” CONST. S. AFR., 1996,
§ 28(1)(c). Emphasis added.
470
471
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its available resources to achieve the progressive
realization of the right to have access to adequate
housing.476
The High Court then rejected the “argument that the right of
access to adequate housing under section 26 included a minimum core
entitlement to shelter in terms of which the state was obliged to
provide some form of shelter pending implementation of the program
to provide adequate housing.”477 Yacoob J then noted that the second
part of the High Court’s judgment “addressed the claim of the children
for shelter in terms of section 28(1)(c).”478 The learned justice went on
to note that the High Court “reasoned that the parents bore the
primary obligation to provide shelter for their children, but that section
28(1)(c) imposed an obligation on the state to provide that shelter if
parents could not” and that the “shelter to be provided according to
this obligation was a significantly more rudimentary form of protection
from the elements than is provided by a house and falls short of
adequate housing.”479
The High Court then concluded that “an order which enforces
a child’s right to shelter should take account of the need of the child
to be accompanied by his or her parent. Such an approach would be
in accordance with the spirit and purport of section 28 as a whole.” 480
Yacoob J then reviewed the High Court’s order—the Court had
ordered as follows:
(2) It is declared, in terms of section 28 of the
Constitution that;
(a) the applicant children are entitled to be
provided with shelter by the appropriate organ or
department of state;

476
477
478
479
480

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 14.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 14.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 15.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 15.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 15.
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(b) the applicant parents are entitled to be
accommodated with their children in the
aforegoing shelter; and
(c) the appropriate organ or department of state is
obliged to provide the applicant children, and their
accompanying parents, with such shelter until such
time as the parents are able to shelter their own
children.481
Yacoob J then proceeded to outline the argument in the
Constitutional Court (“CC”). The learned justice noted that the
“[w]ritten argument submitted on behalf of the appellants and the
respondents concentrated on the meaning and import of the shelter
component and the obligations imposed upon the state by section
28(1)(c).”482 Yacoob J also noted that
[t]he written argument filed on behalf of the amici
sought to broaden the issues by contending that all the
respondents, including those of the adult respondents
without children, were entitled to shelter by reason of
the minimum core obligation incurred by the state in
terms of section 26 of the Constitution. It was further
contended on behalf of the amici that the children’s
right to shelter had been included in section 28(1)(c) to
place the right of children to this minimum core
beyond doubt.483
Yacoob J then noted that the “key constitutional provisions at
issue in [the case at bar] are section 26 and section 28(1)(c).” 484 The
learned justice then noted that “[w]hile the justiciability of socioeconomic rights has been the subject of considerable jurisprudential
and political debate, the issue of whether socio-economic rights are
justiciable at all in South Africa has been put beyond question by the
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 16.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 18.
483
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 18. Emphasis in original.
484
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 19. See also CONST. S. AFR.,
1996, §§ 26 and 28(1)(c).
481
482

674

2020

The Role of International Human Rights Law

8:2

text of our Constitution as construed in the Certification judgment.” 485
Yacoob J noted that during the certification proceedings,486 it had been
“contended that [socio-economic rights] were not justiciable and
should therefore not have been included in the text of the new
Constitution.”487 In response, the CC held as follows:
[T]hese rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable.
As we have stated in the previous paragraph, many of
the civil and political rights entrenched in the NT will
give rise to similar budgetary implications without
compromising their justiciability. The fact that socioeconomic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such
implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their
justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic
rights can be negatively protected from improper
invasion.488
Noting that in South Africa, socio-economic rights are
“expressly included in the Bill of Rights,” Yacoob J argued that the
issue is not one of whether these rights are justiciable under the
country’s basic law (i.e., its Constitution), “but how to enforce them in
a given case.”489 The learned justice then noted that “[a]lthough the
judgment of the High Court in favor of the appellants was based on
the right to shelter (section 29(1)(c) of the Constitution), it is
appropriate to consider the provisions of section 26 first so as to
facilitate a contextual evaluation of section 29(1)(c).”490 Yacoob J then
proceeded to examine the obligations imposed on the state by § 26 and
discussed how to interpret this provision.491 Of particular note to
Grootboom and Others is that rights must “be interpreted and understood
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 20. The Certification
judgment refers to the judgment in Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional
Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, 1996 (4) SA 744; 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para. 78.
486
In Re Certification of the Constitution, supra note 485.
487
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 20.
488
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 20. See also In Re
Certification of the Constitution, supra note 485, para. 78.
489
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 20.
490
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 20.
491
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 20.
485
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in their social and historical context.”492 The right not to be
discriminated against, noted Yacoob J, “must be understood against
[South Africa’s] legacy of deep social inequality.”493
Yacoob J then cited to Soobramoney v. Minister of Health
(KwaZulu-Natal),494 where Chaskalson P described the context in which
the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted. In that case Chaskalson P held
as follows:
We live in a society in which there are great disparities
in wealth. Millions of people are living in deplorable
conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of
unemployment, inadequate social security, and many
do not have access to clean water or to adequate health
services. These conditions already existed when the
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to
address them, and to transform our society into one in
which there will be human dignity, freedom and
equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional
order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist
that aspiration will have a hollow ring.495
Once the issue of the context in which the Bill of Rights was
to be interpreted had been examined, the CC then moved on to
consider the role of international law in the interpretation of the
Constitution and noted that § 39 of the Constitution “obliges a court
to consider international law as a tool to interpretation of the Bill of
Rights.”496 Yacoob J then cited to Chaskalson P’s decision in
Makwanyane,497 where Chaskalson P held that “[i]nternational
agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a
framework within which Chapter Three can be evaluated and
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 25.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 25
494
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), [1997] ZACC 17;
1998 C1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) (BCLR) 1696 (Nov. 27, 1997).
495
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), supra note 494,
para. 8.
496
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 26.
497
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123.
492
493
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understood.” 498 The learned Chief Justice and President of the CC
noted that “[t]he relevant international law can be a guide to
interpretation but the weight to be attached to any particular principle
or rule of international law will vary,” however, “where the relevant
principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be directly
applicable.”499
Yacoob J then noted that “[t]he amici submitted that the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the
Covenant) is of significance in understanding the positive obligations
created by the socio-economic rights in the Constitution.” 500 Yacoob J
made reference to Article 11.1 of the Covenant, which provides as
follows:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of
this right, recognizing to this effect the essential
importance of international co-operation based on free
consent.501
This case, The Government of The Republic of South Africa, was
decided by the CC on October 4, 2000. At this time, South Africa had
signed but had not yet ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). The country finally

498
S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 123, para. 35. This case was decided under
the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993). In this Constitution, Chapter 3 is
“Fundamental Rights.”
499
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 26. Footnotes omitted.
500
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 27. Emphasis in original.
501
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
UNGA
Res.
2200A(XXI)
(Dec.
16,
1966),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx (Nov. 5, 2019),
art. 11(1).
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ratified the ICESCR on January 12, 2015.502 Article 11(1), Yacoob J
argued, must be read with Article 2(1), which provides that:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to take steps, individually and through international
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.503
The learned justice then proceeded to examine the “differences
between the relevant provisions of the Covenant and [South Africa’s]
Constitution” and noted that these differences are “significant in
determining the extent to which the provisions of the Covenant may
be a guide to an interpretation of section 26.”504 The differences, “in
so far as they relate to housing,” Yacoob J noted, are:
(a) The Covenant provides for a right to adequate housing
while section 26 provides for a right of access to adequate
housing.
(b) The Covenant obliges states parties to take
appropriate steps which must include legislation while the
Constitution obliges the South African state to take
reasonable legislative and other measures.505
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“CESCR”) is tasked with the job of monitoring the actions
undertaken by States Parties to ensure compliance with the ICESCR.
Yacoob J noted that the amici in this case had relied on “the relevant

502
United Nations Treaty Series, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural
Rights:
Status
of
Treaties,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en (Nov. 5, 2019).
503
ICESCR, supra note 501, art. 2(1).
504
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 28.
505
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 28.
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general comments issued by the [CESCR] concerning the
interpretation and application of the [ICESCR], and argued that these
general comments constitute a significant guide to the interpretation
of section 26.”506 The amici noted that in interpreting § 26 of the
Constitution, the court should pay particular attention to paragraph 10
of the CESCR’s General Comment No. 3, which states as follows:
On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the
Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it,
over a period of more than a decade of examining
States parties’ reports the Committee is of the view that
a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each
of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus,
for example, a State party in which any significant
number of individuals is deprived of essential
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic
shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of
education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were
to be read in such a way as not to establish such a
minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived
of its raison d’être. By the same token, it must be noted
that any assessment as to whether a State has
discharged its minimum core obligation must also take
account of resource constraints applying within the
country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each State
party to take the necessary steps “to the maximum of
its available resources”. In order for a State party to be
able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum
core obligations to a lack of available resources it must
demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to

506

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 29.
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satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum
obligations.507
Yacoob J then noted that “[i]t is clear from [the extract above]
that the [CESCR] considers that every [State Party] is bound to fulfil a
minimum core obligation by ensuring the satisfaction of a minimum
essential level of the socio-economic rights, including the right to
adequate housing.”508 Thus, argued the learned justice, “a state in
which a significant number of individuals is deprived of basic shelter
and housing is regarded as prima facie in breach of its obligations under
the Covenant.”509 Each State Party, hence, must “demonstrate that
every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal to
satisfy the minimum core of the right.”510 The CESCR’s General
Comment, however, does not define what it means by “minimum
core.”511
Noting that the “[m]inimum core obligation is determined
generally by having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable group
that is entitled to the protection of the right in question,” Yacoob J
then concluded that “[i]t is in this context that the concept of minimum
core obligation must be understood in international law.”512 With
respect to the determination of a minimum core in the context of “the
right to have access to adequate housing,”513 Yacoob J noted that the
Court “did not have sufficient information to determine what would
comprise the minimum core obligation in the context of [the South
African] Constitution.”514 It was not necessary, the learned justice
stated, for the Court to “decide whether it is appropriate for a court to
determine in the first instance the minimum core content of a right.” 515

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General
Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant),
Doc. E/199/23) (Dec. 14, 1990), para. 10.
508
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 30.
509
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 30. Emphasis in original.
510
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 30.
511
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 30.
512
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 31.
513
CONST. S. AFR., 1996, § 26(1).
514
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 33.
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Yacoob J then proceeded to “consider the meaning and scope
of section 26 in its context.” 516 The learned justice began the analysis
by noting that subsections (1) and (2) of § 26 “are related and must be
read together,”517 and that the right “delineated in section 26(1) is a
right of ‘access to adequate housing’ as distinct from the right to
adequate housing encapsulated in the Covenant.” 518 This, the learned
justice noted, is an important difference. In order for an individual to
fully exercise the right of access to adequate housing, Yacoob J noted,
land must be available, “appropriate services such as the provision of
water and the removal of sewage and the financing of all these,
including the building of the house itself.”519
Thus, argued the learned justice, in order for a person “to have
access to adequate housing, . . . there must be land, there must be
services, there must be a dwelling” and hence,
[a] right of access to adequate housing also suggests
that it is not only the state who is responsible for the
provision of houses, but that other agents within our
society, including individuals themselves, must be
enabled by legislative and other measures to provide
housing. The state must create the conditions for
access to adequate housing for people at all economic
levels of our society. State policy dealing with housing
must therefore take account of different economic
levels in our society.”520
Within South African society, for those individuals who are
financially able to purchase houses, argued Yacoob J, the “state’s
primary obligation lies in unlocking the system, providing access to
housing stock and a legislative framework to facilitate self-built houses
through planning laws and access to finance.”521 However, with respect
to the poor, that is, those who cannot afford or have the financial
516
517
518
519
520
521

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 34.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 34.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 35.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 35.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 35.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 36.
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resources to purchase houses, the state needs to pay special attention
to them.522 The learned justice went on to state that “[i]t is in this
context that the relationship between sections 26 and 27 and the other
socio-economic rights is most apparent.” 523 While § 26(2) “speaks to
the positive obligation imposed upon the state,”524 it makes clear that
“the obligation imposed upon the state is not an absolute or
unqualified one.”525 Three important or key elements define or qualify
the state’s obligation: “(a) the obligation to ‘take reasonable legislative
and other measures’; (b) ‘to achieve the progressive realization’ of the
right; and (c) ‘within available resources.’”526
Yacoob J makes note of the fact that South Africa’s is a federal
governmental system, consisting of federal/national, provincial and
local government spheres. As a consequence, “[a] reasonable
[legislative] program” designed “to achieve the progressive realization”
of an ESC right “must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to the
different spheres of government and ensure that the appropriate
financial and human resources are available.”527 Hence, the learned
justice continued, “a co-ordinated state housing program must be a
comprehensive one determined by all three spheres of government in
consultation with each other as contemplated by Chapter 3 of the
Constitution.”528 While each sphere of government “must accept
responsibility for the implementation of particular parts of the
program,” Yacoob J argues, however, that the national government
“must assume responsibility for ensuring that laws, policies, programs
and strategies are adequate to meet the state’s section 26
obligations.”529
Since the state is required by law “to take reasonable legislative
and other measures” to meet the “positive obligations imposed on it
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 36.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 37.
524
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 38.
525
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 38.
526
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 38.
527
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, paras. 38 and 39.
528
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 40. Chapter 3 of the
Constitution sets the modalities for cooperation between the various spheres of
government—national, provincial and local. See CONST. S. AFR., 1996, Chapter 3.
529
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 40.
522
523
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by section 26(2),” argues Yacoob J, “the question will be whether the
legislative and other measures taken by the state are reasonable.”530 In
addition to legislative measures, noted Yacoob J, the state must also
design and implement “well-directed policies,” which themselves must
be implemented reasonably.531 The learned justice then goes on to
argue that in order to determine if a program designed to realize the
state’s obligations under § 26(2) is reasonable, it is necessary “to
consider housing problems [in South Africa] in their social, economic
and historical context,” as well as “the capacity of institutions
responsible for implementing the program.”532 In addition, argues the
learned justice, “[a] program that excludes a significant segment of
society cannot be said to be reasonable” and most importantly,
“[r]easonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of
Rights as a whole. The right of access to adequate housing is
entrenched because we value human beings and want to ensure that
they are afforded their basic human needs.”533
Yacoob J argues that the obligation imposed on the state by §
26(2) involves the “progressive realization” of the right spelled out in
§ 26(1)—that is, “the right to have access to adequate housing.”534 Read
together, the two sections indicate that the “right could not be realized
immediately.”535 The phrase “progressive realization,” states Yacoob J,
“is taken from international law and Article 2.1 of the [International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] in particular.” 536

530

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, paras. 41 and 42. Emphasis in

original.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 342
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 43.
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Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 44.
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Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 45. See also CONST. S. AFR.,
1996, §§ 26(1) & 26(2).
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Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 45.
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Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 45. Article 2(1) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states as follows:
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical,
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full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” See International
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Yacoob J then goes on to argue that the CESCR has analyzed the
requirement of progressive realization of ESC rights and made the
following comment:
Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, or in
other words progressively, is foreseen under the
Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving
the obligation of all meaningful content. It is on the
one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the
realities of the real world and the difficulties involved
for any country in ensuring full realization of
economic, social and cultural rights. On the other
hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall
objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant
which is to establish clear obligations for States parties
in respect of the full realization of the rights in
question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that
goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive
measures in that regard would require the most careful
consideration and would need to be fully justified by
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in
the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the
maximum available resources.537
CESCR General Comment No. 3 was designed to explain and
elaborate States Parties’ obligations under the ICESCR. Nevertheless,
argues Yacoob J, the CESCR’s analysis
is also helpful in plumbing the meaning of ‘progressive
realization’ in the context of [the South African]
Constitution. The meaning ascribed to the phrase is in
harmony with the context in which the phrase is used
in [the South African] Constitution and there is no
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1996),
art. 2(1).
537
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General
Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant),
Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), para. 9.
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reason not to accept that it bears the same meaning in
the Constitution as in the document from which it was
so clearly derived.538
Yacoob J then next examines the phrase “within its available
resources”539 and concludes that the obligation on the South African
state contained in § 26(2) of the Constitution of South Africa “does
not require the state to do more than its available resources permit.” 540
This implies, argues Yacoob J, that “both the content of the obligation
in relation to the rate at which it is achieved as well as the
reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the result are
governed by the availability of resources.”541 This reasoning is in line
with the Constitutional Court’s decision in Soobramoney,542 where
Chaskalson P said that:
What is apparent from these provisions is that the
obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27
in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water
and social security are dependent upon the resources
available for such purposes, and that the
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason
of the lack of resources. Given this lack of resources
and the significant demands on them that have already
been referred to, an unqualified obligation to meet
these needs would not presently be capable of being
fulfilled.543
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the realization of
“the right to have access to adequate housing” points to “a balance
between goal and means.”544 As argued by Yacoob J, “[t]he measures
must be calculated to attain the goal expeditiously and effectively but
the availability of resources is an important factor in determining what
538
539
540
541
542
543
544

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 45.
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 26(2).
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 46.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 46.
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is reasonable.”545 The learned justice then went on to examine the
“fragmented housing arrangements”546 that the state inherited from the
apartheid regime in 1994, as well as the system as it existed at the time
that Grootboom and Others was decided, including the roles played by
each of the three governmental spheres.547
Yacoob J then made reference to the definition of “housing
development” and “housing development project” as provided in § 1
of the Housing Act.548 The Housing Act sets out, in § 2(1) “the general
principles binding on national, provincial and local spheres of
government.”549 In addition, the Housing Act also “sets out the
functions of the national, provincial and local government in relation
to housing.”550 Part of the task before the Constitutional Court in this
case was “to decide whether the nationwide housing program is
sufficiently flexible to respond to those in desperate need in our society
and to cater appropriately for immediate and short-term
requirements.”551
Yacoob J then returned to § 28(1)(c) of the Constitution and
noted that the High Court’s judgment amounted to:
(a) section 28(1)(c) obliges the state to provide
rudimentary shelter to children and their parents on
demand if parents are unable to shelter their children;
(b) this obligation exists independently of and in
addition to the obligation to take reasonable legislative
and other measures in terms of section 26; and (c) the
state is bound to provide this rudimentary shelter
irrespective of the availability of resources. On this
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 46.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 47. This case was decided
by the Constitutional Court on Oct. 4, 2000.
547
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, paras. 47–50.
548
Government of South Africa, NO. 107 OF 1997: HOUSING ACT, 1997,
https://www.gov.za/documents/housing-act (Nov. 6, 2019), § 1(vi–vii).
549
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 49. See also HOUSING ACT,
1997, § 2(1).
550
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 50. The functions of the
three governmental spheres are set out in §§ 3, 7 & 9.
551
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 55.
545
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reasoning, parents with their children have two distinct
rights: the right of access to adequate housing in terms
of section 26 as well as a right to claim shelter on
demand in terms of section 28(1)(c).552
The learned justice then noted that “[t]his reasoning produces
an anomalous result. People who have children have a direct and
enforceable right to housing under section 29(1)(c), while others who
have none or whose children are adult are not entitled to housing under
that section, no matter how old, disabled or otherwise deserving they
may be.”553
Most importantly, argues Yacoob J,
[t]he carefully constructed constitutional scheme for
progressive realization of socio-economic rights would
make little sense if it could be trumped in every case by
the rights of children to get shelter from the state on
demand. Moreover, there is an obvious danger.
Children could become stepping stones to housing
their parents instead of being valued for who they
are.554
Noting that there is “an evident overlap between the rights
created by sections 26 and 27 and those conferred on children by
section 28,” Yacoob J argues, however, that “[t]his overlap is not
consistent with the notion that section 28(1)(c) creates separate and
independent rights for children and their parents.” 555
Yacoob J returns to international law and states that “[t]he
extent of the state obligation must also be interpreted in the light of
the international obligations binding upon South Africa.”556 The
learned justice considered the UN Convention on the Rights of the

552
553
554
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Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 70.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 71.
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Child (“CRC”), which was ratified by South Africa in 1995.557 The CRC
imposes an obligation on States Parties to make certain that the rights
of children within their countries are respected and properly protected.
According to Article 2(1),
States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set
forth in the present Convention to each child within
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind,
irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal
guardian’s race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
property, disability, birth or other status.558
According to Yacoob J, § 28 of the South African Constitution
“is one of the mechanisms to meet these obligations” which are
binding on the state.559 This section obligates the state “to take steps
to ensure that children’s rights are observed” and the state does so
by ensuring that there are legal obligations to compel
parents to fulfil their responsibilities in relation to their
children. Hence, legislation and the common law
impose obligations upon parents to care for their
children. The state reinforces the observance of these
obligations by the use of the civil and criminal law as
well as social welfare programs.560
Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution of South Africa, argues
Yacoob J, “must be read in this context.”561 According to subsections
28(1)(b) and (c):
Every child has the right—

557
558
559
560
561

Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov. 20, 1999).
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 557, art. 2(1).
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(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate
alternative care when removed from the family
environment;
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services
and social services.562
Yacoob J states that these two subsections:
must be read together. They ensure that children are
properly cared for by their parents or families, and that
they receive appropriate alternative care in the absence
of parental or family care. The section encapsulates the
conception of the scope of care that children should
receive in our society. Subsection (1)(b) defines those
responsible for giving care while subsection (1)(c) lists
various aspects of the care entitlement.563
The state, for example, must provide needed shelter to children
who have been removed from their parents.564 Hence, argues Yacoob
J, § 28(1)(c) “does not create any primary state obligation to provide
shelter on demand to parents and their children if children are being
cared for by their parents or families.”565
Despite this conclusion, Yacoob J argues that “[t]his does not
mean, however, that the state incurs no obligation in relation to
children who are being cared for by their parents or families.” 566 First,
“the state must provide the legal and administrative infrastructure
necessary to ensure that children are accorded the protection
contemplated by section 28.”567 Second, “the state is required to fulfil
its obligations to provide families with access to land in terms of
section 25, access to adequate housing in terms of section 26 as well as

562
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access to health care, food, water and social security in terms of section
27.”568
The Constitutional Court’s judgment was that “sections 25 and
27 require the state to provide access on a programmatic and
coordinated basis, subject to available resources. One of the ways in
which the state would meet section 27 obligations would be through a
social welfare program providing maintenance grants and other
material assistance to families in need in defined circumstances.” 569
Nevertheless, noted Yacoob J, “[i]t was not contended that the
children who are respondents in this case should be provided with
shelter apart from their parents.” 570 The learned justice then went on
to state that “[a]ll levels of government must ensure that the housing
program is reasonably and appropriately implemented in the light of
all the provisions in the Constitution.”571 In addition, “[a]ll
implementation mechanisms, and all state action in relation to housing
falls to be assessed against the requirements of section 26 of the
Constitution. Every step at every level of government must be
consistent with the constitutional obligation to take reasonable
measures to provide adequate housing.”572
However, noted Yacoob J, § 26 must be “read in the context
of the Bill of Rights as a whole”573 and the evaluation of the
reasonableness of state action must consider the “inherent dignity of
human beings.”574 The learned justice then proceeded to allow the
appeal in part, set aside the order of the Cape of Good Hope High
Court and replace it with another, which included the following:

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 78. Section 25 defines, inter
alia, the rights to property and the conditions under which one may be deprived of
his or her property. Section 26 defines the right to have access to adequate housing,
and section 27 defines the right to have access to health care, food, water and social
security. See CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, §§ 25, 26 & 27.
569
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It is declared that:
(a)
Section 26(2) of the Constitution requires the
state to devise and implement within its available
resources a comprehensive and coordinated program
progressively to realize the right of access to adequate
housing.
(b)
The program must include reasonable
measures such as, but not necessarily limited to, those
contemplated in the Accelerated Managed Land
Settlement Program, to provide relief for people who
have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and
who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis
situations.
(c)
As at the date of the launch of this application,
the state housing program in the area of the Cape
Metropolitan Council fell short of compliance with the
requirements in paragraph (b), in that it failed to make
reasonable provision within its available resources for
people in the Cape Metropolitan area with no access to
land, no roof over their heads, and who were living in
intolerable conditions or crisis situations. 575
In reaching its decision in this case involving economic, social
and cultural rights (specifically, the right to have access to adequate
housing), the Constitutional Court utilized international law as a tool
of interpretation. First, Yacoob J cited to Soobramoney, a case decided
by the Constitution Court in 1997. In this case, Chaskalson P described
the context in which the Bill of Rights must be interpreted and made
note of what he believed lay at the heart of the country’s new
constitutional order—human dignity, freedom, and equality.576 Then
Yacoob J cited to another one of Chaskalson P’s decisions, that in
Makwanyane, where the Chief Justice and President of the
Constitutional Court, held that “[i]nternational agreements and

575
576

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 99.
Soobramoney, supra note 494, para. 8.
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customary international law accordingly provide a framework within
which Chapter Three can be evaluated and understood.” 577
Yacoob J then discussed differences between relevant
provisions of the ICESCR and the South African Constitution and
showed how provisions of the ICESCR could be used as a guide to the
interpretation of § 26 of the Constitution, especially as they relate to
the right to have access to adequate housing. Yacoob J also made
generous use of the general comments of the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, especially as they relate to the
obligations of each State Party to ensure the realization of the ESC
rights. After noting that the “[m]inimum core obligation [of each State
Party] is determined generally by having regard to the needs of the
most vulnerable group that is entitled to the protection of the right in
question,” Yacoob J then concluded that “[i]t is in this context that the
concept of minimum core obligation must be understood in
international law.”578
Yacoob J made specific use of the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (“CESCR”) General Comment
No. 3 to help interpret expressions, such as, “progressive realization”
and “within its available resources” in South Africa’s Bill of Rights.
After using the general comments of the CESCR to interpret various
terms and expressions in § 26, Yacoob J noted that “[t]he extent of the
state obligation must also be interpreted in the light of the international
obligations binding upon South Africa.”579 Yacoob J also made
reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”)
and noted that the CRC, which was ratified by South Africa in 1995,
imposes an obligation on South Africa to ensure that children’s rights
within the country are respected and properly and fully protected. 580
Thus, in making their decision in Grootboom and Others, the
577
Makwanyane, supra note 123, para. 35. Note that Makwanyane was decided
in 1995 and hence, was decided under the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993).
In this Constitution, Chapter 3 is “Fundamental Rights.” The Interim Constitution
was repealed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996),
which replaced “Fundamental Rights” with the “Bill of Rights” (Chapter 2).
578
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 31.
579
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 75.
580
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, para. 75.
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Constitutional Court made use of international law as an interpretive
tool.
C. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and
Others (Constitutional Court of South Africa)
This case was an appeal to the Constitutional Court (“CC”) in
which the appellants were praying for a reversal of “orders made in a
high court against government because of perceived shortcomings in
its response to an aspect of the HIV/AIDS challenge.”581 More
specifically, the High Court’s finding was that the “government had
acted unreasonably in (a) refusing to make an antiretrovial drug called
nevirapine available in the public health sector where the attending
doctor considered it medically indicated and (b) not setting out a
timeframe for a national program to prevent mother-to-child
transmission of HIV.”582
The original applicants in this case were several associations
and members of civil society who were concerned with the treatment
of HIV/AIDS and with the prevention of new infections. Of these,
the principal actor was the Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”). 583
As part of its response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the Government
of South Africa designed a program to specifically address “motherto-child transmission of HIV at birth and identified nevirapine as its
drug of choice for this purpose.”584 The government’s program,
however, imposed “restrictions on the availability of nevirapine in the
public health sector.”585 In the High Court case, the applicants
“contended that these restrictions are unreasonable when measured

Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and
Others (No. 2), [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (July 5,
2002), para. 2. The appellants were the South African Minister of Health and
Members of the Executive Council for Health of the Eastern Cape, Free State,
Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Northern Province, and
the North West.
582
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 2.
583
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 3. In
the appeals case to the Constitutional Court, these applicants were the respondents.
584
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 4.
585
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 4.
581
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against the Constitution, which commands the state and all its organs
to give effect to the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.” 586
At issue in this case are the rights guaranteed by §§ 27(1) and
28(1) of the Constitution, which are part of the Bill of Rights.
According to § 27(1–2), “[e]veryone has the right to have access to—
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; (2) The
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of
these rights.”587 Section 28(1) provides as follows: “Every child has the
right—(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and
social services.”588
The second issue in this case also arose out of the provisions
of §§ 27 & 28 and concerns whether the “government is
constitutionally obliged and had to be ordered forthwith to plan and
implement an effective, comprehensive and progressive program for
the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV throughout
the country.”589
As part of the background to the appeal, the Constitutional
Court (“CC”) noted that the “two principal issues” before the CC “had
been in contention between the applicants and the government for
some considerable time prior to the launching of the application before
the High Court.”590 In September 1999, when applicant, Treatment
Action Campaign (“TAC”), “pressed for acceleration of the
government program for the prevention of intrapartum mother-toTreatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 4. The
duty in question is provided for in §§ 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution. According to
§ 7(2), “[t]he state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of
Rights.” Section 8(1) provides as follows: “The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.” See CONST.
REP. S. AFRICA, §§ 7(2) & 8(1).
587
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 27(1–2).
588
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 28(1).
589
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 5.
590
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 10. The
applicants included the Treatment Action Campaign, Dr. Haroon Saloojee,
Children’s Rights Center, Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Community
Law Center. See Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 0.
586
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child transmission of HIV,” TAC and the other concerned parties were
“told by the Minister that this could not be done because there were
concerns about, among other things, the safety and efficacy of
nevirapine.”591
In August 2000, nearly a year after the Minister of Health’s
proclamation about “safety and efficacy of nevirapine,”592 and
“following the [thirteenth] International AIDS Conference in Durban
[South Africa] [as well as] a follow-up meeting attended by the Minister
and the MECs, the Minister announced that nevirapine would still not
be made generally available. Instead, each province was going to select
two sites for further research and the use of the drug would be
confined to such sites.”593 In a letter dated July 17, 2001 and written by
their attorney, the applicants:
placed on record that “[t]he Government has decided
to make NVP [nevirapine] available only at a limited
number of pilot sites, which number two per
province.”
The result is that doctors in the public sector, who do
not work at one of those pilot sites, are unable to
prescribe this drug for their patients, even though it has
been offered to the government for free.594
The applicants then asked the Minister to:
(a) provide us with legally valid reasons why you will
not make NVP available to patients in the public health
sector, except at the designated pilot sites, or
alternatively to undertake forthwith to make NVP
available in the public health sector.

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 10.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 10.
593
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 10. The
“MECs” are “the respective members of the executive councils (MECs) responsible
for health in all provinces.” See id.
594
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 11.
591
592
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(b) undertake to put in place a program which will
enable all medical practitioners in the public sector to
decide whether to prescribe NVP for their pregnant
patients, and to prescribe it where in their professional
opinion this is medically indicated.595
In a reply dated August 6, 2001, the Minister of Health “did
not deny the restrictions imposed on the government on the
availability of nevirapine” and indicated that there was no specific plan
to extend the availability of nevirapine.596 The CC noted that the
“meaning of the Minister’s letter is, however, quite unmistakable. It
details a series of governmental concerns regarding the safety and
efficacy of nevirapine requiring continuation of government’s research
program.”597
The CC noted that,
in January 2001 the World Health Organization [had]
recommended the administration of [nevirapine] to
mother and infant at the time of birth in order to
combat HIV and between November 2000 and April
2001[,] the Medicines Control Council settled the
wording of the package insert dealing with such use.
The insert was formally approved by the Council in
April 2001 and the parties treated that as the date of
approval of the drug for the prevention of mother-tochild transmission of HIV.598
The Minister, the CC noted further, “quite clearly intimated
that . . . [t]he decision was to confine the provision of nevirapine in the
public sector to the research sites and their outlets.”599
The CC noted, however, that “[t]he crux of the problem [was]:
what is to happen to those mothers and their babies who cannot afford
595
596
597
598
599

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 11.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 11.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 11.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 11
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 14.
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access to private health care and do not have access to the research
and training sites?”600 At the time the appeal came before the CC, there
was no clear indication on when the government would make the
medicine—nevirapine—available outside the research and training
sites.601 The CC went on to note that it was quite clear from the
materials presented to the Court by the government that nevirapine
was not likely to be made available at “any public health institution
other than one designated as part of a research site.”602
The two principal issues before the Constitutional Court were,
as stated in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the affidavit of the TAC:
20. The first issue is whether the Respondents are
entitled to refuse to make Nevirapine (a registered
drug) available to pregnant women who have HIV and
who give birth in the public health sector, in order to
prevent or reduce the risk of transmission of HIV to
their infants, where in the judgment of the attending
medical practitioner this is medically indicated.
21. The second issue is whether the Respondents are
obliged, as a matter of law, to implement and set out
clear timeframes for a national program to prevent
mother-to-child transmission of HIV, including
voluntary counselling and testing, antiretroviral
therapy, and the option of using formula milk for
feeding.603
The CC then moved on to provide an overview of the
enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa. The Court
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 17.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 17.
602
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 17.
603
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 18.
Note that in the appeals case before the Constitutional Court, the applicants, who
include the Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”), are the “respondents,” while the
“appellants” are the Minister of Health and the MECs. See id. at para. 0. Paragraph
22 of the respondents/applicants’ affidavit summarizes the applicants’ case. That
summary can be found in paragraph 19 of Treatment Action Campaign and Others,
supra note 581. See id.
600
601
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noted that it had had to “consider claims for enforcement of socioeconomic rights on two occasions” and that “[o]n both occasions it
was recognized that the state is under a constitutional duty to comply
with the positive obligations imposed on it by sections 26 and 27 of
the Constitution.”604 The Court, noted, however, that “the obligations
are subject to the qualifications expressed in sections 26(2) and
27(2).”605 With respect to the first opportunity that the CC had to rule
on a claim for the enforcement of socio-economic rights, in
Soobramoney “the claim was dismissed because the applicant failed to
establish that the state was in breach of its obligations under section
26 in so far as the provision of renal analysis to chronically ill patients
was concerned.”606
In Grootboom,607 the CC had a second opportunity to rule on a
claim for the socio-economic rights. In that case, the Court upheld the
claim “because the state’s housing policy in the area of the Cape
Metropolitan Council failed to make reasonable provision within
available resources for people in that area who had no access to land
and no roof over their heads and were living in intolerable
conditions.”608
With respect to Treatment Action Campaign and Others, the Court
noted that the question before it was not “whether socio-economic
rights are justiciable,” but “whether the applicants have shown that the
measures adopted by the government to provide access to health care
services for HIV-positive mothers and their newborn babies fall short
of its obligations under the Constitution.” 609 Before proceeding to
examine the applicants’ legal submissions, the Court considered “a line
of argument presented on behalf of the first and second amici,” which
“contended that section 27(1) of the Constitution establishes an
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 23.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 23.
606
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 23. See
also Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), [1997] ZACC 17; 1998 (1)
SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (Nov. 27, 1997).
607
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom
and Others, [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (Oct. 4, 2000).
608
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 23.
609
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 25.
604
605
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individual right vested in everyone.”610 It was further contended that the right
mentioned above has “a minimum core to which every person in need
is entitled.”611
The Court then noted that “the concept of ‘minimum core’
was developed by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights [“CESCR”] which is charged with monitoring the
obligations undertaken by [State Parties] to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”612 For example, the CESCR,
in its General Comment No. 3, which deals with the nature of States
Parties’ obligations, states that:
[o]n the basis of the extensive experience gained by the
Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it,
over a period of more than a decade of examining
States Parties’ reports the Committee is of the view that
a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each
of the rights is incumbent upon every State Party.613
According to the Court, “[s]upport for this contention was
sought in the language of the Constitution and attention was drawn to
the differences between sections 9(2), 24(b), 25(5) and 25(8) on the
one hand, and sections 26 and 27 on the other.”614 After examining the
differences between the two sets of constitutional provisions, the
Court stated that, although the minimum core in these provisions may
be difficult to define, it, nevertheless, “includes at least the minimum
decencies of life consistent with human dignity.”615 In addition, argued
the Court, “[n]o one should be condemned to a life below the basic
level of dignified human existence. The very notion of individual rights
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 26.
Emphasis added.
611
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 26.
612
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 26.
613
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General
Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the ICESCR),
Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), para. 10.
614
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 27.
Footnotes omitted.
615
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 28.
610
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presupposes that anyone in that position should be able to obtain relief
from a court.”616
The main issue in this case comes down to how South African
courts have interpreted “subsections (1) and (2) of both section 26 and
27” and how these subsections are “linked in the text of the
Constitution.”617 The Court noted that the issue of interpretation has
been resolved by the Court in Soobramoney618 and Grootboom.619 In
Soobramoney, Chaskalson P declared as follows:
What is apparent from these provisions is that the
obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27
in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water
and social security are dependent upon the resources
available for such purposes, and that the corresponding
rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources. 620
The Court in the present case—Treatment Action Campaign and
Others—then noted that the obligations referred to in the above
paragraph from Soobramoney, “are clearly the obligations referred to in
sections 26(2) and 27(2) and the corresponding rights referred to in
sections 26(1) and 27(1).”621 In Grootboom, the Court made clear that §§
26(1) and 26(2) “are closely related and must be read together.” 622
Yacoob J, writing for the Court in Grootboom, said:
The section has been carefully crafted. It contains three
subsections. The first confers a general right of access
to adequate housing. The second establishes and
delimits the scope of the positive obligation imposed
upon the state to promote access to adequate housing
and has three key elements.623

616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 28.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 29.
Soobramoney, supra note 494.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444.
Soobramoney, supra note 494, at para. 11.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 31.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 34.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 21.
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The Grootboom Court also declared that “[s]ection 26 does not
expect more of the State than is achievable within its available
resources.”624 In addition, § 26 does not confer on any individual an
entitlement to “claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand.” 625
“[A]s far as the rights of access to housing, health care, sufficient food
and water, and social security for those unable to support themselves
and their dependents are concerned,”626 the South African “State is not
obliged to go beyond available resources or to realize these rights
immediately.”627
In Grootboom, Yacoob J also made use of provisions of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”) and held that in terms of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, the question that the Court needed to address was
“whether the measures taken by the State to realize the right afforded
by [section] 26 are reasonable.”628 The Court in the present case—
Treatment Action Campaign and Others—then noted that:
[a]lthough Yacoob J indicated that evidence in a
particular case may show that there is a minimum core
of a particular service that should be taken into account
in determining whether measures adopted by the state
are reasonable, the socio-economic rights of the
Constitution should not be construed as entitling
everyone to demand that the minimum core be
provided to them. Minimum core was thus treated as
possibly being relevant to reasonableness under section
26(2), and not as a self-standing right conferred on
everyone under section 26(1).629
The Treatment Action Campaign and Others Court then went on to
state that “[i]t is impossible to give everyone access even to a ‘core’
service immediately. All that is possible, and all that can be expected
624
625
626
627
628
629

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 46.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 95.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 32.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 94.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 33.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 34.
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of the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socioeconomic rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive
basis.”630 The Court then concluded that:
. . . section 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise
to a self-standing and independent positive right
enforceable irrespective of the considerations
mentioned in section 27(2). Sections 27(1) and 27(2)
must be read together as defining the scope of the
positive rights that everyone has and the
corresponding obligations on the state to “respect,
protect, promote and fulfil” such rights. The rights
conferred by sections 26(1) and 27(1) are to have
“access” to the services that the state is obliged to
provide in terms of sections 26(2) and 27(2).631
Next, the Court provided an overview of government policy
on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.632 In doing
so, the Court noted that after the Thirteenth International Conference
on HIV/AIDS that was held in Durban (South Africa) in July 2000,
the government “took a decision to implement a program for the
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS.”633 This
new program, the Court noted, “entailed the provision of voluntary
HIV counseling and testing to pregnant women, the provision of
nevirapine and the offer of formula feed to HIV-positive mothers who
chose this option of feeding.”634 Nevertheless, the implementation of
this program was “to be confined to selected sites in each province for
a period of two years” and used “primarily to evaluate the use of
nevirapine, monitoring and evaluating its impact on the health status
of the children affected as well as the feasibility of such an intervention
on a countrywide basis.”635 It was stipulated that information gathered
from these clinical trials would be used to develop a “national policy

630
631
632
633
634
635

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 35.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 39.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at paras. 40–43.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 41.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 41.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 41.
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for the extension of this program to other public facilities outside the
pilot sites.”636
The Court then proceeded to review the applicants’ case,
which centered on their belief that:
the measures adopted by the government to provide
access to health care services to HIV-positive pregnant
women were deficient in two material respects: first,
because they prohibited the administration of
nevirapine at public hospitals and clinics outside the
research and training sites; and second, because they
failed to implement a comprehensive program for the
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.637
In examining the applicants’ case, the Court noted that “[i]n
deciding on the policy to confine nevirapine to the research and
training sites, the cost of the drug itself was not a factor.” 638 This, the
Court argued, was made clear in an affidavit presented to the Court by
Dr. Ntsaluba. According to Dr. Ntsaluba:
I admit that the medicine has been offered to the first
to ninth respondents for free for a period of five years
by the manufacturer. The driving cost for the provision
of Nevirapine however is not the price to be attached
to the medicine but the provision of the formula
feeding for those persons who are not in a position to
afford formula feeds in order to discourage breast
feeding and other costs incurred to provide operational
structures which are appropriately and properly geared
toward counselling and testing persons who are
candidates for the administration of Nevirapine.639

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 41.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 44.
638
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 48.
639
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 48.
Note the “first to ninth respondents” are the Minister of Health and the eight MECs.
636
637
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In addition, Dr. Ntsaluba also stated that:
[t]he public health sector hospitals, as it is, are under
tremendous pressure, and while it may be ideal for such
doctors to go on to provide Nevirapine with the
appropriate advice, counselling and follow-up care, is
presently not immediately attainable. It is imperative
that appropriate support structures for counselling,
follow-up etc. be put in place to ensure that Nevirapine
is effective and that it delivers the promised benefits. 640
With respect to the government’s program on the provision of
health care services to HIV-positive mothers, the Court concluded that
“[t]he costs that are of concern to the government are therefore the
costs of providing the infrastructure for counseling and testing, of
providing formula feed, vitamins and an antibiotic drug and of
monitoring, during bottle-feeding, the mothers and children who have
received nevirapine.”641
Nevertheless, stated the Court, “[t]hese costs are relevant to
the comprehensive program to be established at the research and
training sites. They are not, however, relevant to the provision of a
single dose of nevirapine to both mother and child at the time of
birth.”642 The Court noted that the government had given four reasons
for restricting the “administration of nevirapine to the research and
training sites.”643 First, the government complained about the “efficacy
of nevirapine where the ‘comprehensive package’ is not available.” 644
Second, “there was a concern that the administration of nevirapine to
the mother and her child might lead to the development of resistance
to the efficacy of nevirapine and related antiretrovirals in later years.”645
Third, nevirapine is considered “a potent drug and it is not known

640
641
642
643
644
645

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 48.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 49.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 50.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 51.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 51.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 51.
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what hazards may attach to its use.”646 Finally, there was the issue of
resource scarcity. The Court noted that:
[i]t was contended on behalf of government that
nevirapine should be administered only with the ‘full
package’ and that it was not reasonably possible to do
this on a comprehensive basis because of the lack of
trained counsellors and counselling facilities and also
budgetary constraints which precluded such a
comprehensive scheme being implemented.647
The Court then proceeded to examine the issues raised by the
government regarding the use of nevirapine. After examining the issue
of nevirapine’s efficacy, the Court held that “the wealth of scientific
material produced by both sides makes plain that sero-conversion of
HIV takes place in some, but not all, cases and that nevirapine thus
remains to some extent efficacious in combating mother-to-child
transmission even if the mother breastfeeds her baby.”648 With respect
to resistance, the Court noted that “[a]lthough resistant strains of HIV
might exist after a single dose of nevirapine, this situation is likely to
be transient.”649
Regarding the safety of nevirapine, the Court noted
that
[t]he only evidence of potential harm concerns risks
attaching to the administration of nevirapine as a
chronic medication on an ongoing basis for the
treatment of HIV-positive persons. There is, however,
no evidence to suggest that a dose of nevirapine to
both mother and child at the time of birth will result in
any harm to either of them.650
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647
648
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Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 51.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 54.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 58.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 59.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 60.
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The Court then noted that the World Health Organization has
recommended the use of nevirapine, without qualification, for the
treatment of HIV-positive persons651 and the South African Medicines
Control Council “registered nevirapine in 1998 (affirming its quality,
safety and efficacy) and later expressly approved its administration to
mother and infant at the time of birth in order to combat HIV.”652
With respect to capacity, the Court noted that:
[a]lthough the concerns raised by Dr. Simelela are
relevant to the ability of government to make a ‘full
package’ available throughout the public health sector,
they are not relevant to the question whether
nevirapine should be used to reduce mother-to-child
transmission of HIV at those public hospitals and
clinics outside the research sites where facilities in fact
exist for testing and counselling.653
The Court then noted that:
[t]he policy of confining nevirapine to research and
training sites fails to address the needs of mothers and
their newborn children who do not have access to the
sites. It fails to distinguish between the evaluation of
programs for reducing mother-to-child transmission
and the need to provide access to health care services
required by those who do not have access to the
sites.654
Next, the Court made reference to its decision in Grootboom
regarding what it means for government policy or action to be
reasonable. There, the Court held as follows:
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of
account the degree and extent of the denial of the right
651
652
653
654

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 60.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 61.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 66.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 67.
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they endeavor to realize. Those whose needs are the
most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights
therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the
measures aimed at achieving realization of the right.655
The Court acknowledged that the research carried out at the
government-designated research and training sites can inform public
policy and enhance the ability of the government to develop and
implement more effective programs to deal with mother-to-child
transmission of HIV-AIDS. Nevertheless, the Court also noted that:
[t]his does not mean, however, that until the best
program has been formulated and the necessary funds
and infrastructure provided for the implementation of
that program, nevirapine must be withheld from
mothers and children who do not have access to the
research and training sites. Nor can it reasonably be
withheld until medical research has been completed. 656
The Court concluded by making reference to Yacoob J’s
decision in Grootboom, where the learned justice stated that a program
to realize socio-economic rights must “be balanced and flexible and
make appropriate provision for attention to . . . crises and to short,
medium, and long-term needs. A program that excludes a significant
segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable.”657
The Court also noted that in deciding this case, it was also
important to consider the rights of children, specifically, new-born
children. According to § 28(1)(b) and (c) of the South African
Constitution,
[e]very child has the right—
(a) . . .

655
656
657

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 68.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 68.
Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 43.
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(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate
alternative care when
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services
and social services.658
The Court then noted that the applicants, as well as, the amici
curiae, “relied on these [constitutional] provisions to support the order
made by the High Court.”659 The Court then proceeded to cite to
Yacoob J’s holding in Grootboom, where the learned justice held that
subsections (b) and (c) of § 28 (1) “must be read together.”660 Yacoob
J then went on to note that § 28(1)(b) and § 28(1)(c):
ensure that children are properly cared for by their
parents or families, and that they receive appropriate
alternative care in the absence of parental or family
care. The section encapsulates the conception of the
scope of care that children should receive in our
society. Subsection (1)(b) defines those responsible for
giving care while subsection (1)(c) lists various aspects
of the care entitlement.
It follows from subsection 1(b) that the Constitution
contemplates that a child has the right to parental or
family care in the first place, and the right to alternative
appropriate care only where that is lacking.661
Relying on these passages from the Grootboom judgment, the
counsel for the government had argued before the Court that § 28(1)(c)
imposes “an obligation on the parents of the newborn child, and not
the state, to provide the child with the required basic health care
services.”662 The Court noted, however, that while the primary
responsibility for providing basic health care services to children “rests
on those parents who can afford to pay for such services, it was made
658
659
660
661
662

CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 28(1)(b) & (c).
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 74.
Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 75.
Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 75.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 76.
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clear in Grootboom that ‘[t]his does not mean . . . that the State incurs
no obligation in relation to children who are being cared for by their
parents or families.’”663
The Court then examined the jurisprudence of foreign
jurisdictions, notably, the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Federal
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, the House of
Lords (UK), and the Supreme Court of India, on the question of
remedies and noted that “courts in other countries also accept that it
may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances of the particular
case, to issue injunctive relief against the state.”664
The Court then set aside the orders made by the High Court
and replaced them with others, which included the following:
We accordingly make the following orders:
1. The orders made by the High Court are set aside and
the following orders are substituted.
2. It is declared that:
a) Sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require
the government to devise and implement within its
available resources a comprehensive and
coordinated program to realize progressively the
rights of pregnant women and their newborn
children to have access to health services to
combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV.
b) The program to be realized progressively within
available resources must include reasonable
measures for counselling and testing pregnant
women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive
pregnant women on the options open to them to
reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 77. See
also Grootboom, supra note 444, at para. 78.
664
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 107.
663
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HIV, and making appropriate treatment available
to them for such purposes.
c) The policy for reducing the risk of mother-tochild transmission of HIV as formulated and
implemented by government fell short of
compliance
with
the
requirements
in
subparagraphs (a) and (b) in that:
i) Doctors at public hospitals and clinics other than
the research and training sites were not enabled to
prescribe nevirapine to reduce the risk of motherto-child transmission of HIV even where it was
medically indicated and adequate facilities existed
for the testing and counselling of the pregnant
women concerned.
ii) The policy failed to make provision for
counsellors at hospitals and clinics other than at
research and training sites to be trained in
counselling for the use of nevirapine as a means of
reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission
of HIV.
3. Government is ordered without delay to:
a) Remove the restrictions that prevent nevirapine
from being made available for the purpose of
reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission
of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that are not
research and training sites.
b) Permit and facilitate the use of nevirapine for
the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child
transmission of HIV and to make it available for
this purpose at hospitals and clinics when in the
judgment of the attending medical practitioner
acting in consultation with the medical
superintendent of the facility concerned this is
medically indicated, which shall if necessary
710
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include that the mother concerned has been
appropriately tested and counselled.
c) Make provision if necessary for counsellors
based at public hospitals and clinics other than the
research and training sites to be trained for the
counselling necessary for the use of nevirapine to
reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of
HIV.
d) Take reasonable measures to extend the testing
and counselling facilities at hospitals and clinics
throughout the public health sector to facilitate and
expedite the use of nevirapine for the purpose of
reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission
of HIV.
4. The orders made in paragraph 3 do not preclude
government from adapting its policy in a manner
consistent with the Constitution if equally appropriate
or better methods become available to it for the
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.
5. The government must pay the applicants’ costs,
including the costs of two counsel.
6. The application by government to adduce further
evidence is refused.665
As was the case with its decision in Grootboom, the
Constitutional Court utilized international law as a tool of
interpretation. Specifically, the Court made reference to Soobramoney
and Grootboom, cases in which the Constitutional Court had used
international law to interpret various sections of the Constitution
dealing with socio-economic rights, particularly §§ 26 and 27. The
Court made specific reference to the General Comments of the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”),
which is empowered and charged with “monitoring the obligations
665

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 135.
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undertaken by States Parties to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”666 The Court looked
specifically to the CESCR’s General Comment No. 3 in its efforts to
deal with the issue of “minimum core.”667 Hence, in making their
judgment in Treatment Action Campaign and Others, the justices of the
Constitutional Court made use of international law as an interpretive
tool.
IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948, the international environment for the
recognition and protection of human rights has improved significantly.
The international community has adopted several treaties, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
which impose obligations on each State Party to undertake:
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in [the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights], without distinction of any kind, such
as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.668

Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, at para. 26.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General
Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the ICESCR),
Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
668
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Res. 2200A(XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
(Nov. 13, 2019).
666
667
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In addition, international organizations, 669 regional
organizations,670 and national governments671 have adopted various
“procedures for protecting against and providing remedies for human
rights abuses.”672
Human rights are considered “a domain of international
law.” Since treaties674 and custom are the most important sources of
international law, any study of international human rights must
invariably involve an examination and understanding of treaties and
their relationship to each country’s domestic laws.675 By far, one of the
most important treaties of the modern era is the United Nations
Charter, which established the United Nations. 676 Since 1945, the
international community has concluded, adopted, and ratified other
treaties, particularly those dealing with human rights.677 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, together with the International
673

For example, the United Nations, which has adopted such international
human rights instruments as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
670
For example, the Organization of African Unity/African Union, which
has adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
671
For example, since the early-1990s, many African countries have adopted
new constitutions or amended their existing constitutions to include a Bill of
Rights—the latter includes constitutional recognition of and protections for human
rights. See, e.g., Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (No. 108 of
1996)—G17678, at Chapter 2.
672
DAVID WEISSBRODT AND CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2007).
673
WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 672, at 4.
674
See WEISSBRODT, supra note 672, at 4.
675
WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 672, at 4.
676
See Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (Oct. 24, 1945).
677
In addition to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the international
community has also adopted and ratified other international human rights
instruments, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
Convention on the Rights of the Child; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are collectively referred to as
the International Bill of Human Rights.678
Unfortunately, the international community does not have a
government that has the capacity to enforce international human
rights, that is, those guaranteed by the various international human
rights instruments.679 International legal scholars have argued that
national governments, that is the governments of States Parties to each
international human rights instrument, can function as an effective
mechanism for enforcing international human rights law. David
Weissbrodt states that “[t]he most effective mechanism for enforcing
international law is for each ratifying government to incorporate its
treaties and customary obligations into national laws.”680
For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010,
provides that “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form
part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.” 681 Earlier, this article
examined the two approaches to the determination of how effect is
given to international law instruments in each country. These are the
monist and dualist approaches.682 In countries, which follow the
monist approach, international law and domestic law comprise one
single legal order within the country’s legal system, but international
law overrides any contrary domestic law.683 In a monist country, once
an international treaty has been signed and ratified, it is no longer
necessary for national legislators to domesticate the treaty and create
rights that are justiciable in domestic courts.684

CHRISTOPHER N. J. ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS ix (2015).
679
For example, the economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed by the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
680
WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 672, at 4.
681
CONST. REP. KENYA, 2010, art. 2(6).
682
See, e.g., WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 672, at 4. See also John
Mukum Mbaku, International Law and Limits on the Sovereignty of African States, 30 FLA J.
INT’L L. 43, 69 (2018).
683
Mbaku, supra note 682, at 69.
684
Mbaku, supra note 682, at 69.
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In countries that follow the dualist approach, the legislature
must domesticate provisions of international law in order to create
rights that are justiciable in domestic courts. In dualist countries,
international law and domestic law are considered separate and
independent legal systems and for international law to create rights that
are justiciable in domestic courts, national authorities must explicitly
use legislation to incorporate the provisions of international law
instruments into domestic law.685 It is important to note that
international jurists and other international law experts consider
international norms “that have attained the status of international
customary law . . . to be part of municipal law under both the monist
and dualist theories, and therefore prevail over national law even in
domestic courts.”686
This article noted that “[a] State can, through its constitution,
put to rest any doubts as to whether international law, including
customary international law, is law within its jurisdiction.” 687 South
Africa’s post-apartheid constitution, for example, directly addresses
the applicability of both international law and customary international
law in the country’s domestic courts.688 Throughout the continent,
however, some countries have been able to overcome the constraints
that “nonincorporation [of treaties] would normally impose through
their use of international human rights instruments as persuasive
authority in national court decisions.” 689
Courts in some African countries, such as Ghana, which has
not explicitly made allowance in its constitution for the use of
international law as some form of authority, have overcome the
constraints imposed on them by adopting the “transjudicial model.” 690
As explained by Adjami, “[t]he transjudicial model accounts for the
actual use of international law and comparative case law in domestic
courts, regardless of the binding or nonbinding status of their
685
See, e.g., John Laws, Monism and Dualism, 2 LA REVUE ADMINISTRATIVE
18 (2000) (examining, inter alia, monism and dualism in administrative law).
686
Adjami, supra note 28, at 109.
687
Mbaku, supra note 682, at 73.
688
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, 1996, §§ 232–233.
689
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112.
690
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112.
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sources.”691 International law scholars have argued that
transjudicialism has significantly improved dialogue across the world’s
judicial system, as well as judicial comity.692 This article then examined
cases from several countries to determine the extent to which domestic
courts have utilized international law and comparative law sources in
their decisions generally and interpretation of national constitutions in
particular. Specifically, the present article examined cases from Ghana,
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania. Through this
process, it was determined that courts in many African countries are
increasingly utilizing international law and comparative law as
instruments to help them interpret their national constitutions,
including their Bills of Rights. As declared by Archer CJ in New Patriotic
Party v. Inspector-General of Police (Ghana), “I do not think that the fact
that Ghana has not passed specific legislation to give effect to [the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights], [means that] the
Charter cannot be relied upon.”693
This article further makes reference to case law from South
Africa to demonstrate how judges have been able to find creative ways
to use international human rights instruments to interpret the Bill of
Rights and significantly enhance the recognition and protection of
human rights. In this section, emphasis is placed on economic, social
and cultural rights, which are contained in both the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and South Africa’s
Bill of Rights.694 First, the present article provided a general overview
of economic, social and cultural (“ESC”) rights in the context of South
African political economy, as well as the country’s 1993695 and 1996696
constitutions. Second, the article distinguished between ESC rights
that are not subject to internal constitutional qualifications, or priority

Adjami, supra note 28, at 112–113.
Adjami, supra note 28, at 112.
693
Quoted in Christian N. Okeke, The Use of International Law in the Domestic
Courts of Ghana and Nigeria, 32 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 411–412 (2015).
694
South Africa’s Bill of Rights are found in Chapter 2 of the country’s postapartheid Constitution.
695
The 1993 Constitution is generally referred to as the Interim Constitution
or the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 2000 of 1993.
696
The 1996 Constitution is South Africa’s permanent post-apartheid
Constitution or Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996.
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rights, and those that are subject to internal qualifications, which are
referred to as internally qualified rights. In doing so, this article identified
those constitutional provisions that contain priority rights and those
that contain internally qualified rights. Third, this article examined
various South African cases to see how the courts interpret various
provisions of the Bill of Rights dealing with ESC rights. For example,
Van Biljon and Others v. Minister of Correctional Services and Others 697
provided an interpretation for § 35(2)(e) of the Constitution as it relates
to the expression “adequate medical treatment.”698
Fourth, after examining the various constitutional provisions
that guarantee priority rights, the article then moved on to examine those
constitutional provisions that guarantee internally qualified rights. Specific
attention was paid to §§ 26, 27 and 29. Again, reference was made to
several cases in which South African courts have interpreted these
provisions. Finally, the article looked at other ESC rights in South
Africa’s Constitution, which do not fit easily into the classifications
“priority rights” and “internally qualified rights.”699
The final part of the article was devoted to an in depth
examination of two important South African cases, which were
decided by the country’s Constitutional Court (“CC”) to show the
extent to which international law is serving as an interpretive aid or
tool in the CC’s evolving jurisprudence, especially as it concerns ESC
rights. The cases examined were the Government of the Republic of South
Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others,700 and the Minister of Health and
Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others.701 In Grootboom and Others,
the appellants—the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the
Premier of the Province of the Western Cape, the Cape Metropolitan
Council, and Oostenberg Municipality—had been ordered by the High
Court to provide the respondents (Irene Grootboom and others and
their children) with adequate temporary shelter while they waited to

697
698
699

Van Biljon and Others, supra note 366.
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, § 35(2)(e).
For example, rights related to labor relations. See CONST. REP. S. AFRICA,

§ 23.
700
701

Grootboom and Others, supra note 444.
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581.

717

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

acquire permanent housing. The appellants had subsequently appealed
the High Court’s order to the Constitutional Court.
In adjudicating the appeal, Yacoob J, writing for the Court,
noted that extensive use was made of international law, noting that
“[d]uring argument, considerable weight was attached to the value of
international law” as an interpretive tool or aid in the interpretation of
the Bill of Rights.702 The learned justice also noted that “where the
relevant principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be
directly applicable.”703 Yacoob J also held that “[t]he differences
between the relevant provisions of the [International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)] and [the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa] are significant in
determining the extent to which the provisions of the [ICESCR] may
be a guide to an interpretation of section 26.”704
The Grootboom Court also considered the views of the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”).
Referring specifically to the CESCR’s General Comment No. 3,
Yacoob J noted that it is clear from examining paragraph 10 of General
Comment No. 3 that the CESCR “considers that every state party is
bound to fulfil a minimum core obligation by ensuring the satisfaction
of a minimum essential level of the socio-economic rights, including
the right to adequate housing.”705 The learned justice noted, however,
that determining the “minimum threshold for the progressive
realization of the right of access to adequate housing”706 must be undertaken
through a process that takes “context” into consideration. 707
A similar approach was adopted in the second case that was
examined in the present article, Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment
Action Campaign and Others.708 This, too, was an appeal in which the
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 26.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 26.
704
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 27.
705
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 30.
706
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 32.
707
That context includes specifically such factors as “income,
unemployment, availability of land and poverty.” Grootboom and Others, supra note
444, at para. 32.
708
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appellants prayed for the reversal or dismissal of “orders made in a
high court against government because of perceived shortcomings in
its response to an aspect of the HIV/AIDS challenge.”709 The Court
noted that in Grootboom, Yacoob J had made use of the ICESCR and
had held that in terms of South Africa’s Bill of Rights, the issue that
needed to be addressed was “whether the measures taken by the State
to realize the right” in question “are reasonable.”710 The CC in
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, noted Magaisa, “placed the issues
within the international context by referring the country’s obligations
in terms of the International Covenant on Economic[,] Social and
Cultural Rights.”711 Magaisa also noted that “[i]n two previous cases
the CC had tackled the same issue, so this case extends the positive
and active stance that the court seems to have taken in relation to
matters affecting socio-economic rights” and that “[i]n light of [the
CC’s] previous decisions, the justiciability of socio-economic rights is
already a settled point and this case only served to cement that
position.”712 In its decisions in both cases, the CC also noted support
from jurisprudence from the courts of other jurisdictions, including,
for example, Canada, 713 Germany,714 India,715 the UK,716 and the United
States.717
Scholars who support the use of international law as an
interpretive tool argue that “imposing a general obligation on all judges
to consider international law will increase the frequency with which
international law will influence judicial reasoning since lawyers will
increasingly treat international law as a legitimate and reliable resource
which operates independently of the judicial personality.”718 South
Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 581, para. 2.
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at para. 33.
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Alex Tawanda Magaisa, Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action
Campaign and Others (2002), 47 J. AFR. L. 117, 119 (2003).
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Africa’s post-apartheid constitution—the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996—imposes an obligation on courts to consider
international law when they interpret the Bill of Rights. According to
§ 39, “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum—(b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign
law.”719 In addition, the Constitution states that “[c]ustomary
international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.” 720 Finally, the Constitution
provides that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is
inconsistent with international law.”721
South Africa’s post-apartheid legal order is governed by “clear
and robust rules which [have] replaced [the country’s] common law
system.”722 Within this new post-apartheid legal system, the
applicability of international law is governed by constitutional
provisions. Nevertheless, it is noted that South African judges do not
always make use of international law in their decisions and that
“ideology and judicial personality obstruct the full realization of
international law in South African constitutional adjudication.” 723
These criticisms aside, it is important to recognize the fact that South
Africa’s post-apartheid legal system is young and still in its embryonic
stages. As argued by Hudson, “[i]t may be that time is one of the most
significant alternate variables; maybe it simply takes more time than
has passed in South Africa for lawyers and judges to become fully
immersed in international legal culture.”724 Hudson argues further that
“[r]espect for authority is cultivated through repeated engagement with
institutional rules and roles; actors come to identify themselves as

719
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, 1996, art. 39(1)(b–c). Emphasis on (b) and (c) in
original. Emphasis on “must” and “may” added.
720
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, 1996, art. 232.
721
CONST. REP. S. AFRICA, 1996, art. 233.
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Hudson, supra note 718, at 352.
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members of a social institution and feel obligated to discharge their
obligations as members.”725
With respect to the recognition, respect and protection of
human rights, the ideal situation is for each African country to
incorporate the provisions of international human rights instruments
into their national constitutions and thus, create rights that are
justiciable in domestic courts. This process, of course, will take some
time. In the meantime, as noted by the International Commission of
Jurists, in countries where “international treaties do not apply until
domestic legislation reproduces or refers to the content of a treaty,”
judges in such countries “have developed more creative ways of
making use of international standards.” 726 The International
Commission of Jurists then went on to mention that South Africa,
which at the time had not yet ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and hence, was not a State Party
to the Covenant, actually “used CESCR’s General Comments to
interpret the ESC rights enshrined in the South African
Constitution.”727
The policy imperative in African countries that have not done
so is for each of them to engage in robust constitutional reforms to
provide themselves with national constitutions undergirded by the
separation of powers with checks and balances. Among the checks and
balances must be a truly and fully independent judiciary, armed with
the necessary capacity to function effectively as a check on the exercise
of government power. The functions of such an independent judiciary
must include the interpretation of the national constitution. In
addition, each country should domesticate international human rights
instruments and create rights that are justiciable in domestic courts.
Where the incorporation of international law into the national
constitution has not yet taken place, judges can use their powers to
interpret the constitution to bring local laws, including customs and
traditions, into compliance or conformity with the provisions of
international human rights instruments. Thus, in the absence of the
Hudson, supra note 718, at 353.
International Commission of Jurists, supra note 235, at 19.
727
International Commission of Jurists, supra note 235, at 19. See also
Grootboom and Others, supra note 444, at paras. 29, 30, 31, and 45.
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domestication of international human rights law through positive
legislative acts, courts can minimize the abuse of human rights by using
international law as an interpretive tool in their legal adjudications. The
ultimate goal, however, remains the domestication of international
human rights instruments to create rights that are justiciable in
domestic courts.
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